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Sunday, June 28, 2026

Iran Update: Escalation in the Strait and Lebanon Pilot Zones

 The following is a reproduction of the Iran Update Special Report published by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) on June 28, 2026.

Key Takeaways

  1. Iran has continued to attack US forces in the region to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian drone struck the Panama-flagged M/T Kiku on June 27, prompting US military aircraft to target Iranian surveillance, communications, air defense, drone storage, and mine-laying infrastructure. On June 28, the IRGC launched drone and ballistic missile attacks against the US Fifth Fleet Naval Base in Bahrain and the Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait.
  2. Iran’s strikes may reflect an effort to dissuade Gulf states from resisting Iranian control over the strait. Iran likely intended these strikes to signal that it will respond with force to any opposition to its management of the waterway.
  3. Iran is threatening to suspend negotiations as part of its efforts to deter the United States from challenging its sovereignty over the strait. The IRGC Navy stated that US strikes violated the ceasefire and will result in the "complete halt of all diplomatic processes."
  4. The Israeli government confirmed the locations of two “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as part of a June 26 trilateral framework agreement. These zones lie beyond the IDF’s “anti-tank line,” which likely reduces the risk of Hezbollah attacks on Israeli territory from those areas.

Escalation in the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has continued to attack US forces to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. Following the drone strike on the M/T Kiku on June 27, US retaliatory strikes targeted a range of Iranian military infrastructure. In response, the IRGC Navy released a statement threatening US bases and launched missile and drone attacks on the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait on June 28. While Bahraini air defenses intercepted several projectiles, the Interior Ministry reported that one Iranian attack destroyed a residential building.

Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have emphasized that Iran is “solely responsible” for managing the strait under the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). However, the fifth article of that MoU requires Iran to engage in dialogue with Oman and other Gulf states to determine the waterway's future administration. Artesh Spokesperson Mohammad Akraminia stated that Iran seeks to use this control to strengthen its regional power, rather than just for collecting tolls. ISW-CTP assesses that Iran is prioritizing recognized control over the strait as a strategic goal.

Iran's strikes also aim to signal to Gulf states that opposition to Iranian management will be met with force. This follows a June 25 declaration by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States rejecting Iranian attempts to assert control or charge tolls. Omani officials have also publicly opposed mandatory fees, citing international freedom of navigation. Iranian media has responded with a harsher tone, accusing Gulf states of trying to "conceal" a new "regional balance" established by Iranian control.

Furthermore, Iran is using the threat of suspending negotiations to alter US decision-making. This tactic was previously used prior to the signing of the MoU to compel the US to pressure Israel regarding operations in Lebanon.


Lebanon "Pilot Zones" and Hezbollah Opposition

The Israeli government has confirmed two “pilot zones” for the LAF to assume security responsibility:

  • Northern Pilot Zone: Territory surrounding Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in the Nabatieh District.
  • Southern Pilot Zone: Territory surrounding Ghandouriyeh and Froun in the Bint Jbeil District.

These zones are located on opposite banks of the Litani River and sit beyond the IDF's "anti-tank line," which should reduce the risk of Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks on northern Israel. While the LAF is tasked with disarming groups in these zones, the IDF plans to retain positions on advantageous terrain near Ali al Taher, Beaufort Castle, and Kfar Tebnit for defensive purposes.

Hezbollah has responded by threatening civil war in Lebanon if the government attempts to implement the agreement and disarm the group. Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah claimed the agreement's purpose is to undermine the US-Iran MoU and warned that Iran will not sign any agreement without a guaranteed Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. ISW-CTP assesses that Iran and Hezbollah are attempting to condition nuclear negotiations on a full Israeli withdrawal to preserve Hezbollah's presence in the south.


Other Axis of Resistance Activity

In Iraq, political parties with Iranian-backed militia wings are reportedly planning to publicly announce their separation from their affiliated militias. This "removal of military uniforms" is seen as a move to covertly take over Iraqi state institutions and protect against US pressure to reduce Iranian influence. An estimated 3,000 senior civil servant positions could be redistributed to these parties as they further entrench themselves in the government.

