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Wednesday, August 19, 2026

Hezbollah’s Pivot to FPV Drones Requires Israeli Overmatch

 

Hezbollah’s Pivot to FPV Drones Requires Israeli Overmatch

Date: July 29, 2026
Researchers: Avery Borens (Middle East Researcher), Kelly Campa (Middle East Team Lead)


Introduction and the FPV Threat

Hezbollah’s ability to develop and refine its use of tactical first-person view (FPV) systems represents a significant development that could alter the character of future conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah increasingly deployed FPV systems in its asymmetric campaign against Israel between March and June 2026, likely as part of an early effort to integrate more precise FPV strike capabilities into its operations. Hezbollah’s current challenges with scale and integration have likely thus far limited Hezbollah’s ability to impose serious operational or strategic effects upon Israel, but Hezbollah will almost certainly work to expand and refine its FPV capabilities in the coming months if given time and space to do so. Hezbollah’s ability to develop a more robust FPV drone program represents a serious medium-term threat to Israel, which will need to not only rapidly adapt appropriate countermeasures to counter the current threat but also anticipate Hezbollah’s future adaptations and prepare accordingly.

Triggers of Tactical Innovation

Hezbollah’s flawed military campaign between October 7, 2023, and the end of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in 2024 likely helped trigger tactical innovation within Hezbollah that led to the adoption of tactical FPV drones on a greater scale. Hezbollah had long relied on rockets, missiles, and anti-tank guided missiles as the backbone of its military forces. These systems were designed to deter an Israeli attack into southern Lebanon by holding the security of northern Israeli towns at risk. This strategic concept presupposed that Israel was unwilling to accept the risk required to launch a major campaign into southern Lebanon to silence the rocket fire, especially after the challenges Israel had in ending Hezbollah’s rocket fire in the 2006 war. Any Israeli attack on Lebanon would be answered with rocket fire into northern Israel, and Israeli leaders would therefore be unwilling to attack. This theory failed when former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah initiated fires at Israel on October 8, 2023, and could not stop the fire lest he be seen as abandoning Hamas. Israel made the decision to stop the rocket fire through military force, and Hezbollah’s strategic concept collapsed.

Hezbollah’s defense of southern Lebanon in Fall 2024 similarly failed. Hezbollah was unable to organize a serious defense of southern Lebanon, likely due in some part to its initial shock and disruption following the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) pager attack and air campaign. Hezbollah was therefore unable to meaningfully disrupt Israeli operations in southern Lebanon or force an Israeli withdrawal with its attacks. The IDF was able to clear surrounding border towns in Lebanon and deprived Hezbollah of some of its capabilities to attack Israel by seizing ridgelines from which Hezbollah would fire direct fire anti-tank guided missiles into northern Israel.

Hezbollah’s integration of tactical FPV systems into its operations is likely part of the group’s efforts to learn and adapt from these failures. Hezbollah began to operate FPV systems as early as June 2024 but did not deploy these capabilities at any meaningful scale until after the group’s Fall 2024 conflict with Israel. Hezbollah’s long-term strategic reliance on rocket, missile, and anti-tank guided missile forces probably created organizational inertia that discouraged senior commanders from investing heavily in small, tactical drones like those now used by Hezbollah. The failures outlined above—in combination with the loss of Hezbollah’s primary smuggling conduit through Syria after the fall of Assad in December 2024—almost certainly contributed to Hezbollah’s decision to devote time and resources to developing cheaper, more precise weaponry rather than replenishing its missile and rocket stockpiles as the group’s main priority.

The Attrition-Based Strategy

Hezbollah designed its most recent campaign to diminish Israel’s political will to continue its operations in Lebanon by maximizing Israeli casualties and demoralizing the Israeli population. Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, openly stated that Hezbollah has sought to maximize Israeli casualties as a means to compel an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. This attrition-based concept is based on previous Hezbollah experience in the 1990s, when Hezbollah used small-scale guerrilla attacks to cause Israeli casualties. This strategy ultimately led to increasing pressure from the Israeli public on the Israeli government to withdraw from southern Lebanon as “[Israeli] society grew increasingly intolerant of IDF casualties.”

Hezbollah has drawn on this legacy in its most recent campaign by using FPV drones to conduct small-scale attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, particularly since the April 16 ceasefire. Hezbollah’s FPV drone attacks caused the majority of IDF deaths in Lebanon between the April ceasefire and mid-June 2026. Hezbollah likely calculated that the increasing casualties—in addition to widespread reports that the IDF is struggling to develop countermeasures to protect soldiers from drones—would increase public pressure in Israel for a withdrawal. The IDF has faced significant domestic criticism over the casualties from Hezbollah’s FPV strikes, but this domestic consternation has not yet led to any significant change in Israeli policy in the way that Hezbollah hoped.

Hezbollah’s campaign is intended to be cumulative, however. Recent political agreements between Israel, the Lebanese government, and the United States have largely paused the active fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF. Hezbollah appears willing to refrain from launching attacks against the IDF for now, but Hezbollah leaders and officials have made it clear that Hezbollah will not tolerate any long-term Israeli presence in Lebanon. Rising Israeli casualties from future attacks—whether from larger attacks or ineffective Israeli countermeasures—could further reduce Israeli willingness to continue operations in Lebanon.

Operational Challenges and Current Limitations

Hezbollah’s use of FPV systems imposed some operational challenges on the IDF due to the IDF’s inadequate counter-drone measures, but Hezbollah is unlikely to force an IDF withdrawal on military grounds while sustaining its current scale of FPV strikes. It is unclear to what degree Hezbollah prevented the IDF from accomplishing its missions under adapted circumstances. The IDF’s fear of Hezbollah attacks nonetheless drove reactive operational adaptations by IDF units. Hezbollah attacks restricted IDF movement in southern Lebanon, for example, including by forcing many units to operate at night. Some Israeli officials have characterized the IDF’s expansion of the security zone in southern Lebanon as a response to the drone threat. Hezbollah FPV strikes at their current scale have not yet generated sufficient pressure on Israeli political and military officials to compel a withdrawal, however.

Hezbollah’s current challenges with scale and integration likely limited Hezbollah’s ability to impose serious operational or strategic effects upon Israel. Hezbollah drone operators are organized into small, decentralized cells that are dispersed among the regional units of Hezbollah’s ground forces. Hezbollah’s FPV drone operations are decentralized, and it is unclear to what degree these operators are integrated into regional ground units. Decentralizing drone cells makes coordinating large strikes more difficult, though assigning these cells to regional units could, in principle, enable better coordination between infantry and drone forces in the future.

Hezbollah has struggled to conduct complex strikes that provide coordinated air support to ground units. Hezbollah has been able to execute at least some complex attacks that would require coordination between several FPV operators, such as several “swarming” attacks in which operators employ three or more drones operating in a staggered but near-simultaneous manner. These ”swarming” attacks have been operational-level strikes against Israeli laagers in Lebanon or outposts in northern Israel—similar to how Hezbollah has long employed larger, Iranian-made drones—rather than tactical-level strikes designed to support ground maneuver or defense, however. Supporting ground maneuver would require greater coordination with ground commanders at the tactical level.

Hezbollah is suffering from a relative lack of experience piloting FPVs at scale in combat and has so far employed relatively rudimentary tactics. This conflict marks the first time that Hezbollah has deployed these systems in any serious way. Operators are still largely relying upon rudimentary, slow targeting cycles and rudimentary tactics. The current approach uses a static targeting model in which Hezbollah conducts drone reconnaissance to identify targets, requires a commander to approve the strike, and then uses an attack drone to strike. The subsequent attack drones in “swarming” attacks conduct a hasty battle damage assessment, both to acquire propaganda footage and probably to determine if a second strike is required. This approach makes dynamic targeting very difficult.

Future Adaptation and Scaling

Hezbollah’s early battlefield successes with tactical FPV systems in this campaign will almost certainly lead Hezbollah to invest further in its development of FPV systems, including by refining strike tactics to improve the effectiveness of its attacks. The sophistication of Hezbollah’s recent operations and attacks suggests that it is still in the early, experimental stages of integrating FPV drone systems into its warfare. Hezbollah has demonstrated increasingly complex capabilities since March 2026, which suggests that the group will continue to refine its tactics and attempt more complex strikes, particularly as operators gain more experience. The “swarm” attacks noted above demonstrate that Hezbollah already appears to be improving coordination between drone operators, for example. Hezbollah has also demonstrated its ability to quickly adapt to and overcome relatively rudimentary Israeli countermeasures. Hezbollah, for example, adapted to IDF night operations by fielding thermal camera-equipped FPV drones that enable nighttime attacks.

Hezbollah will develop the capacity to scale up its operations if allowed the time and space to do so. Hezbollah reportedly has at least 90 operators in southern Lebanon, which may be temporarily constraining the group’s ability to execute strikes at a greater scale. This relatively small number of trained operators is likely to expand in the coming months. A Ukrainian drone operator, for example, only needs three to five weeks of training. A normal Hezbollah fighter undergoes 33 days of basic training, which means a drone operator could be ready to deploy in around two months, and even less if he does not attend basic training. Hezbollah is training additional operators, according to Israeli assessments. The operators are not a bottleneck for Hezbollah’s drone program in the same way that rocket or missile operators are not a bottleneck for those Hezbollah units, even though their operators also undergo specialized training.

Hezbollah can use the current ceasefire to reconstitute its military forces and prepare for renewed fighting with Israel. Hezbollah has largely paused defensive operations against Israeli forces since Israel committed to a ceasefire under the Israel-Lebanon-United States Trilateral Framework on June 26. The group likely calculates that the pause gives it time to rebuild and reorganize before any potential resumption of fighting. Hezbollah has repositioned fighters in unspecified parts of southern Lebanon in recent weeks in anticipation of a resumption of conflict, according to Israeli officials. Ongoing disagreements between Israel and the Lebanese government about the timeline and requirements for implementing ”pilot zones” to disarm Hezbollah will likely give Hezbollah additional time to prepare.

Recommended Israeli Overmatch

Hezbollah’s ability to develop a more robust FPV drone program represents a serious threat to Israel and Israeli forces over the medium term. This threat will require Israel to anticipate Hezbollah’s future adaptations and prepare accordingly. The current Israeli approach to developing countermeasures, which remains largely reactive to Hezbollah adaptations as they arise, is necessary in that the immediate priority must be protecting forces in the field. Israeli forces have implemented relatively rudimentary passive defenses on the battlefield in Lebanon and in northern Israeli towns while the IDF makes significant investments to procure and develop counter-drone systems.

The IDF is currently testing systems intended to intercept Hezbollah’s fiber-optic drones, which are immune to jamming and therefore pose one of the most urgent threats to Israeli forces. Hezbollah has used fiber-optic systems in most of its recent FPV strikes. The development and deployment of counter-drone systems can fill the existing gaps in Israeli defenses, but this approach is insufficient on its own.

The likelihood that Hezbollah will attempt to improve upon its preexisting FPV capabilities underscores the need for the IDF to achieve overmatch vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s nascent precision strike complex. Improved integration and coordination between Hezbollah ground units and drone operators could rapidly improve Hezbollah’s drone capabilities and Hezbollah’s ability to overcome IDF defenses, such as through massed fire. Hezbollah may pursue longer-range FPV systems that would allow Hezbollah to launch from positions much further north of the Litani River, which would make Israeli efforts to target operators and launch positions much more challenging.

