Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET. Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET.

Toplines Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to militarize Russian society and to shift the responsibility for the war in Ukraine onto the Russian State Duma deputies and the Russian population.

Key Takeaways

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to militarize Russian society and to shift the responsibility for the war in Ukraine onto the Russian State Duma deputies and the Russian population.
2. Putin continues efforts to persuade personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and continue fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
3. Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms.
4. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian export and oil infrastructure from July 26 to 27.
5. Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 26 to 27.
6. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 27.

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Putin Efforts to Militarize Russian Society and Shift War Responsibility

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to militarize Russian society and shift responsibility for the war in Ukraine to the Russian population and State Duma deputies. During a speech on July 26 for Russia’s Navy Day, Putin heavily emphasized the importance of national unity around the war effort. He claimed that Russia must “imbue the consciousness” of its civil society with the importance of the conflict, maintaining this unity even after the war ends. Putin asserted that nothing is more important currently than the forces fighting in Ukraine and claimed that Russian volunteers are eager to help, portraying the population as willing to bear sacrifices for victory.

On July 27, Putin met with Russia State Duma deputies, highlighting the government's unity. He noted that the Duma has passed nearly 3,000 bills since 2021, with two-thirds passing with support from all factions to support the military, defense industry, and domestic economy. Putin specifically mentioned that deputies passed laws to integrate illegally occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts into Russia. These actions are likely intended to deflect personal responsibility for the costly war and to portray broad support ahead of the Duma elections in September 2026.

Recruitment of Mobilized Personnel

Putin continues to urge personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the Russian MoD. During Navy Day celebrations on July 26, Putin had a likely scripted encounter with a mobilized sailor who claimed he intended to sign a contract after fighting since September 2022. Putin held this up as a "great example" of a serviceman finding a calling in the war. This is part of a broader effort to retain forces without formal demobilization, a strategy the MoD has pursued since mid-2025 through both incentives and coercion.

Increase in Armed Forces End Strength

On July 27, Putin signed a decree setting the authorized strength of the Russian Armed Forces at 2,426,130 total personnel, which includes 1,535,000 military personnel. This marks an increase of 27,000 total personnel from a previous June 2026 decree. While Russia has expanded its end strength significantly each year since the 2022 invasion (adding 137,000 in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024), the 2026 increases have been relatively marginal. These expansions support the broader force structure reforms initiated in January 2023.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued a long-range strike campaign against Russian infrastructure between July 26 and 27. Notable strikes include:

• Rostov-on-Don: An export terminal was struck, causing fires.
• Sarapul, Udmurt Republic: Drones likely struck the Prioritet Federal State Budgetary Institution, a long-term fuel and petroleum storage facility.
• Yaroslavl Oblast: President Zelensky confirmed strikes on oil facilities over 1,300 kilometers from the border.

These strikes are significantly impacting Kazakhstan’s oil output, which more than halved (dropping from 2.16 million to roughly one million barrels per day) as strikes forced the closure of a main Black Sea exporting terminal. Russia is responding by building new Pantsir air defense sites around Moscow City, with 24 new towers constructed since late May 2026 to protect key facilities like the Moscow Oil Refinery and Putin’s residence.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 26 and 27 but made no advances. On July 27, Ukrainian forces intercepted a Russian Forpost-R heavy strike drone—only the sixth confirmed downing of this type—over Kursk Oblast.

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

• Kharkiv Oblast: Offensive operations continued in northern Kharkiv and the Velykyi Burluk direction with no advances.
• Oskil River: Russian operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions were met by Ukrainian counterattacks; no advances were confirmed.
• Donetsk Oblast: The Russian MoD claimed forces pushed Ukrainian groups out of Lyman and seized Torske, though ISW has not observed geolocated evidence confirming these claims. In the Oleksandrivka direction, Russian sources have used likely AI-altered footage to claim advances in Khrystoforivka.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces are largely limited to infiltration missions in groups of three to four in the Hulyaipole direction. While they maintain a numerical advantage, Russian logistics in the area are considered "vulnerable" due to Ukrainian strikes on ground lines of communication. In western Zaporizhia, geolocated footage showed Russian infiltrators surrendering to a Ukrainian drone in northern Plavni.

In occupied Crimea, Ukrainian strikes targeted 14 electrical substations on July 26 and 27, causing widespread power outages. Additionally, the GUR reported the destruction of a Russian S-400 air defense launcher and radar on the night of July 25 to 26. These strikes have likely forced a reduction in Russian aviation and naval activity in the Black Sea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russia launched 147 drones on the night of July 26 to 27, targeting residential, energy, and port infrastructure. Ukrainian forces intercepted 123 of these drones. Russia is increasingly utilizing jet-powered drones (like the Geran-4), which are harder to intercept and have been used to target civilian areas, including a supermarket in Chernihiv City and railway workers in Donetsk Oblast.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.