This maneuver follows a mid-June meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi and US Special Envoy Tom Barrack, who presented a plan of “investment in exchange for arms.” The US offered economic support in exchange for Zaydi’s government limiting Iranian influence by disarming militias, dismantling corrupt financial networks, and removing militia-aligned figures from the government. In response, Zaydi’s government has replaced the Central Bank governor and launched a large-scale corruption crackdown that has led to over 45 arrests.


Researchers: Adham Fattah, William Doran, Carolyn Moorman, Benjamin Schmida, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld.

Newspaper Summary 290626

     The article titled "Inflection point" from the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine discusses the current state and potential of India's Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs).


Inflection point

With a little support, MSMEs can be a driving force

There cannot perhaps be a better time than the present to take stock of how India’s micro, small and medium enterprises are faring. After all, there are 8.77 crore MSMEs employing 38.9 crore people, contributing nearly a third of GDP and half our exports.

Quite apart from the fact that the week starting June 27 is observed as MSME week globally, the world has been through a period of extraordinary flux over the last year or more, starting with the Liberation Day tariffs last April and culminating in the Gulf war. Alongside, developments in AI and automation are rapidly redefining production processes, creating opportunities and challenges with respect to skilling. It is against this backdrop that this newspaper organised its annual ‘MSME Growth Conclave’ in Bengaluru and Hyderabad. At least three things define MSMEs, and the policies meant for them, are dealing with technological and geopolitical shifts. The first is an inclusive space for concerning MSMEs (actually an umbrella term that encompasses enterprises from ₹2.5 crore to ₹500 crore), came up for discussion — access to finance, human resource management and managing the growth path of the enterprise.

To take the last point first, industry leaders rightly observed MSMEs should overcome the ‘Peter Pan’ syndrome, which seems to arise from a fear of losing family control. This also means snapping out of the sub-contracting mindset and instead owning intellectual property, particularly in the dairy. The use of modern equipment and digitised processes can aid expansion and standardisation of products. To this end, synergies between industrial and educational system need be developed. But to hack this ambitious, and more so a for a place as a financial ecosystem are pre-requisites. MSMEs struggle to retain talent. It was observed that the workforce should be able to visualise a career path.

As for finances, MSMEs continue to struggle. According to a recently released Deloitte report, most MSMEs do not have access to formal credit and raise funds from informal sources. While the availability of gold loans seems to be a factor, the banking system must do some serious introspection. Specifically, taking credit and working capital requirements met or adjusted to deal with global shocks. Credit appraisal schemes seem to help up to a point. Bankers with intimate knowledge of local conditions must be rewarded for nurturing enterprises over time with patient capital. While being wary of NPAs, as in the present times, bankers need to account for circumstantial stress. As for working capital finance, the Trade Receivables electronic Discounting System is not doing very well, despite recent efforts to reform it. The 45-day payment norm is often circumvented. Yet, it is remarkable that MSMEs have shown great resilience — despite Covid, demonetisation and the war-induced shocks since 2022 — to put the economy back on the growth path. Ecosystem support can make a huge difference.


The article titled "Line & Length: It has merit, but it stood in India" by TCA Srinivasa-Raghavan, published on page 4 of the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine, provides a critical look at mercantilism and India's economic history.


Line & Length: It has merit, but it stood in India

India has stood mercantilism on its head by importing far more than it exports.

A lot of highly intelligent people think China is the cat’s whiskers. Thus, “power in international trade disputes in a fundamental sense reflects power over supply, not power over demand, which is something economists have always tried to say.”

That, was Paul Krugman, the Nobel winning economist who is a trenchant critic of the Donald Trump government, wrote this in an article a few days ago. He was comparing the US and China.

Trump, he was implying, made the mistake of thinking that bottomless demand for goods mattered more than was China’s control of supply that has no substitutes.

Krugman is both right and wrong. China wins only because of its control of the supply of a few rare earths. Much of the rest of what it produces can be, and is, produced quite easily elsewhere.

Yes, it is true that it sells what it produces very cheaply. But that’s because of gigantic subsidies and currency manipulation. Economists have researched this to death. Countries can also fight back by taxing these import duties steeply. China doesn’t care.