The IDF will ultimately need to invest significant intellectual and financial resources into developing countermeasures for determining where Hezbollah’s FPV drone and strike complex will be in the medium term. This approach will force Hezbollah to react to IDF countermeasures in the next war and allow the IDF to play to its relative advantages, such as the financial resources of the state and its preponderance in technology, including artificial intelligence. Hezbollah is still in the early stages of integrating FPV systems into its operations. The limitations of Hezbollah’s drone capabilities at this time mean that the IDF has an opportunity to recalibrate its approach to create long-term overmatch.

Russia’s Global AI Media Training and Cognitive Warfare Strategies

# The Kremlin is Cultivating an AI-Trained Global Media Cadre for Lasting Influence


**August 12, 2026**


**Authors:**

*   Nataliya Bugayova (Director, Cognitive Warfare Project and Modern Warfare Fellow)

*   Jacob Spencer (Cognitive Warfare Researcher)

*   Kateryna Stepanenko (Russia Team Lead and Deputy Director of the Cognitive Warfare Project)

*   Lucianna Marquez (Contributing Intern)

*   Anna Guethoff (Contributing Intern)


---


## Key Takeaways


**Key Takeaway:** The Kremlin is growing a global cadre of Russia-trained journalists as part of its cognitive warfare efforts. Russia uses cognitive warfare to shape the decisions and will of its opponents. The Kremlin is expanding state-run international journalism training initiatives, building a global media recruitment pipeline, and expanding training that specifically targets young media professionals abroad. Kremlin-run media is increasingly incorporating AI media training curricula, likely to scale production of content that aligns with Kremlin narratives. The Kremlin’s investment in global media talent is not opportunistic, but rather supports Russia’s strategic aims. The Kremlin uses media training in Africa and Asia to discredit the West, shape global narratives on the war in Ukraine, and obscure the Kremlin’s weaknesses. Russian state media training in the former Soviet states furthers the Kremlin’s aim of reestablishing control over those countries. Russian state media training is also a part of the Kremlin’s occupation playbook in Ukraine and Georgia. The Russian-trained global journalist cadre is key to the resilience of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare infrastructure, as the cadre operates outside of Russian state structures, allowing it to maintain influence even when Russian media face restrictions.


The Kremlin has been expanding journalism training initiatives, particularly via state-run SputnikPro and RT Academy training programs. Russian state news agency Sputnik established the SputnikPro international journalism education project in March 2018, and the program has reportedly trained over 15,000 participants as of 2026. The Kremlin’s international TV and broadcasting network RT launched the RT Academy English-language journalism training program in February 2024 and claimed that it had trained over 7,000 participants as of August 2026. Kremlin-controlled think tank, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund (also known as the Gorchakov Fund), established the InteRussia fellowship program for training foreign specialists in multiple fields including journalism in 2021, with funding from the Russian Presidential Grants Foundation. InteRussia partnered with RT’s Arabic service to launch a fellowship for journalists from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Sudan in May 2026. InteRussia also partnered with SputnikPro to organize training programs in Moscow for Latin American journalists in September and October 2025 and for African journalists in July 2026. The growth of Russian international journalism training events is coupled with the Kremlin’s effort to expand its network of Russian state media partnerships with foreign outlets — another pillar of Russian cognitive warfare infrastructure that ISW analyzed in an April 2026 report.


The Kremlin seeks to expand the scale, reach, and longevity of Russia’s information influence through its growing journalism training initiatives abroad.


---


## Scale and Reach


Russian media has been increasingly incorporating AI training into its global training curricula in 2025 and 2026, likely to scale production of content that aligns with the Kremlin’s narratives via AI content creation and AI-assisted media workflows. SputnikPro and RT Academy increased training of foreign journalists to use AI for content production, streamlining media workflows, and managing social media accounts in 2025 and 2026. SputnikPro and RT Academy conducted at least 50 training events between July 2025 and July 2026, roughly 50 percent of which integrated AI modules. SputnikPro held sessions on using AI for content production and streamlining editorial workflows for New Era University in the Philippines and at the Sputnik Multimedia Press Center in Minsk, Belarus in May 2026; for the University of Tripoli in Libya in February 2026; and for Kenyan television channel Prime Africa Channel in June 2025, among others. RT Academy and RT China held a discussion at the Communication University of Zhejiang in China on the use of neural networks in media workflows in April 2026. Integration of AI may enable Russia-trained journalists to increase content production, spread Kremlin narratives at a greater scale to broader audiences, and more efficiently monitor and respond to global events.


---


## Longevity


The Kremlin has been expanding training formats that specifically target the next generation of journalists and influencers globally.


The Kremlin is targeting young foreign journalists by offering them AI media internships and training through Kremlin-run youth and cultural programs.

*   *Sputnik partnered with the New Generation (Novoye Pokoleniye) international youth program to launch a SputnikPro internship focused on AI in June 2026, which offered training on using AI to generate text, images, videos, and to conduct data analysis in media production.*

The Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) founded New Generation in 2011. The program hosts foreigners from the political, civic, scientific, and business sectors for short trips to Russia, which include visits to Russian state media outlets and meetings with Russian state media officials. RT Academy and Rossotrudnichestvo’s Russia House cultural center in Jakarta, Indonesia, held a session on AI for several hundred East Asian youth influencers, journalists, and media students in November and December 2025.


SputnikPro and RT Academy are targeting young journalists by hosting media training events at foreign universities. SputnikPro and RT Academy held at least 14 training events at universities abroad in the first six months of 2026. RT Academy presented a lecture covering how RT creates content at Tsinghua University; a lecture on the role of language skills in journalism at Peking University; a lecture on journalism in a “multipolar world” and the influence of AI on media workflows at Communication University of Zhejiang; and a lecture about coverage of international events at East China Normal University in China in April 2026. SputnikPro held sessions on applications of AI in journalism and the “evolving media landscape” for the University of Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania in June and May 2026; a session on media ethics for the University of Education, Winneba in Ghana in May 2026; a lecture on digital journalism for the Uzbek State World Languages University and Bucheon University Tashkent in Uzbekistan in April 2026; and a lecture on “an effective media strategy in the context of information wars” for the Institut Supérieur de la Communication et du Multimédia in Burkina Faso in April 2026. SputnikPro held trainings on using AI for media content creation for New Era University in the Philippines, Al-Azhar University in the Gaza Strip, Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme et de Communication in Niger, Sana’a University in Yemen, Daffodil International University in Bangladesh, and at the University of Tripoli in Libya between February and May 2026. ISW analyzed Russian state media’s distinct efforts to establish partnerships with foreign universities in its April 2026 publication.


The Kremlin explicitly uses its media trainings in other countries to expand the recruitment pipeline for Russian media. RT Academy offers potential employment opportunities to high-performing graduates of RT journalism programs. The Kremlin-controlled African Initiative news agency offered professional contracts to top students at African Initiative’s journalism school in Mali in December 2024. The Kremlin established the African Initiative in 2023 in an effort to disseminate anti-Western narratives in African countries.


Russian cognitive warfare spans generations. The Kremlin’s growing and global effort to co-opt media professionals and influencers early in their careers is critical to Russia’s ability to shape narratives over the coming decades. Kremlin-run media frequently promotes narratives that it then keeps nearly dormant for extended periods of time before reactivating them at opportune moments. Russian state media likely uses university outreach, programs like New Generation, and AI media trainings to cultivate pro-Russian sentiments among entry-level media professionals and to expand the recruitment pipeline for Russian state media.


---


## Influence, Control, and Occupation


Global journalism training advances the Kremlin’s strategic objectives. These objectives include expanding Russia’s international influence, undermining Western influence, reestablishing control over the former Soviet states, and maintaining control over the territories Russia illegally occupies.


The Kremlin provides media training in non-Western countries to instill Russian narratives, shape foreign media coverage of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and discredit the West. The Kremlin has established a large media training presence in Africa and Asia. Russian media outlets have held at least 20 journalism training events for participants from at least 29 African countries since July 2025, for example.


Russian media training includes Kremlin ideological indoctrination as part of program curricula. RT Academy instructors baselessly described Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) as “neo-Nazis” during a journalism training event for journalists from Africa. RT correspondent Igor Kurashenko promoted a false narrative during an online seminar for African journalists that Ukraine staged the Russian Armed Forces’ mass murder of Ukrainian civilians and POWs in Bucha, Kyiv Oblast in March 2022. The French-language editorial board of African Initiative reportedly taught 60 Malian journalism students in July and August 2024 to publish articles with “striking and provocative” headlines targeted against Western officials. African Initiative has also invited African journalists to Russia and the destroyed and occupied city of Mariupol, likely in an effort to influence their coverage of Russia’s war and atrocities in Ukraine.


Russian state media offers media training in the former Soviet states to advance the Kremlin’s strategic aim of reestablishing control over those countries. SputnikPro notably launched the “SputnikPro on Zubovsky” training program for Russian-language journalists from CIS countries in May 2023. SputnikPro on Zubovsky claims that it seeks to promote cooperation among Russian-language media outlets in the post-Soviet states. SputnikPro on Zubovsky hosted a multi-day series of trainings in Moscow in September 2025 for participants from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russian-occupied Abkhazia, Georgia. SputnikPro on Zubovsky held training sessions in Moscow on the creation and promotion of Telegram channels in May and July 2024 and in September 2025. SputnikPro held in-person training sessions on AI content creation in Belarus in May 2026 and Tajikistan in April 2025; content creation and fact-checking in Uzbekistan in April 2026; audience retention in Georgia in April 2026 and Azerbaijan in April 2023; business journalism in Georgia in February 2025; content promotion at the Sputnik Kazakhstan press center in April 2023; and audience retention in Azerbaijan in April 2023. RT School, another RT-led media training program, hosted students from Belarus, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of the 11th cohort of its TV and online journalism course in February 2025. The Kremlin likely aims to grow the cadre of Russia-trained journalists in former Soviet states to propagate narratives that support Kremlin efforts to influence public opinion and political decision-making in those countries.


Russian media training is a part of the Kremlin’s occupation playbook, which aims to establish firm control over Russian-occupied territories. The Kremlin has been offering media training for journalists in occupied parts of Ukraine since before the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with RT organizing an internship for journalists from occupied Donetsk Oblast in March 2021. Russian occupation authorities have since opened media training centers for high school and university students in Mariupol and for journalism students aged 16 to 25 in Donetsk City in 2024. Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti operates a multimedia press center in Russian-occupied Simferopol, Crimea, where it holds SputnikPro trainings, including on topics such as AI content creation and reporting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. RT School trained journalists on a range of subjects, including AI-assisted media workflows, in Sukhumi and Gagra in Russian-occupied Abkhazia, Georgia in February 2026. SputnikPro held a masterclass in Tskhinvali in Russian-occupied South Ossetia, Georgia, on promoting channels on Telegram and the Kremlin’s state-controlled messenger app MAX in June 2026. Journalists and bloggers from Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, attended a media training program at Rossotrudnichestvo’s InterNovosti media school in Moscow in December 2023. The Russian-trained cadre of journalists is a tool of the Kremlin’s effort to establish and sustain information control in the territories Russia illegally occupies.


