NOVEMBER 12, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East.
Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.
Key Takeaways
The Houthis launched a combined-arms offensive operation in southeastern Lahij Governorate on November 11 that likely aims to isolate Yemeni government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coast by severing the Mokha-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC).
The Houthi offensive on the Lahij front likely seeks to capture Yemeni government-controlled high ground at Jabal Kharaz, which lies south of al Shatt, in order to establish fire control over the Mokha-Aden GLOC. Houthi fire control over the Mokha-Aden GLOC would effectively isolate some Yemeni government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coastal plain, which would simultaneously set conditions for the Houthis to capture the remainder of the Red Sea coastal plain while depriving the Yemeni government of the units best able to defend Aden City.
The Houthis could also exploit their recent gains in Lahij Governorate to outflank Yemeni government-aligned forces west of al Shatt to divide Yemeni government-aligned forces' defensive efforts between protecting the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, defending the wider Red Sea front, and relieving potentially encircled units near Jabal Kahbub.
Iran continues to claim that commercial vessels are striking naval mines along the US-backed route in the southern part of the Strait of Hormuz, likely to undermine ship operators' confidence in US escort operations and compel vessels to transit through Iranian territorial waters.
Toplines
The Houthis launched a combined-arms offensive operation in southeastern Lahij Governorate on November 11 that likely aims to isolate Yemeni government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coast by severing the Mokha-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC). The Houthis began their offensive with ballistic missile salvos that targeted government staging areas in Ras al Arah and Kharaz, Lahij Governorate, likely intended to degrade government forces' ability to reinforce frontline positions. The Houthis simultaneously conducted ballistic missile strikes on a government command-and-control headquarters in Aden City that is responsible for the Lahij front, likely to disrupt government forces' ability to coordinate a response to the imminent ground offensive. Houthi mechanized units and infantry then attempted to advance southwest from al Majza, Lahij Governorate, toward al Shatt and al Sarih on November 11, but Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled them, according to multiple anti-Houthi sources. Houthi forces later successfully captured al Shatt and al Sarih junction on November 12 after conducting additional strikes on Yemeni government staging areas. Saudi-Yemeni government airstrikes on Houthi positions in al Shatt on November 12 indicate that the Houthis retain control over the town at this time. The Houthi offensive in Lahij Governorate follows recent reports that the Houthis are exploiting Yemeni government-aligned forces' coordination issues on the southeast Lahij frontline.
The Houthi offensive on the Lahij front likely seeks to capture Yemeni government-controlled high ground at Jabal Kharaz, which lies south of al Shatt, in order to establish fire control over the Mokha-Aden GLOC. A Houthi military commentator told Houthi media on November 11 that Houthi forces seek to control Jabal Kharaz in order to target the Mokha-Aden GLOC. The Houthis' capture of Jabal Kharaz—the highest southern position on the Red Sea coastal plain—would provide the Houthis with defensible overwatch positions and enable them to establish fire control over the Mokha-Aden GLOC. Houthi fire control over the Mokha-Aden GLOC would effectively isolate the Yemeni government's most capable and most mobile units, the Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces, which are currently deployed on the Red Sea coastal plain. This isolation would simultaneously set conditions for the Houthis to capture the remainder of the Red Sea coastal plain while depriving the Yemeni government of the units best able to defend Aden City. This isolation would also protect the Houthis' rear flank if the Houthis attempt to advance southeastward from al Maqatirah District, via Tur al Baha District, toward Aden City. The Houthis would likely struggle to advance on this route toward Aden City given the district's much flatter terrain, which would leave advancing Houthi units vulnerable to Saudi airstrikes, however.
The Houthis could also exploit their recent gains in Lahij Governorate to outflank Yemeni government-aligned forces west of al Shatt. The Houthis could advance west from al Shatt to outflank and potentially encircle government units near Jabal Kahbub, even if government forces prevent the Houthis from capturing Jabal Kharaz. This maneuver would force Yemeni government-aligned forces to divide their defensive efforts between protecting the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, defending the wider Red Sea front, and relieving potentially encircled units near Jabal Kahbub.
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
Restore deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners
Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
Iran continues to claim that commercial vessels are striking naval mines along the US-backed route in the southern part of the Strait of Hormuz, likely to undermine ship operators' confidence in US escort operations and compel vessels to transit through Iranian territorial waters. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh have consistently claimed that vessels have struck mines following US Central Command's August 27 confirmation that US forces had completely demined the strait. The start of these claims also coincided with US strikes on August 31 targeting rockets that Iran was reportedly attempting to use to re-mine the strait. ISW-CTP assessed at the time that Iran may have been using the rockets because previous US strikes had degraded other, more effective Iranian strike-laying capabilities. ISW-CTP has not observed any indicators that Iran has successfully re-mined the strait. The IRGC and Artesh have recently started to note in their claims of vessels hitting mines that the vessels were allegedly under US escort, likely to try to reinforce Iran's information operation to discredit US escort operations.