When Trump increased tariffs on Chinese goods, he would have succeeded except that he made the same mistake that he made when he attacked Iran earlier this year. He forgot that China controls rare earths just as Iran controls the straits of Hormuz. Every Achilles has a vulnerable heel.

But to conclude from this that to supply that determines power in international trade is probably wrong. By that logic, Russia should control both Europe and the US because it could produce nearly $50 trillion worth of goods and services. It is often said that without the demand from China and Europe the Russian economy would collapse. The other buyers of the buyers would merely deflate while they diversify their sources of supply.

CHINA’S WEAKNESS Despite temporary phases of having the upper hand, a single seller is therefore always more vulnerable. The Chinese should bear this in mind while withholding supply. Actually, China knows this. And that’s why it’s constantly putting out the news that it’s invulnerable. But who is it fooling?

Let’s not forget that it can’t feed itself. Nor is it self-sufficient in energy. In fact, far from it. If tomorrow there were food or energy sanctions against it, together the two would very quickly bring it to its knees.

INDIAN MERCANTILISM But leave Krugman and China and let’s return to mercantilism. Where does India stand on it? Believe me, you don’t want to know. It’s enough to make a strong mind boggling.

In a typical inversion of policies which make neither economic nor political sense, India has stood mercantilism on its head. The core of mercantilism, as enunciated by the Englishman Thomas Mun in the 17th century, is to export as much as you can and import as little as you need. India does the exact opposite.

Two things have been mainly responsible for this economic absurdity. One was the political belief that we needed to save foreign exchange. So the model of being an exporting country that didn’t have any industrial base of its own and the other was the need to stop the colonial maltreatment of labour.

It never occurred to anyone that rapid industrialisation is inconsistent with the jellymoulding of labour. You can’t have both. Communist China understood this perfectly, we didn’t. Basically, to show we stood mercantilism on its head, because our comparative advantage in labour was wholly neglected.

In India equity for labour displaced efficiency for capital. And that is how we stood mercantilism on its head, because our comparative advantage in labour was wholly neglected.

Amongst the various counterproductive things we did, we ignored the basic fact that after 1947 China after 1978 did the exact opposite. It now has a $20 trillion economy. We have a $4 trillion economy. We used to follow China. Now we buy everything from it. It is not as if India’s first prime minister wasn’t told about the negative outcomes of his economic policies after 1957. He was, but he ignored all the warnings.

Can the fallout be fixed? Not unless we prioritise efficiency over equity. Will we do it? Yes but in homeopathic doses, as in the new labour codes.

What does that mean? I think we should replace that 0 in 2047 with 1, to make it 2147.

I mean, look at us. Even after 79 years of Independence we are governed by politicians and babus who can’t decide what is really sufficient to improve Indian citizenship. What can we expect of them?


The article titled Other Voices (South China Morning Post), found on page 4 of the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine, addresses the mental health challenges facing youth in Hong Kong:


South China Morning Post

Hong Kong must tackle roots of youth mental health crisis

The mental health problems faced by the young, leading in extreme cases to suicide, are a long-standing issue experienced widely around the world. But they remain a source of deep public concern, requiring constant attention. There were 91 cases of students having suspected of committed suicide between 2023 and 2025. The figure rose from 28 in 2024 to 31 last year, despite a range of initiatives intended to help. This suggests we need to look even more closely at risk support. With the reasons for each suicide are complex. But the challenges and pressures resulting from the city’s competitiveness and toxicity on social media can limit their ability to develop people skills and can expose them to cyberbullying or other harmful content.


The article titled "The cost of over-reliance on antibiotics" by Rajeev Jayadevan, published on page 5 of the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine, is a book review of A World of Resistance by Aaron Doran and Alex Broom.


The cost of over-reliance on antibiotics

The book presents a diverse array of useful perspectives — though India is not a lone contributor or victim as painted

The central theme of this work is antimicrobial resistance (AMR), with the authors choosing to highlight global India’s role within this public health challenge. Before evaluating the book’s specific focus on India, it’s vital to discuss what AMR means. It is a global problem identified by the World Health Organization where existing treatments can no longer effectively combat bacteria and other infections, leading to more severe illnesses, prolonged hospital courses, and worse clinical outcomes.