---


## Implications


The Kremlin’s efforts to build a global cadre of Russia-trained journalists and coopt the next generation of media professionals globally remain largely uncontested. The United States and its partners need to monitor and disrupt Russia’s efforts to expand its media conglomerate or otherwise risk facing a growing Russian capability to spread false narratives and shape perceptions, decisions, and actions around the globe and over time. The United States and its partners must recognize that Russia is specifically targeting youth in non-Western countries to cultivate anti-Western sentiment in regions of the world that hold strategic importance to both Russia and the West, such as Africa.


The United States and its partners can thwart Russian media expansion efforts by exposing the Kremlin’s ideological media training, providing alternatives to such training, increasing economic pressure on Russia, and investing in Ukrainian battlefield successes.


---


## How to Watch the Ecosystem


Key Russian journalism training programs: SputnikPro, SputnikPro on Zubovsky, RT Academy, RT School, InteRussia, and New Media Workshop.


**Individuals central to the Kremlin’s journalism training efforts who indicate the direction of the effort:**

*   **Vasily Pushkov:** the director of international cooperation at Rossiya Segodnya [Russia Today]; participated in numerous training events worldwide, including throughout Africa and in China.

*   **Anna Kalinkina:** senior video editor for Sputnik Africa; frequently leads training sessions for African journalists on integration of AI into media work.

*   **Anna Kovtunova:** the head of RT Academy; led numerous training events in China and Africa.

*   **Alexander Petrov:** AI and video production specialist for Rossiya Segodnya [Russia Today]; often leads trainings in the post-Soviet space and Russian-occupied territories.


---


## Universities and Media Outlets that Received Russian State Media Training

*(This list represents partial findings)*


*   **Algeria**

    *   Le Jeune Indépendant

*   **Argentina**

    *   Ambito Financiero

    *   National University of Quilmes

    *   Página 12

*   **Armenia**

    *   Tsayg TV

*   **Bangladesh**

    *   Daffodil International University

    *   University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh

*   **Belarus**

    *   Gomel TV and Radio Company

*   **Bolivia**

    *   San Francisco de Asís University

    *   Visión 360

*   **Brazil**

    *   Brasil 247

    *   University of Sorocaba

*   **Burkina Faso**

    *   Institut Supérieur de la Communication et du Multimédia

    *   Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina

*   **Burundi**

    *   Burundi News Agency

*   **Cameroon**

    *   Cameroon News Agency

    *   Cameroon Radio Television

    *   Radio Tiémeni Siantou

*   **Chad**

    *   Flash-Tchad

*   **China**

    *   Beijing Language and Culture University

    *   China Content Broadcasting Network

    *   Communication University of Zhejiang

    *   Dalian University of Foreign Languages

    *   East China Normal University

    *   Lanzhou University

    *   Peking University

    *   Renmin University of China

    *   Shanghai International Studies University

    *   Sichuan University

    *   Tsinghua University

*   **Colombia**

    *   El Espectador

*   **Cuba**

    *   Telesur

*   **Dominican Republic**

    *   Listín Diario

*   **Ecuador**

    *   Empresa Pública de Comunicación

    *   Exa FM

*   **Egypt**

    *   Al-Akhbar

    *   Daily News Egypt

*   **El Salvador**

    *   El Independiente

*   **Ethiopia**

    *   Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation

    *   Ethiopian Ministry of Defense

    *   Ethiopian News Agency

    *   Fana Broadcasting Corporate

*   **Gabon**

    *   Agence Gabonaise de Presse

*   **Gambia**

    *   Gambia News Agency

*   **Georgia**

    *   State Television and Radio Company “Ir”

*   **Ghana**

    *   University of Education, Winneba

*   **India**

    *   Amity School of Communication

    *   Bennett University

    *   Manav Rachna International Institute of Research and Studies

    *   Jawaharlal Nehru University

    *   Sharda University

    *   University of Petroleum and Energy Studies

*   **Indonesia**

    *   National Development University “Veteran” Yogyakarta

*   **Iraq**

    *   Iraq International News Agency

*   **Kazakhstan**

    *   24KZ

*   **Kenya**

    *   Kenya Broadcasting Corporation

    *   Radio Africa Group

*   **Lebanon**

    *   Al Mayadeen

*   **Libya**

    *   Libyan News Agency

    *   University of Tripoli

*   **Mali**

    *   MaliJet

    *   Office of Radio and Television of Mali

*   **Mexico**

    *   Sin Línea

*   **Morocco**

    *   Bayane Al Yaoume

*   **Namibia**

    *   Namibia Broadcasting Corporation

*   **Nicaragua**

    *   Telesur

*   **Niger**

    *   Agence Nigérienne de Presse

    *   École Supérieure de Journalisme et de Communication

*   **Nigeria**

    *   News Agency of Nigeria

*   **Pakistan**

    *   Information Service Academy

*   **Peru**

    *   Andina

    *   National University of Ucayali

*   **Philippines**

    *   New Era University

*   **Saudi Arabia**

    *   Saudi Press Agency

*   **Serbia**

    *   University of Belgrade

*   **South Africa**

    *   Independent Media

    *   Independent Online

    *   University of Johannesburg

*   **South Korea**

    *   Seokyeong University

*   **Syria**

    *   Al-Souriya TV

*   **Tanzania**

    *   University of Dar es Salaam

*   **Thailand**

    *   Rangsit University

*   **Tunisia**

    *   Radio Sabra FM

    *   Réalités

    *   Tunis Afrique Presse

*   **Turkey**

    *   Harici

*   **Uganda**

    *   New Vision

*   **United Arab Emirates**

    *   Emirates News Agency

    *   United Arab Emirates University

*   **Uzbekistan**

    *   Bucheon University Tashkent

    *   Uzbek State World Languages University

*   **Venezuela**

    *   Bolivarian University of Venezuela

    *   Telesur

*   **Vietnam**

    *   Báo Hưng Yên

    *   Báo Quảng Ninh điện tử

    *   Nhân Dân

    *   Vietnam News Agency

    *   Voice of Vietnam

*   **West Bank and Gaza**

    *   Al-Azhar University

    *   Ma’an News Agency

*   **Yemen**

    *   Sana’a University

    *   Yemen Today

*   **Zambia**

    *   Zambia Daily Mail

 

Iran Update: UAE Economic Pressure and Iraqi Militia Dynamics

 # Iran Update, August 19, 2026


**The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute**


**Data Cutoff:** 2:00 PM ET


*Note: ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.*

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## Key Takeaways


1. **The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intensifying economic pressure on Iran** to discourage Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran. The announcement comes after the UAE accused Iran of launching missiles from Iranian territory toward the UAE on August 18.

2. **The UAE has previously supported US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait**, which suggests that the UAE’s decision is part of a broader effort to raise the costs of Iran’s attempts to control or disrupt maritime traffic.

3. **The UAE’s decision will further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy** by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions. Roughly one-third of Iran’s imports have come from the UAE, and the largest proportion of Iranian imports in the last five years come from the UAE.

4. **Iran will likely respond to the UAE’s decision with greater military and economic pressure against the UAE** rather than abandon its efforts to secure greater control over the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP previously also assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major Ahmad Vahidi’s faction — whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is driving regime decision-making — may be willing to accept some economic costs and the risk of renewed war if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives, including Iranian control over the strait.

5. **Increasing Emirati alignment with the United States will also drive longer-term hostility between the UAE and Iran.** It is not clear the extent to which the Iranian regime decisionmakers have internalized the ramifications of long-term hostility with the UAE, given the economic relationship between the two states.

6. **Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is under pressure from both the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors over Iraqi militia disarmament** but appears to be responding primarily to militia pressure at this time. Zaydi reportedly planned to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism unit near Jurf al Sakhar, south of Baghdad, to monitor the movement of people and vehicles, and would not lead to a raid or a military incursion into the militia’s key site.

7. **Iran has also dispatched senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to Baghdad** in recent days to discourage conflict between the Iraqi federal government and the militias. These officials are also discouraging disarmament.

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## Researchers

* **Ria Reddy** – Iran Team Deputy Lead

* **Carolyn Moorman** – Middle East Analyst

* **William Doran** – Middle East Researcher

* **Adham Fattah** – Iran Analyst

* **Katherine Wells** – Iran Analyst

* **Brian Carter** – Research Manager

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## Toplines


### UAE Economic Pressure on Iran

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intensifying economic pressure on Iran to discourage Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran. The announcement comes after the UAE accused Iran of launching missiles from Iranian territory toward the UAE on August 18. The UAE later said the missiles unsuccessfully targeted vessels to disrupt ”maritime navigation.” Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei denied that Iran launched these attacks. Iran has recently attacked tankers near the Emirati coast.


The UAE has previously supported US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait, which suggests that the UAE’s decision is part of a broader effort to raise the costs of Iran’s attempts to control or disrupt maritime traffic. The timing of the UAE‘s decision also suggests that the UAE may seek to influence ongoing Iran-Oman negotiations over the future management of the strait. The Associated Press reported on August 18, citing two regional officials, that the Trump administration told Oman that it opposes elements of the yet-to-be-announced Iran-Oman agreement, including joint Iranian-Omani management of the strait’s exit route. An Iranian analyst close to the regime separately stated on August 18 that the UAE is playing a significant role in increasing US pressure on Oman over the agreement. The UAE’s decision may, therefore, also seek to prevent any Iran-Oman arrangement that grants Iran any control over navigation through the strait.


### Economic Impact on Iran

The UAE’s decision will further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions. Roughly one-third of Iran’s imports have come from the UAE, and the largest proportion of Iranian imports in the last five years come from the UAE. The UAE also serves as a critical hub for Iran’s shadow-banking and sanctions-evasion networks through which Iran generates significant revenue. Approximately 80 percent of Iran’s imported foreign exchange reportedly comes through the UAE. Cutting this channel will exacerbate Iran’s pre-existing foreign-currency shortages and make it more difficult for the regime to finance both imports and exports. An Iranian sanctions-focused analyst assessed on August 19 that the impact will be particularly significant amid the ongoing US naval blockade on Iran because trade between Iran and the UAE occurs beyond the US naval blockade line in the Persian Gulf, and thus, the UAE likely provided Iran with an important channel for obtaining goods despite the blockade. The UAE’s decision will compound the economic pressure that the blockade has already imposed on Iran.


### Expected Iranian Response

Iran will likely respond to the UAE’s decision with greater military and economic pressure against the UAE rather than abandon its efforts to secure greater control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran will likely view the UAE’s actions as both an immediate economic threat and a broader challenge to its core objectives, which include controlling the strait. Iran could seek to impose costs on UAE shipping or territorial security to demonstrate the consequences of opposing Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the strait. Such actions would be consistent with Iran’s repeated use of force against Gulf states to compel them to accept Iranian demands since the start of the US-Iran war in February 2026. ISW-CTP previously also assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major Ahmad Vahidi’s faction — whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is driving regime decision-making — may be willing to accept some economic costs and the risk of renewed war if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives, including Iranian control over the strait. Increasing Emirati alignment with the United States will also drive longer-term hostility between the UAE and Iran. It is not clear the extent to which the Iranian regime decisionmakers have internalized the ramifications of long-term hostility with the UAE, given the economic relationship between the two states.