Iran continues to attack vessels with likely drones and missiles in and around the Strait of Hormuz. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two projectile attacks against tankers in and near the Strait of Hormuz, including a strike on an engine room. This attack is consistent with a recent increase in Iranian attacks on vessel engine rooms. ISW-CTP assessed on October 21 that Iran may be using more advanced weapons systems to conduct more precise attacks after at least five of 23 attacks in early October struck engine rooms.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Iranian security forces continue to counter infiltration attempts from Kurdish opposition fighters based in Iraqi Kurdistan as the regime raises military readiness along Iran's northwestern border. The IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base announced on November 12 that its forces killed two Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) militants attempting to infiltrate Iran's northwestern border from Iraq. The IRGC claimed that the militants intended to conduct "sabotage and terrorist" attacks inside Iran and were carrying weapons, ammunition, and Starlink devices. PJAK has not commented on the incident at the time of this writing. IRGC forces have killed Kurdish separatist fighters in northwestern Iran in recent months, including a Kurdish separatist fighter in Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province, on September 20 and four PJAK members near Mahabad and Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province, on June 30. The recent incident comes after Iranian military commanders stated on October 31 that Iranian forces are increasing readiness along Iran's northwestern and southeastern borders, reflecting the regime's concerns about anti-regime militant activities.
Iraq
The Iraqi federal government likely suspended an operation to inspect Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah's oil smuggling activities in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. Informed sources told Iraqi media on November 12 that Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and Counter Terrorism Service units mobilized to escort an Iraqi government investigative committee into Jurf al Sakhr to inspect smuggling-related oil storage sites, tankers, and transport routes. The federal government ordered the formation of the investigative committee on November 11 after US-funded regional media published a leaked Iraqi intelligence report that Kataib Hezbollah has generated millions of dollars of revenue from oil theft and smuggling activities in Jurf al Sakhr since 2021. Kataib Hezbollah has controlled Jurf al Sakhr since 2014 and has denied the Iraqi government access to the area for over a decade. This operation to investigate oil smuggling in Jurf al Sakhr comes as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has taken steps to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' revenue sources.
The Iraqi government suspended the operation to enter Jurf al Sakhr after Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki, and Interior Minister Yasser al Maliki intervened to mediate between Kataib Hezbollah and Iraqi government forces to prevent an "armed confrontation". Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi had mobilized fighters in preparation to confront Iraqi government forces and threatened to fire on any Iraqi security forces that entered Jurf al Sakhr without the militia's approval, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media on November 12. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors similarly pressured Zaydi into reversing his reported plans to enter Jurf al Sakhr in August 2026.
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis reportedly launched two ballistic missiles targeting Yemeni government-aligned forces' staging areas in Jawf and Marib governorates in eastern Yemen, likely in an effort to disrupt Yemeni government advances toward Jawf Governorate's capital city, al Hazm. The Houthi movement claimed that it launched two ballistic missiles at Yemeni government military staging areas, striking Yemeni government-aligned units and vehicles, in Jawf and northwestern Marib governorates on November 12. These missile strikes come amid recent Yemeni government-aligned forces' advances in Jawf and northwestern Marib governorates, including in the Jabal Dahida mountain range and near the Mas Military Camp, which are 75 kilometers and 50 kilometers from al Hazm, respectively. These advances are part of a shaping operation to recapture al Hazm City. The Houthis have repeatedly fired ballistic missiles at Yemeni government-aligned forces' staging areas in an effort to disrupt resources and reinforcements necessary to support counteroffensives in eastern Yemen.
The Houthi movement claimed that it struck a military cargo aircraft at a Saudi airport near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, likely to disrupt Saudi military aid to the Yemeni government. The Houthis claimed that a drone struck a military cargo plane at the Sharura Domestic Airport, which is located about 60 kilometers from the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, on November 12. ISW-CTP cannot verify the Houthis' claim at the time of this writing. The Houthis have consistently claimed to target and strike military cargo aircraft at Yemeni airports to degrade Saudi and international partner sustainment efforts to the Yemeni government throughout the recent conflict. Sharura Domestic Airport is notably located on a well-maintained Saudi and Yemeni highway route that directly connects to Yemeni government-controlled Marib City, which is the largest staging ground for Yemeni government-aligned forces near frontlines in northwestern Marib and Jawf governorates.
The Houthi movement claimed that it struck Saudi energy infrastructure on November 12 as part of its strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed on November 12 that the Houthis struck an unspecified Aramco facility in Riyadh, the Yanbu Oil Refinery, and a pumping station on the East-West Pipeline with drones. The Houthis have targeted and struck the East-West Pipeline on multiple occasions throughout the conflict. A previous Houthi attack on the East-West Pipeline in September 2026 forced Saudi authorities to close the pipeline for approximately 11 days to conduct emergency repairs. ISW-CTP cannot verify the Houthis' claims at the time of this writing. The Houthis seek to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia to compel the kingdom to meet Houthi demands, such as lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen's oil and gas resources.
Saudi military and government entities separately announced that Saudi air defenses intercepted six Houthi projectiles, including a drone near Riyadh, a drone in the Eastern Province, two Houthi ballistic missiles in western Saudi Arabia, and two ballistic missiles near Mecca, on November 11. Saudi air defenses have repeatedly intercepted Houthi missiles and drones in the vicinity of these cities. The Houthis have consistently denied targeting the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the start of their strike campaign against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure.