The resulting economic pressure on Iran from the UAE’s decision will nevertheless likely increase regime concerns about domestic unrest, but it is unclear whether those concerns will compel Vahidi’s faction to make meaningful concessions. The UAE supplies almost 37 percent of Iran’s essential goods imports (which are not prohibited under the US blockade and sanctions), which makes the loss of access to trade with the UAE particularly significant to the domestic Iranian population. The Emirati decision to impose economic penalties on Iran comes after Iranian officials and media have expressed growing concern in recent weeks about deteriorating economic conditions and the potential for domestic unrest. The regime already appears to be pursuing multiple measures to mitigate these risks rather than reconsider its core demands, however. Iran has taken initial steps to increase access to foreign currency and strengthen alternative economic relationships, including with Tajikistan, although the effectiveness of these efforts remains unclear. The regime is also simultaneously preparing for potential unrest, which is consistent with its longstanding approach to suppressing dissent rather than addressing the underlying economic grievances that drive the unrest.


### Iraqi Militia Dynamics and Disarmament Pressure

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is under pressure from both the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors over Iraqi militia disarmament but appears to be responding primarily to militia pressure at this time. Qatari-owned regional media reported on August 19 that Zaydi’s plan to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism unit near Jurf al Sakhar, south of Baghdad, was only to monitor the movement of people and vehicles and would not lead to a raid or a military incursion into the militia’s key site. This is a reversal from previous reporting, which claimed that Zaydi was preparing for Iraqi security forces to retake Jurf al Sakhar. Kataib Hezbollah has refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April. Conducting an operation to retake the area would require significant planning, mobilization, and coordination among Iraqi security forces. It would also be a notable move in favor of US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias. Zaydi’s hesitation to follow through on this operation demonstrates how much influence Iranian-backed Iraqi actors retain over Zaydi’s government.


The recently reported plan to only “monitor” Jurf al Sakhr indicates that Iranian-backed actors, including the militias and leaders within the ruling Shia Coordination Framework, have coerced Zaydi into responding to their directives rather than complying with US pressure to rein in the militias. Zaydi initiated the government’s disarmament campaign and set September 30 as the deadline for the campaign’s completion. Zaydi initiated the campaign and set this deadline in part due to US pressure on Baghdad, which included offers of additional US funding and investment in Iraq if Zaydi is successful. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including those that are closest to Iran and that have been the most kinetically active in recent months, continue to refuse to disarm and resist government efforts to rein them in. The Iraqi militias are also circumventing and delaying the government’s disarmament efforts, including by handing in inoperable or small amounts of weapons. Many Iranian-backed actors pressured the Iraqi government into surrendering a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader over to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)–which contains a number of Iranian-backed militias–after Iraqi authorities arrested the leader earlier in August. The Supreme Judicial Council then dropped his charges. Pressure from Iranian-backed actors similarly thwarted former Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi’s attempts to crack down on the militias.


Members of the framework are reportedly concerned about the government’s recent attempts to crack down on the militias and the potential for armed confrontation between the militias and the government. Some framework members are even attempting to negotiate settlements between the federal government and the militias that have included “weapons management” proposals and delaying government demands to disarm until after US forces leave Iraq. Zaydi’s September 30 deadline currently corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq.

Iran has also dispatched senior Iranian officials to Baghdad in recent days to discourage conflict between the Iraqi federal government and the militias. These officials are also discouraging disarmament. Iraqi sources told Saudi media on August 19 that Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf relayed Iranian proposals to unspecified Iraqi officials that aimed to avoid a confrontation between the federal government and the militias. Iran also reportedly proposed “freezing” or hiding heavy weapons and transferring weapons to Iran until the militias reach a political settlement. Zaydi’s supposed previous plan to send Iraqi security forces to Jurf al Sakhr reportedly prompted IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s recent visit to Baghdad on August 10, during which he urged militia leaders to avoid armed confrontation with the government and to reach a settlement to avoid handing militia weapons to the state.

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## US and Partner Military Operations

*Nothing significant to report.*


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## Iranian Strike Campaign

*Assessed Iranian War Aims:*

* Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz

* Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war

* Restore deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners

* Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states


*See topline section.*


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## US-Iran Negotiations

*Nothing significant to report.*


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## Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei made several new appointments within the judiciary on August 19 amid renewed concern in the regime over domestic unrest. It is unclear why the regime has decided to reshuffle and promote these officials. The judiciary’s official media outlet reported that Ejei made at least 23 judiciary appointments to the Supreme Judicial Council and across several provincial judiciaries on August 19. The appointments included new heads of various divisions within the Supreme Judicial Council, such as chief justice, deputy judiciary chief, prisons organization head, and social affairs and crime prevention minister.


The regime, including nonjudicial bodies, may be engaged in this judiciary reshuffle to prepare to prosecute anti-regime elements. Ejei stated on August 17 that Iranian officials must remain vigilant against foreign infiltration and attempts to undermine national unity. Ejei separately stated on August 17 that he ”personally received recommendations“ for judiciary appointments from IRGC and Intelligence Ministry officials. It is unclear if Ejei had recommended these appointees and then the IRGC and/or Intelligence Ministry officials approved these appointees or vice versa, but it is nevertheless notable for extra-judicial bodies to make recommendations for judiciary appointments.


It also remains unclear if Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei was involved in deciding these appointments. Ejei’s August 17 statement and August 19 appointments come after Mojtaba appointed former IRGC Intelligence Organization Head Hossein Taeb as Basij commander on August 10 and tasked Taeb to use the Basij to increase surveillance of Iran’s population. ISW-CTP assessed that Taeb’s appointment may, in part, reflect the regime’s anticipation of potential unrest amid mounting economic pressure due to Taeb’s previous roles in brutal protest suppression.

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## Lebanon

*Nothing significant to report.*

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## Iraq

### Cementing Iraqi Economic Dependence on Iran

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf probably continued Iranian efforts to cement Iraqi economic dependence on Iran during meetings with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on August 19. Iraqi and Iranian media reported that Ghalibaf arrived in Baghdad on August 19 and has meetings with various Iraqi officials and political blocs, including Zaydi and the Shia Coordination Framework, until August 21. Ghalibaf said that Iran is “one” with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during a joint press conference with Iraqi First Deputy Parliament Speaker Adnan Faihan, who is a member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political bloc. Ghalibaf also said during the conference that his visit to Iraq accompanies Iranian efforts to create a “new regional order” in the Middle East without “foreign interference,” referring to the United States.


Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al Halbousi requested that Iran grant Iraq a “special status” under which Iraq could export oil through the Strait of Hormuz during a meeting with Ghalibaf on August 19. Iraqi media previously reported that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed prospects of Iranian permission for Iraqi oil tankers to transit the Strait with militia and framework leaders in Baghdad on August 10. Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati also visited Baghdad on August 16 and 17 to discuss an agreement that would facilitate “commercial and financial transactions” between Iraq’s and Iran’s central banks, which Iran could use to receive Iraqi payments for safe passage through the strait. These discussions come amid Iraqi consultations with the United States and other regional governments to develop pipelines and overland oil export corridors from Iraq to the Mediterranean and Red Sea that would bypass the strait. Such infrastructure projects challenge Iran’s long-term leverage over the global economy by offering regional oil producers alternatives to exporting fuel through the strait, which would reduce the waterway’s importance to global commerce if completed. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran seeks to draw Iraq away from pursuing alternative oil export routes and maintain Iran’s long-term leverage by discussing the possibility of a deal to export Iraqi oil through the strait. Any Iranian offer to provide safe passage for Iraqi tankers would also legitimize Iran’s illegal efforts to codify its domination of the strait by requiring Iraq to recognize Iranian control over the waterway.


Ghalibaf also discussed other economic initiatives with Iraqi officials on August 19, including reviving cross-border railways and developing Iraqi-Iranian “border markets,” in a meeting with Iraqi President Nizar Amedi. These trade initiatives combined intend to cement Iraq’s economic and political dependence on Iran by requiring Iraq to rely on Iranian terms to export Iraqi oil, which accounts for up to 90 percent of Iraqi government revenues, and expand cross-border economic activity.


### Kurdish Opposition and Border Security

Ghalibaf also likely discussed Iranian Kurdish opposition activity in Iraq, which the Iranian regime continues to be concerned about, during his meetings with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on August 19. Iranian state media reported on August 19 that Ghalibaf will discuss border security and counterterrorism issues with Iraqi leaders during his visit to Iraq. Iranian leaders consider Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan a counterterrorism concern and a threat to the regime in Tehran. Iran has repeatedly demanded that the Iraqi government dismantle Iranian Kurdish opposition militia bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and remove the militias from the vicinity of the Iran-Iraq border since 2021. Iranian forces have also frequently attacked anti-regime Kurdish militias in Iraqi Kurdistan during the Spring 2026 War. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) more recently accused Iran of conducting a drone attack on KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s office and the KRG’s intelligence chief’s residence in Erbil on August 17. Iranian officials subsequently denied Iran’s involvement.

### Militia Drone Handover and Disarmament Challenges

An Iraqi militia with a political wing, probably referring to either Asaib Ahl al Haq or Kataib al Imam Ali, handed over 20 Iranian-made fixed-wing drones to the Iraqi government on August 19, according to a senior Iraqi official speaking to UK-based Saudi media. Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali both have political wings and announced their willingness to disarm on July 2, differing from more militias more closely aligned with Iran that have refused to disarm thus far. The Iraqi official said that unspecified US officials attended the handover and that the Iraqi federal government is specifically focused on collecting drones and “cross-border” missiles from the militias, instead of conventional weapons like artillery or small arms

Militias have predominantly used drones and rockets to attack US positions in Iraq and reportedly Gulf states since the start of the war. An unspecified militia leader told Saudi media that the militia that handed over weapons to the Iraqi federal government on August 19 gave drones that could target Israel. The unspecified militia leader claimed that the Iraqi militias have most of the same weapons that the Iraqi army possesses. It will be difficult for the Iraqi federal government to verify the level of disarmament for the militia cooperating with the government or any other militia due to the covert nature of the Iraqi militias, including those within the PMF, however.

## Arabian Peninsula

*Nothing significant to report.*


Russian Campaign Assessment: Economic Strain and Fuel Crisis Tactics

 # Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2026


**Assessment as of:** 8:00 PM ET  

**Data Cutoff:** 11:15 AM ET  

**Prepared by:** Jennie Olmsted, Samuel Frykholm, Tetiana Trach, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Shymkiv, Arielle Sher, Nikolai Sundstrom, and Frederick W. Kagan  

**Institute for the Study of War (ISW) & Critical Threats Project (CTP)**

## Toplines / Analyst Notes


Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia’s poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage that over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have done to the Russian economy. Putin stated that Russia’s GDP growth is currently around one percent, characterizing the growth as “modest” but positive. Putin acknowledged that “external pressure” and “terrorist attacks” — the Kremlin’s code for Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign — are affecting Russia’s economic growth. 


Putin tacitly acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities in late July and August 2026, which are imposing growing operational and financial costs on Russia, mean that some logistics and warehouses require “restoration” but claimed that all trade infrastructure is operating effectively. Putin sought to reassure the Russian public that he is taking appropriate measures to address Russia’s economic challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections. He tried to present the Russian government as prioritizing quality of life issues for Russian citizens even as the Kremlin also tries to prepare Russian society to make more sacrifices for his failing war. 


The Russian people have been increasingly feeling the effects of war in the form of rising inflation and the price of goods, gasoline shortages, and labor shortages. Putin is likely acknowledging the damage Ukrainian strikes are doing to the Russian economy to portray himself and his United Russia party as aware of the economic and social struggles of the Russian people and to avoid appearing isolated from economic realities ahead of the elections.


Putin has been able to present a fictional picture of the Russian military’s performance on the battlefield to the Russian public more readily than he can dissemble about the economic situation. The Kremlin has conducted a broad censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the progress of the full-scale invasion since 2022, making it easier for Putin to present a much more positive vision of the war’s progress than the military situation actually supports. Ukrainian long-range strikes, however, have forced Putin to publicly acknowledge the economic effects that over four years of war have had on Russia as the Russian population and business community see those strikes and their effects themselves in ways that censorship cannot control.


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## Gasoline Shortages and Economic Strain


Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in areas Putin has sought to shield from negative consequences of the war. Russian state newspaper *Izvestia* reported on August 18, citing data from Russian crowd-sourced mobile application *GdeBENZ* (which provides Russians real-time fuel availability and prices), that gasoline was available at only 28 percent of all Russian gas stations, down from 41 percent the previous week. Fuel availability has reportedly declined across several Russian oblasts that are frequent targets of Ukrainian long-range strikes, including Moscow Oblast. 


Russian state-owned oil company Gazprom Neft’s hotline acknowledged to Russian business outlet *RBK* that it has instituted gasoline quotas at some gas stations in Moscow City but claimed that it was making efforts to increase supply. *Izvestia* correspondents confirmed on August 17 that 21 gas stations in Moscow City and Moscow Oblast were experiencing varying levels of gasoline shortages, particularly of high-quality gasoline. The correspondents reported that only seven of the 21 gas stations were selling AI-92 gasoline, six were selling AI-95, and only five were selling AI-98 gasoline. The Kremlin has long sought to shield residents of urban areas in western Russia, particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg, from the impacts of its war in Ukraine. Renewed gasoline shortages across Russia, including in Moscow, resulting from Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, indicate that the Kremlin’s ability to shield Moscow residents is becoming tenuous.


### Compounding Effects on Other Sectors

The Russian government’s attempts to alleviate gasoline shortages are having compounding effects, including in other key economic sectors. Russian business newspaper *Kommersant* reported on August 19 that Russia is also experiencing shortages in motor oil due to the reduced availability of raw inputs and difficulties importing motor oil. *Kommersant* reported on August 18 that the Russian Government Commission on Economic Development and Integration met in mid-August 2026 to discuss a possible ban on the export of aromatic hydrocarbons. 


Aromatic hydrocarbons are used in lower-quality gasoline but are necessary for a number of defense-related products, including synthetics, rubbers, and polymers. *Kommersant* noted that refineries produce aromatic hydrocarbons and decide how much to release to the domestic market rather than using them to produce gasoline. Russian refineries are now using more aromatic hydrocarbons to produce lower-octane gasoline in order to alleviate the ongoing Russian fuel shortages following a July 2 decree allowing them to do so. 


Reallocation of aromatic hydrocarbons to the production of lower-quality gasoline is exacerbating shortages in other sectors, including in the availability of motor oil, as fueling with lower-octane gasoline requires more motor oil to maintain vehicles. The Russian government’s attempts to increase the domestic flow of gasoline supplies are increasing stressors on other parts of the Russian petrochemical industry and on industrial production dependent on petroleum products other than gasoline or diesel. Even these measures, however, have not resolved ongoing fuel shortages in Russia.


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## Security and Civil Suppression Tactics


### Deployment of Paramilitary Forces

Kremlin concern about social disorder resulting from fuel shortages has reportedly led to the deployment of paramilitary forces in some areas. A Russian insider source claimed on August 18 that Putin deployed Rosgvardia (Russia’s heavily militarized internal security force) units to gas stations in Moscow Oblast. Rosgvardia personnel have reportedly deployed to at least 13 gas stations in Russia and occupied Crimea amidst ongoing fuel shortages in Summer 2026. 


Putin is deploying additional Rosgvardia manpower to patrol gas stations likely in order to manage civil unrest and violence occurring at gas stations due to severe fuel shortages and sales restrictions. Putin’s deployment of Rosgvardia personnel also likely suggests that the Kremlin expects the Russian fuel crisis and fuel-related violence to protract. The deployment of Rosgvardia troops indicates that the Kremlin does not have confidence in the ability of Russian regular police forces to manage the scale of fuel-related violence.


### Expansion of Legal Authorities for Emergency Forces

The Kremlin is also expanding the legal authorities of Russia’s emergency forces, likely in part in anticipation of more widespread public unrest. Russia’s legislative commission approved a draft bill on August 18 allowing Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations’ rescue forces to use physical force and firearms if the forces cannot fulfil their duties through nonviolent means, according to a source within the Kremlin and another source within the legislative commission. 


The bill allows rescue forces to use firearms to prevent attempts to seize military equipment and to protect Ministry of Emergency Situations’ personnel. The deputy chairman of Russia’s Security and Anti-Corruption Committee reported that the bill will also provide a legal tool for Russian rescue forces to counter Ukrainian drone strikes during evacuations in occupied Ukraine and in emergency situations. Russian officials are framing the bill solely as a counter-drone measure. 


However, the draft bill provides the Kremlin with additional means to suppress domestic unrest, including through violent means if necessary. The Kremlin is amending Russia’s civil defense law likely in anticipation of public discontent amidst continuing domestic gasoline shortages and possibly in anticipation of involuntary mobilization that Putin is reportedly considering for after the September State Duma elections.


### Restrictions on Mass Gatherings in Moscow

Russian authorities are restricting mass gatherings in Moscow’s Red Square, likely out of fear of protests and domestic unrest. The organizers of the Spasskaya Bashnya (Savior Tower) military music festival announced on August 17 the cancellation of the music festival, originally scheduled for August 21 to 30, “for reasons beyond the organizers’ control.” Russia has held the Spasskaya Bashnya music festival annually in Red Square since 2007 (except 2020), and it includes military bands of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Rosgvardia, Federal Security Service (FSB), and other federal security agencies. 


Russian authorities also cancelled an annual concert in Red Square for Russia Day planned for June 12. Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation noted that the cancellations of mass events in Red Square follow protests against the Russian Supreme Court’s decision to ban the opposition Yabloko Party from the September 18 to 20 State Duma elections. Large public events in Red Square would likely draw a large security presence to manage even without fear of protests or civil unrest, and the cancellations of these events indicate that Russian authorities have chosen to preserve the bandwidth of their security forces amid the new competing requirements imposed by the effects of the war in general and of Ukraine’s strike campaign in particular.


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## Political and Diplomatic Developments


### Ukrainian Government Appointments

The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) confirmed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appointment of Yevheniy Khmara as the Ukrainian Defense Minister on August 19. Zelensky appointed Khmara as interim defense minister on July 16 and submitted Khmara’s candidacy for acting defense minister to the Verkhovna Rada on August 18. The Verkhovna Rada also confirmed Zelensky’s reappointment of Andriy Sybiha, who has served as the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister since September 2024.


### Prisoner of War (POW) Exchange

Russia and Ukraine recently conducted an exchange of prisoners of war. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Russia returned 103 Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine, most of them wounded and/or seriously ill. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on August 19 that Ukraine returned 103 Russian servicemembers who were immediately sent to Belarus to receive psychological and medical assistance.


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## Key Takeaways (Summary)


1. **Putin's Narrative Framing:** President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia's poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have caused.

2. **Fuel Shortages:** Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in western urban areas (like Moscow) that the Kremlin has long sought to shield from the war's negative consequences.

3. **Compounding Economic Stress:** Measures to alleviate the gasoline shortages are exacerbating constraints in other economic sectors, including shortages in motor oil due to the diversion of aromatic hydrocarbons.

4. **Paramilitary Security Measures:** Concerns over fuel-related social disorder have led to the deployment of Rosgvardia internal security forces to gas stations in Moscow Oblast and occupied Crimea.

5. **Moscow Gatherings Restricted:** Major public events in Moscow's Red Square (like the Spasskaya Bashnya music festival) are being cancelled, reflecting fears of protests and a desire to conserve security force bandwidth.

6. **Ukrainian Leadership Changes:** The Ukrainian Parliament confirmed Yevheniy Khmara as Defense Minister and reappointed Andriy Sybiha as Foreign Minister.

7. **POW Exchange:** Russia and Ukraine exchanged 103 prisoners of war each.

8. **Kharkiv & Kupyansk Progress:** Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, while Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

9. **Deep Ukrainian Refinery Strike:** Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refining Hub in the Republic of Bashkortostan, approximately 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

10. **Russian Air Assaults:** Russian forces launched 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 drones against Ukraine overnight.


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## Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refining Hub, which includes three separate refineries, in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border) overnight on August 18 to 19. Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows smoke rising from the Ufa Oil Refining Hub. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko and Bashkortostan Republic Head Radiy Khabirov confirmed the Ukrainian strike. Ukrainian defense outlet *Militarnyi* assessed that the Ukrainian strike destroyed the AVT-6 primary refining unit at the Bashneft Oil Refinery in Ufa.


The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 19 that Ukraine’s August 14 to 15 strike against the Progress Space Launch Center in Samara Oblast hit the Soyuz launch vehicle engine assembly workshop. The Progress Center is Russia’s main production center for Soyuz launch vehicles, which Russia needs to launch satellites for its Rassvet (the Russian Starlink analogue) constellation. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the August 14 to 15 strike also caused a fire at an aircraft maintenance workshop at the Aviakor Aviation Plant in Samara City.


Likely Ukrainian forces reportedly struck grain vessels at or near Russian ports in the Black Sea in recent days. *Bloomberg* reported on August 18, citing sources familiar with the matter, that unspecified actors struck at least five grain vessels near the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai on August 17 and 18 — the first confirmation of strikes against grain vessels at Russian ports. The sources stated that Russian authorities are downplaying the strikes. Ukraine recently offered a moratorium on strikes against maritime targets in the Black Sea, but the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected this proposal on August 14.


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## Frontline Assessments and Land Operations


### Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

* **Russian Objective:** Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border.

* **Ground Activity:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Russian forces advanced east of Volkhivka (northwest of Sumy City and roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).

* **Ukrainian Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 17 and 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a bridge using a GBU-39 guided bomb in Zvannoye, Kursk Oblast (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline) and a mine-laying vehicle in Sudzha (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).


### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1: Kharkiv Oblast

* **Russian Objective:** Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.

* **Ukrainian Advances:** Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Bilyi Kolodyaz (north of Kharkiv City).

* **Russian Operations:** Russian milbloggers claimed on August 19 that Russian forces advanced east of and in northwestern Kozacha Lopan and east of Vysoka Yaruha. Russian forces continue to conduct frontline glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian military assets in the near-rear. Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian artillery system using four FAB-500 glide bombs in northern Slatyne. Russian forces are increasingly reliant on glide bombs to strike military assets in the Ukrainian rear and facilitate Russian infantry advances along the frontline as they are less vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes than artillery systems.

* **Flag-Raising Thwarted:** Ukrainian forces recently thwarted a Russian flag-raising mission in the Vovchansk direction. The Ukrainian State Border Service reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel attempting a flag-raising mission in the Vovchansk direction. Russian flag-raising missions are part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to project a false impression of Russian gains.

* **Velykyi Burluk:** Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance.


### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2: Oskil River

* **Russian Objective:** Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast.

* **Russian Advances:** Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 19 that Russian assault units seized the eastern part of Kivshrivka (southeast of Kupyansk), supporting Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets’ report on August 13 that Russian forces had consolidated on the northeastern outskirts of Kivshrivka. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces advanced east of Mala Shapkivka (north of Kupyansk), north and south of Radkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and in northwestern Kupyansk.

* **Borova Direction:** A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces attacked in the Borova direction on August 19 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.

* **Luhansk Oblast Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot near occupied Lobacheve (roughly either 86 or 118 kilometers from the frontline), a material and technical support warehouse near occupied Kadiivka (roughly 62 kilometers from the frontline), and Russian equipment and manpower near occupied Lysychansk (roughly 36 kilometers from the frontline).


### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3: Donetsk Oblast

* **Russian Objective:** Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

* **Slovyansk Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Lyman.

* **Order of Battle:** Elements of the Russian Phobos Unmanned Systems Battalion (reportedly of the Smersh Unmanned Systems Forces [USF] Brigade) are operating in the Slovyansk direction. This is the first instance ISW has observed of the Smersh USF Brigade or its Phobos Battalion operating in Ukraine. ISW observed reports of the Russian Phobos Drone Group (reportedly of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Kherson direction in November 2025. It is unclear whether the Phobos USF Battalion and Phobos Drone Group are the same unit.

* **Infiltration Tactics near Kostyantynivka:** Russian forces continue small-group infiltration missions within and near Kostyantynivka in order to bypass Ukrainian frontline positions and interdict Ukrainian logistics. Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions in southwestern Kostyantynivka and northeast of Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.

* **Aggrandized Claims:** Russian sources continue to aggrandize Russian claims of advance in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian sources published footage on August 19 purportedly showing Russian soldiers waving flags in Novomykolaivka in order to claim that Russian forces have seized the village. ISW has reason to assess that the footage was likely doctored or AI-altered. The Kremlin has been conducting a cognitive warfare campaign using aggrandized claims of advance and AI-altered footage to create the false perception that Russian forces are making significant gains across the entire theater.

* **Dobropillya Direction:** Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on August 19 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Vodyanske (east of Dobropillya).

* **Manpower Concentration:** Russian forces are reportedly concentrating manpower for a future offensive toward Dobropillya. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 19 that Russian forces are attempting to reach the Rodynske-Kryvorizhzhia highway (southeast and southwest of Dobropillya respectively) to advance toward Dobropillya. The commander noted that Russian forces are accumulating infantry to prepare for further offensive operations — an approach that Russian forces have not used for at least two to three months. The commander added that Russian forces have to travel approximately 10 to 15 kilometers from Pokrovsk over three to four days to reach the frontline.

* **Pokrovsk Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance.

* **Novopavlivka Direction:** Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on August 19.

* **Oleksandrivka Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance.

* **Donetsk Oblast Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and rear-area logistics in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone depots near occupied Novopetrykivka and Novotroitske (roughly 39 and 70 kilometers from the frontline, respectively). Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows a Ukrainian drone strike against a Russian vehicle along the T-0515 Kramatorsk-Donetsk City highway near the entrance to the Donetsk Airport near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline).


### Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

* **Russian Objective:** Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City.

* **Hulyaipole Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 18 to 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. The kill zone in the Hulyaipole direction may increase as seasonal dynamics can affect its growth. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment reported on August 19 that the kill zone in the Hulyaipole direction is not currently increasing as it did in the winter of 2025-2026, but that the growth of the kill zone is often seasonal. Filatov noted that the kill zone may expand significantly in the fall and winter as it did in 2025.

* **Zaporizhia Oblast:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 19 that Russian forces seized Mala Tokmachka (east of Orikhiv).

* **Zaporizhia Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian KamAZ truck along the H-30 Berdyansk-Tokmak highway east of Sofiivka (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline). Footage published on August 19 shows a series of burning Russian trucks and fuel tankers along the M-14 Berdyansk-Mariupol highway, likely following Ukrainian strikes. The Ukrainian Navy reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian BM-27 Uragan 220 mm rocket MLRS in occupied Nikopolskyi Raion.

* **Kherson Direction:** Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 19.

* **"Human Safari" in Kherson City:** Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Ukrainian officials reported on August 19 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone intentionally targeted a minibus in Kherson City, killing four civilians and injuring five others. Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows the aftermath of the strike. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear, especially in Kherson City, is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.

* **Crimea Strikes & Economic Toll:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on August 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a ground repeater used for controlling Russian Geran strike drones near occupied Olenivka (likely one of three settlements approximately 130 to 230 kilometers from the frontline). Crimea-based Telegram channel *Crimean Wind* claimed on August 19 that Ukrainian strikes disabled the Darsan substation in occupied Yalta (roughly 260 kilometers from the frontline) and that explosions occurred near occupied Hurzuf, the Saki Thermal Power in occupied Saki, a mobile gas turbine power plant in occupied Sevastopol, the Malorichenske substation in occupied Malorichenske, and the Alushta substation in occupied Alushta (between roughly 175 and 260 kilometers from the frontline). 

NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at a reported Russian Black Fleet Fleet [sic] storage depot near occupied Sevastopol (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline) and a reported Russian communications center near Annivka (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline). *Crimean Wind* also reported that fuel shortages, power disruptions, logistical problems, and Ukrainian strikes caused hotel occupancy in occupied Crimea to fall by roughly 35 percent in July 2026 and 30 percent in August 2026.


---


## Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign


* **Russian Objective:** Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline.

* **Reporting Interruption:** The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.

* **Nightly Air Strikes:** Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; occupied Donetsk city; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones and two Banderol loitering munitions, that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 10 locations, and that drone debris fell on three locations.

* **Targeted Infrastructure:** Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, transportation, residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukrainian state energy operator *Ukrenergo* reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.

* **Economic Impact on Ukraine:** Russian strikes against Ukraine are causing significant disruption to the Ukrainian economy. *The Economist* reported on August 19 that Russian strikes are inflicting significant damage on the Ukrainian economy, causing an estimated $500 million in damages to Ukrainian businesses and Ukrainian industrial and agricultural infrastructure. *The Economist* noted that Russian strikes against port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast could disrupt Ukraine’s ability to export 50 million tons of already harvested agricultural products.


---


## Significant Activity in Belarus


* **Russian Objective:** Increase military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks.

* **Activity:** Nothing significant to report.


---


*Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports.*


Newspaper Summary 200826

 Here is the complete article reproduced from Page 1 and Page 6 of the August 20, 2026 edition of Mint:


Market regulator weighs setting limits on lookalike passive funds

(Published on Page 1 and continued on Page 6)

[Page 1 Section]

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) is exploring setting limits on the number of lookalike passive funds that mutual fund houses can launch, as part of efforts to reduce clutter and protect retail investors, two people familiar with the development said.

The market regulator is looking into setting limits on lookalike passive funds—index funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that track the same benchmark, such as the Nifty 50, Sensex, or Nifty Bank, or closely related indices. Currently, there is no limit on the number of passive funds an asset management company (AMC) can launch on the same index, whereas on the active side, AMCs are allowed to have only one fund per category (excluding thematic funds).


[Page 6 Continuation]

...[so that their product lines] could be streamlined, one of the people cited above said on the condition of anonymity.

The market regulator is considering a proposal that would restrict the number of index funds or exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that track the same benchmark index or similar indices, such as the Nifty 50 or Sensex, the people said.

Currently, there is no cap on the number of passive funds an asset management company (AMC) can launch. On the active side, where a fund manager selects which stocks to buy, only one fund per category is permitted, except for thematic funds. However, thematic passive funds have picked up significantly.

Launched in the past year, some of these passive funds have seen a surge in inflows, particularly from retail investors. Market participants argue that having multiple funds tracking the same index can confuse investors and create unnecessary complexity, [and Sebi wants to rationalize them in] order so as to make them more distinct.

According to the proposal under consideration, Sebi may restrict the number of lookalike passive funds an AMC can offer, or set a cap on the total number of passive funds that can track a single index across the industry.

The move is aimed at preventing overcrowding in the passive space and ensuring that AMCs offer diverse investment options.

"There is a growing feeling that we are seeing too many identical passive products, which doesn't help the investor. A limit would encourage AMCs to innovate and look at other indices or asset classes," said the second person, an industry consultant.

An email sent to Sebi seeking comment remained unanswered.



In February, the regulator had capped portfolios of foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) to protect equity schemes with other mutual funds, barring large-cap funds from investing in lookalike schemes of other AMCs.

That restriction was aimed at curbing lookalike passive funds' assets, which stood at ₹4.25 trillion as of March 2026, according to Amfi.

With the rise of passive investing, lookalike funds have become a key area of focus for Sebi. In the past five years, the asset base of passive funds has grown from ₹1.5 trillion to ₹10 trillion, according to Amfi.


Here is the complete reproduction of the Plain Facts feature article, "The Economics of India's Toll Roads," from Page 5 of Mint (August 20, 2026):


PLAIN FACTS

THE ECONOMICS OF INDIA'S TOLL ROADS

By Payas Gokhale

India’s highways are becoming a bigger business for companies and the government. Toll collections touched ₹64,400 crore in fiscal year 2025 (FY25), with toll plazas and transactions reaching 3.81 billion. The creation of Indian Highways Management Company Ltd (IHMCL) in 2012 and the launch of the National Electronic Toll Collection (NETC) programme in 2014 paved the way for nationwide FASTag, turning toll collection into a rich source of data on traffic, revenues, and highway concessions. Data by IHMCL now reveals where toll plazas are concentrated, top revenue corridors, key contributors, private operator market share, and the financial impact of FASTag annual passes. Mint explores.


1. TOLL MAP

North and west dominate India’s toll map, reflecting its economic corridors

The NETC network expanded from around 300 toll plazas in 2016 to 1,100 in March 2025, adding roughly 100 plazas a year. Driven by mandatory FASTag adoption and accelerated expressway construction, these plazas, which control main lines, remain heavily concentrated along national highways.

As expected, coverage is highest in northern and western India and around major metropolitan hubs like Delhi-NCR, Mumbai, and Bengaluru. This spatial clustering directly mirrors the country’s primary industrial corridors, high-density freight routes, and port links. The eastern region and Himalayan states, by contrast, have sparser coverage due to geographical constraints and lower infrastructure development.

Within this network, Rajasthan (109), Uttar Pradesh (106), and Maharashtra (95) host the highest number of toll plazas—together accounting for over one-third of the national total—driven by extensive road networks and heavy traffic volumes.


2. COLLECTION HOTSPOTS

Most of India’s top toll plazas are clustered along the Golden Quadrilateral

The highest toll collections are concentrated along India’s busiest highways. All 15 of the highest-grossing toll plazas in FY25 were located on the Golden Quadrilateral, the centerpiece of India’s highway expansion. The northwestern arm, particularly the Delhi-Mumbai corridor, dominates the list.

Together, these plazas collected over ₹5,400 crore in FY25, or 8% of total toll collections. Of these, nine plazas are on the Delhi-Mumbai corridor, which accounted for ₹3,210 crore, or nearly 60% of top 15 collections.

The Shahjahanpur plaza in Neemrana, Rajasthan, operated by Delhi City Expressway Pvt Ltd, topped the list with ₹410 crore in toll collections in FY25, up from fourth position in FY24. This was nearly eight times the average toll collection of ₹58 crore per plaza in FY25. Higher collections at the top plazas are not necessarily driven by higher traffic. Their average transaction value is 1.4% above the national average, while only four are among the 15 busiest plazas.

Top 5 Toll Plazas by Revenue (FY25):

  1. Shahjahanpur (Rajasthan): ₹410 crore (Delhi-Mumbai Corridor)
  2. Lalanagar (Uttar Pradesh): ₹291 crore
  3. Chalgeria (West Bengal): ₹240 crore
  4. Ghoti (Maharashtra): ₹222 crore
  5. Jhakri (Haryana): ₹215 crore

3. TOLL PAYERS

Private vehicles had more transactions but generated lower value in recent quarters

In FY25, toll plaza transactions rose 14% year on year to 3.81 billion, and total toll collections rose 13% to ₹64,400 crore. Private vehicles (cars, jeeps, and vans) accounted for 62% of transactions but only 21% of total revenue, reflecting their lower toll rates. At the Shahjahanpur plaza, for instance, the one-way toll is ₹165 for a private vehicle, ₹355 for a bus or truck, and more than ₹1,000 for vehicles with four or more axles.

The rollout of the FASTag annual pass in August 2025 also appears to have reduced the toll burden on private vehicles in recent quarters. Revenue from private vehicles declined even as transactions continued to rise, pointing to a lower effective toll burden on these users. The annual pass has eased costs for frequent private-vehicle commuters, but India’s tolling system has long faced criticism for "tolling in perpetuity"—even after project expansion costs have been recovered. A Public Accounts Committee report tabled in Parliament in August 2025 flagged the issue.

  • Share of Transactions: Private Vehicles (62%) vs. Commercial Vehicles (38%)
  • Share of Revenue Generated: Private Vehicles (21%) vs. Commercial Vehicles (79%)

4. PRIVATE PREMIUM

Private operators run fewer toll plazas but generate half of the total revenue

Private participation in India’s highway sector has evolved over the past three decades. Until 2012, the government relied heavily on private players to build and toll roads while taking on traffic risk. Rising interest rates, over-optimistic traffic projections, and stalled projects led to a shift in the mid-2010s to government-funded engineering, procurement, and construction.

Since 2018, the government has sought to revive private participation through risk-sharing and asset-monetization models such as the hybrid annuity model and toll-operate-transfer. In FY25, private concessionaires operated 27% of toll plazas but generated half (50%) of total revenues. Their Average Transaction Value (ATV) was about 11% higher than that of public plazas.

Average collection at private plazas was ₹10.9 crore, nearly three times the ₹3.8 crore average for public plazas. Private players' share in toll plazas increased from 24% in FY23, suggesting private participation is increasingly concentrated in high-traffic, high-revenue corridors.

Share of Plazas & Revenue by Operator Type (FY23–FY25):

  • Plazas Share:
    • FY23: Private: 24% | Public: 76%
    • FY24: Private: 26% | Public: 74%
    • FY25: Private: 27% | Public: 73%
  • Revenue Share:
    • FY23: Private: 45% | Public: 55%
    • FY24: Private: 48% | Public: 52%
    • FY25: Private: 50% | Public: 50%

5. ROAD RULERS

India's top eight private toll operators account for about 20% of total collections

Around 300 private entities held highway toll concessions in FY25. The top eight accounted for about a fifth of total collections. IRB Infrastructure is the largest player by toll collections, followed by Cube Highways. IndInfravit's portfolio includes the Vashal toll plaza on the Ahmedabad-Vadodara highway and the Islampur toll plaza on NH-48.

L&T IDPL ranked fourth at ₹1,131 crore, with the Vadodara-Bharuch toll plaza under its purview. Other concessionaires include Reliance Infrastructure, Ashoka Buildcon, and Welspun Enterprises. This has also seen growing participation from foreign institutional investors (FIIs) such as Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) and Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan (OTPP), highlighting a broader shift in private capital from greenfield development to monetizing operational, income-generating highway assets.

Toll Revenue Details of Top 8 Private Concessionaires (FY25):

RankConcessionaireAmount (₹ crore)No. of Plazas
1IRB Infrastructure3,02325
2Cube Highways2,38835
3IndInfravit1,51124
4L&T IDPL1,1317
5Ashoka Buildcon88113
6Welspun Enterprises82112
7Reliance Infrastructure6471
8GMR64012

(Source: Indian Highways Management Company Ltd, Mint calculations)


The author is a PhD student in economics at the Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee.

Here is the complete reproduction of the corporate feature article, "Will festive discounts fuel consumer durables demand?", from Page 7 of Mint (August 20, 2026):


Will festive discounts fuel consumer durables demand?

By Neha M. Alawadhi & Srimoyee Bhattacharya

New Delhi

Last year, India’s consumer durables industry entered the festive season with a tailwind: lower prices after a cut in goods and services tax (GST) rates. This year, retailers are betting that discounts on consumer-durable premium products can keep shoppers spending, even as smartphones and other consumer goods become significantly more expensive.

“We expect around 8-10% growth in the season from last year,” said Nilesh Gupta, director and managing partner at Vijay Sales, noting that the Independence Day sale had provided a strong start.

Retailers are also seeing consumers trade up, rather than retreat from spending.

“Despite selective price increases, consumer interest remains high, with premiumization and productivity-led categories, with clear preferences for premium,” said Satish NS, president of Haier Appliances India.

But higher prices could make demand less predictable, particularly among price-sensitive consumers. Smartphone prices rose roughly 10% by the end of the first quarter, said Research Director Tarun Pathak at Counterpoint Research. “As elasticity is limited at these prices, premiumization may continue across TVs and refrigerators as brands introduce more AI-enabled products,” he said.


The Premiumization Trend

  • Shift in Mobile Sector: “Mobile growth has been driven by premiumization (from fiscal year 2026/FY26) to FY28 and not by volume, owing to high penetration in the category,” Tarun said. He expects that trend to continue as consumers typically move up the value chain. EMI financing, he added, should cushion the impact of higher prices.
  • Widespread Price Hikes: Prices have risen across consumer durable categories. LG Electronics India raised prices by a cumulative 16-17% in two rounds during April-June/Q1 FY27, across its portfolio, while Blue Star raised prices by 5%. Crop failures in some parts of India and high inflation are also expected to weigh on demand for entry-level durables.
  • Strong Premium appetite: There are signs that consumers are willing to trade up. Amazon India said in June sales of premium TVs priced above ₹35,000 double from normal days, with demand for newer kitchen products such as robotic vacuums, coffee machines and air-fryers rising 4.3 times year-on-year.

Festive Momentum & Tech Integration

The more recent Prime Day Sale also showed strong consumer momentum, with Amazon India saying purchases across smartphones, electronics, and consumer durables were more than twice those of a normal day. An Amazon spokesperson confirmed that consumers are also opting for more premium products.

Amrit Singh, vice president and business head (consumer electronics and home appliances) at Godrej Appliances, said the firm expects to grow 10% in festive season sales, driven by demand for premium products like double-door refrigerators, front-load washing machines, and energy-efficient ACs, besides AI-enabled products and other features.

“At the top end of the spectrum, a lot of brands have launched products with AI integration which is expected to continue the premiumization trend across TVs, washing machines and refrigerators,” Singh said.

The Mid- and Entry-Level Squeeze

The squeeze is likely to be greater at the mid- and entry-level, particularly among price-sensitive aspiring consumers in Tier-2 and other smaller markets. Consumers are more likely to become cautious with their budgets in these segments, but value-exchange schemes and finance could help bridge the affordability gap.

(Source: Mint, Page 7)


Here is the complete reproduction of the global finance feature article, "Bonds are getting hammered, and Wall Street says the rout won't end anytime soon", from Page 9 (Global - WSJ) of the August 20, 2026 edition of Mint:


Bonds are getting hammered, and Wall Street says the rout won't end anytime soon

By Sam Goldfarb & Richard Rubin

A selloff in global bonds is driving up borrowing costs for governments, companies and home buyers. And in the developed world, Wall Street sees no end in sight.

Bond yields are at 16-year highs and are rising on everything from the continuing U.S.-Iran conflict, which has stoked inflation worries, to the massive supply of new debt paying for deficits, cash-strapped governments, and budget deficits and a lack of buyers.

Few see eye-to-eye on what will trigger a turnaround and put an end to any further but temporary bond rout. None of those conditions are expected to change anytime soon. What's more, some warn that if things go worse, yields could rise even further—high enough to slow growth and trigger a recession.

In the face of the 2008 financial crisis, the era of ultra-low interest rates meant market conditions might work. Now, as the Fed signaling is likely to keep interest rates higher for longer, that is unlikely.

But the biggest concern remains the long-term bonds, which could move higher and continue to cause losses even if the Fed doesn't move immediately.

At least in part, this is a global phenomenon. Yields on government bonds, which rise when bond prices fall, have been rising in recent weeks, with the yield on the 10-year Treasury note touching 5.02% for the first time since June, and the yield on the 30-year bond touching 5.25%—both of which are the highest they have been since 2007.


Debt Management & Interest Expense

A sustained bond selloff could make it harder for the U.S. government to manage its growing pile of debt as older bonds mature.

Even before this year's run-up, interest on the debt was consuming a bigger slice of the federal budget. Now, nearly one in five dollars of revenue goes to interest payments.

Over the past half-century, net interest expense averaged 2.1% of GDP. That is expected to rise on its way to 4.6% in 2036, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). But it easily could be worse if the yields remain elevated.

The CBO's forecast earlier this year assumed the yield on the 10-year Treasury note would gradually decline from its current level of around 4.3% and remain around 3.6% in the long run.

If yields remain elevated, the government's interest costs would rise even faster. For every percentage-point rate increase above the forecast, the government would add $370 billion in net interest expenses over the next decade, according to the CBO.

“Ultimately, there's no escaping the rising interest rates,” said Michael Strain, director of economic policy studies at the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute. “The issue is the deficit. If we can only be concerned about one thing, that should be the high-risk 10-year deficit outlook.”


Political Pressures & Affordability

For now, the focus remains on affordability. President Trump has repeatedly promised to lower mortgage rates. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also said early in his tenure that the administration would try to push down the 10-year yield, in part by reducing the deficit, which would reduce the supply of bond offerings to the market.

Those efforts, though, haven't borne fruit, and yields are at levels that will make it harder for the administration to deliver on its promise. In recent weeks, Bessent has tried to capture some of that focus, arguing that it is at least in part due to factors outside the U.S.

Those factors include moves by central banks in other major markets to support the Japanese yen, a move that could lead to selling of U.S. government bonds to raise cash. Yields, though, have continued to march higher, exposing Bessent to criticism.

“The fact that action by the Treasury Secretary up to this point has had no visible effect on yields is an indication that this may have a higher hurdle,” said Lou Crandall, chief economist of investment-grade credit research firm Wrightson ICAP.

In one encouraging sign, yields have fallen somewhat recently, with the 10-year yield dropping from its October peak of 4.99% to around 4.75% on Wednesday.

Higher yields also have political implications. In a memo, Biden administration officials blamed the rising yields on GOP deficit-cutting plans, which they said would add to the national debt.

Still, a sustained movement higher in yields would keep borrowing costs high for consumers, businesses and governments. That is raising questions about voters' concerns about affordability.


Stock Market Impact

Stocks also took a hit Tuesday, with the Nasdaq Composite dropping 1.1% on Wednesday. The S&P 500 dropped 0.7%, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 0.3%, or 143 points.

Stock markets took a hit, with all 20 stocks in the PHLX Housing Sector Index in the red during intraday trading. The index fell about 11% since July, on track for its worst month since June 2024.

Indeed, though, yields still remain elevated.

“Markets have been able to overlook the increase in yields for a while, because we had this earnings boom,” said Keith Lerner, chief investment officer at Truist Advisory Services. “But I think as we move past the earnings season, there'll be more focus on yields.”


Here is the complete reproduction of the global business feature article, "Big Food is fighting to tempt taste buds in the era of weight-loss drugs", from Page 10 (Global - WSJ) of the August 20, 2026 edition of Mint:


Big Food is fighting to tempt taste buds in the era of weight-loss drugs

With GLP-1s threatening billions in sales, packaged-food makers are testing ways to win the not-so-hungry

By Annie Gasparro & Jesse Newman

Inside an Omaha test kitchen, executives at Conagra recently huddled over plastic trays of microwavable eggs, potatoes and sausage. One by one, they lifted a package of cheese sauce and squeezed out the liquid in a slow orange ribbon.

No one hated the test food. That was the point: Conagra, the maker of brands like Healthy Choice and Marie Callender’s, was trying to find out which of its existing foods might appeal to GLP-1 users, and develop new products that will entice them on Wegovy or Ozempic.

The testing was one of dozens of tests Conagra has conducted in recent months, a flurry of activity reflecting how seriously the packaged-food industry is treating the threat of GLP-1 drugs.

Food giants, whose success has for decades relied on a proven playbook to coax consumers into eating more, are now trying to figure out how to sell to people who want to eat less.

For decades, food companies have thrived on a business model that encourages overconsumption. But the rise of GLP-1 drugs, which mimic a hormone to suppress appetite and make people feel full, is forcing a rethink.

As many as 55 million Americans, or 15% of the population, are expected to be on GLP-1 drugs by 2035, according to Morgan Stanley. Packaged-food sales could fall by 2% to 4% as users cut back on calories, particularly sweet snacks and carbonated drinks.

The financial stakes are huge: a 2% drop in food sales would translate to billions of dollars in lost revenue for major companies. Already, some of the industry’s biggest players are feeling the squeeze.

Many food industry executives and boards initially took a wait-and-see approach to the drugs, which were initially approved by the FDA in 2005 to treat type 2 diabetes. The drugs mimic a naturally occurring hormone of the physiological class known as incretins, slowing stomach emptying and suppressing hunger.


A new drug

The first versions of GLP-1 drugs were approved by the FDA in 2005, initially for managing type 2 diabetes. But weight-loss trials in recent years showed they can help people lose 15% or more of their body weight.

The treatment at first specifically for weight loss was approved in 2021, followed by Wegovy, Mounjaro and Zepbound. American spending on GLP-1s surged from $5.7 billion in 2018 to $51.7 billion in 2023, according to the American Medical Association.

In late 2023, Walmart’s US President, John Furner, mentioned in a Bloomberg interview that hunger-suppressant users bought "slightly less calories." Afterward, shares of food companies slumped.

A few months later, Mattson, the California-based food developer, gathered a focus group of GLP-1 users who listed foods they had stopped eating since starting the drugs.

"I almost felt like I was eating soap," said Kristen Berry, a Pennsylvania food broker, who told the group of his first few months of meals after he started taking Wegovy. "Nothing had really good flavor."

A well-documented side effect of the drugs is a metallic taste in the mouth, said Richard Boy, president of a state-funded bio-science organization. And food companies want to combat that.

"Certainly if people aren't enjoying eating as much, they aren't going to buy as much," said Dori, a food companies' consultant who focuses on consumer taste and smell tests on GLP-1.


Calling in the chefs

In a kitchen replete with stainless-steel appliances at Conagra's Omaha research and development facility, Chef Vince Taylor poured lemon and a hint of white wine to zip up an Alfredo sauce. Taylor said the secret to favorite family foods in a lot of cases is fat and sugar.

These ingredients happen to turn off those on weight-loss drugs, but they could be another way to sharpen the taste. Instead, they’ll use the delicious combinations of GLP-1 users.

Instead, Conagra is leaning on herbs and spices.

"Instead of a heavy beef stroganoff, we can do a lemon chicken Alfredo," Taylor said. "We want to make sure it hits all of the boxes for GLP-1 users."

When Conagra's vice president of research and development, Laura Mac, was thinking about a growing adoption of GLP-1, she suggested they look at the food. "What if we could have a product like mac and cheese with fiber and protein?" she asked. Instead, she told them: "Just eat it in smaller portions and with more water."

Doctors recommend that GLP-1 users consume more than 100g of protein, to prevent the muscle loss that can occur with rapid weight-loss. A control group was given Conagra's protein shake. Conagra is also looking at its current lineup, which includes things like Healthy Choice bowls, to see which ones are already good for GLP-1 users.


Taste and Reformulation Challenges

Ruiz, a trained chef, knows working with "protein-heavy" mixes is a challenge: macronutrients can taste like chalk. "Protein is chalky," she said. To mask the protein, Conagra designed a custom marinade and added a robust mix of spices to the chicken breast dishes.

A prototype for a frozen burrito with the same protein levels was discarded, because the tortilla couldn't hold that much filling.

To entice the person on Wegovy, Conagra designed a custom recipe for Conagra's Marie Callender's brand of pot pie, using a crust of low-fat Greek yogurt, egg whites, and oat fiber.

To the degree that these continue to be barriers to food, the Conagra consumer experience is to make things that go easily in the microwave or oven and can often be in the disposable packaging a consumer would throw away.

Conagra now has its own employees assess the prototypes on behalf of the target audience—including those on GLP-1s themselves, Nolan said.

"I've been on Ozempic," said one, who works in Conagra's sensory evaluation lab. "I can tell you if it's hitting the spot."


'Here to stay'

Srinivas, the food-industry executive, fields requests from some of the country’s biggest food makers, such as Hershey Co. and PepsiCo, about how to position their products, or speed up projects with protein or fiber. With few exceptions, she said, they are choosing to diversify rather than fight loss of consumers.

Some analysts believe the food companies' fears are overblown. "While higher incomes demand we start GLP-1 users, the high cost is likely to keep them out of reach of many," said an analyst. "It is unlikely to be a permanent shift."

Kraft Heinz, the condiment giant, is among those that says the worry is overdone. In other households, when a family member is taking the drugs, the company's survey is showing other family members are still buying traditional foods, like Heinz tomato ketchup with its lineup of dipping sauces.

To entice the person on Wegovy, there’s also new competition: Nestlé is launching a new brand of frozen meals, called Vital Pursuit, that will feature portion-controlled meals, high-fiber, and other options.

Nestlé is also looking at how its current portfolio of brands, which previously had struggled, can be repositioned. Some analysts say the industry’s biggest players are likely to feel the most impact of GLP-1 drugs, because of their exposure to low-nutrition, high-calorie products.

Others, however, say that the food giants are well-suited to handle the shift, with some already having portfolio-wide reformulations underway, or planning to launch new brands.

"This is a permanent shift in consumer behavior," said an analyst. "Food companies that don't adapt will struggle."

"If food companies can adapt, they can actually benefit from this trend," said an analyst. "GLP-1 users are looking for premium, high-quality foods, which carry higher margins."


Key Statistics Callout

  • Projected GLP-1 Users: As many as 15% of the US population (or about 50 million people) are expected to be on GLP-1 drugs by 2035, according to Morgan Stanley.
  • Spending Boom: Spending on GLP-1s in the US is projected to surge from $5.7 billion in 2023 to $51.7 billion in 2030, according to the American Medical Association.

(Source: Mint, Page 10)


Here is the complete reproduction of the global finance feature article, "With a 150% bond rally, Ukraine shows it can beat the odds", from Page 10 (Global - WSJ) of the August 20, 2026 edition of Mint:


With a 150% bond rally, Ukraine shows it can beat the odds

Investors are throwing their weight behind the country's bonds, pocketing some of the most lucrative gains in bond markets

By Bloomberg

The country's extraordinary performance is reminiscent of other odds, along with billions in debt relief, the country is restructuring debts with creditors. It has been a remarkable turnaround since the start of 2024.

“These developments have helped turn around the sentiment,” said Roger Mark, a managing director at Ninety One in London. “That this country's showing the war isn't fundamentally altered the funding outlook is look-ahead. There's real belief that it now has funding secured and will win this war.”

Skeptics warn that the peace is likely to remain elusive, and a winter could turn the war in Russia's favor, but the bond rally is intensifying. It is business as usual for Ukraine...

...essentially behave like a one-way bet on whether the country can fight its way to the end of the war and receive its assets. Its $1.2 billion note due in 2029 is currently trading around 85 cents on the dollar. Back in June 2025, the bonds traded at just about 33 cents. Even though prices have retreated somewhat in recent months, the returns are still impressive.

Ukrainian sovereign bonds have risen on average 150% since June 2025, according to a JPMorgan index tracking dollar-denominated emerging-market debt, outperforming rivals by more than 10×.

Few analysts believe Ukraine has bought itself more time to raise fresh cash, and the country's bonds are still trading at deep discounts.

And just as important, Europe is showing a willingness to support. This month, the U.S. with allies plans to begin tapping into $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to help.

“It's a way to show Russia we are going to do a lot better and show a lot more commitment on technology,” said Anthony Kettle, an emerging-markets portfolio manager at BlueBay. “What is in it is for market, is...”

Ukraine's bonds, indeed...


Key Statistics Callout

  • Bond Value Surge: Ukrainian sovereign bonds have risen by an average of 150% since June 2025.
  • Price Recovery: The $1.2 billion 2029 note rebounded from 33 cents (June 2025) to approximately 85 cents on the dollar.
  • Relative Performance: Ukraine's bond returns have outperformed rival emerging-market debt peers by over 10×.

(Source: Mint, Page 10)