Incidentally, bacteria have always possessed the biological ability to overcome antibiotics. This is a natural part of their evolutionary survival over billions of years, helping them resist lethal chemicals deployed by other organisms in the environment. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the first case of bacteria suddenly acquiring an antibiotic happened long after man started using antibiotics.

It is true that antibiotic overuse and misuse contribute to larger bacterial populations that are relatively resistant through the process of selection. However, the cliché that only patient blame or irrational prescribing patterns obscures the fundamental nature of the problem globally. These drivers range from large-scale livestock antibiotic use, urban overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, shortcomings in infection prevention strategies, and diagnostic limitations and healthcare access, compounded by worldwide educational disparities.

Ultimately, the entire world needs to work together to reduce resistance, particularly because the number of new drugs in the pipeline does not match the rising need.

In the first paragraph of their introduction, the authors mention the controversial term New Delhi Metallo-beta-lactamase-1 (NDM-1), which was branded as “India’s superbug” by the international media in 2008. This created an unfortunate perception that India was exporting dangerous bacteria to the rest of the world, and there was an unsafe place for global health. Experts decried such criticism as scientifically inaccurate, given that resistance has evolved over billions of years and cannot be pinpointed to a specific location.

In subsequent sections, the authors discuss the considerable number of tuberculosis patients in India, noting that many suffer from drug-resistant strains. To provide necessary context, tuberculosis remains a monumental global challenge, and drug resistance is an escalating crisis present across many populous and developing nations.

HISTORICAL REFERENCES

The authors also present historical references to advisories regarding antibiotic use in India. However, these guidelines were relatively sparse in the early post-Independence era, when the primary focus was combating the larger share of illness and death from infectious diseases. The advent of antibiotics, improved sanitation, vaccination and modern aseptic practices that allowed life expectancy to rise quickly beyond the fourth decade. An unintended consequence of this successful historical transition was a lingering cultural and clinical practice of utilising an antibiotic whenever an infection was suspected.

Fuelled by an earnest desire to heal their patients, doctors in developing nations — not just in India — err on the side of overprescribing rather than under-prescribing. This is a multi-faceted process driven by a lack of rapid diagnostic tests that can differentiate between bacterial and viral infections, a mutual reluctance to perform these tests due to cost concerns and patient compliance, a higher prevalence of many types of bacterial diseases, avoidance of patient dissatisfaction at not receiving a prescription, and a defensive fear of missing a serious bacterial infection when initial symptoms mimic a viral fever. In India, unfortunately, this challenge is compounded by self-medication and the availability of antibiotics from pharmacies without a physician's prescription.

The next portion of the book addresses the rise of India as a hub for generic drug manufacturing, where the authors discuss environmental pollution caused by pharmaceutical effluents. Environmental contamination is indeed a recognised variable in AMR. When industrial waste containing active antibiotic residues enters water bodies, it can expose local bacteria to sub-lethal doses of these agents, selectively promoting the growth of resistant organisms. The book notes that this environmental resistance occurs as a side effect of lower-cost manufacturing, as well as widespread antibiotic use in agriculture, citing similar studies from China. While it is easy to point fingers at the developing world's manufacturing processes with all intensity, the fact remains that western countries are the beneficiaries of this cost-cutting, which incentivises pharmaceutical firms to manufacture generics at the lowest cost possible.

When discussing the veterinary use of antibiotics in India, the book highlights recent measures undertaken to regulate these practices. On a global scale, worldwide agricultural antibiotic use (which consumes three-quarters of all antibiotics produced) remains the hidden elephant in the room, even as the book extensively discusses individual doctors’ prescribing habits and corporate promotional activities grab the public’s attention more easily.

Ultimately, the book, A World of Resistance, offers diverse and useful perspectives collected from various segments of society, which will be useful for policymakers in the country to comprehend the multifaceted nature of AMR. Although the authors describe India as the “ground zero of the growing AMR crisis”, several processes that drive AMR in India are common to many other nations, including wealthy ones. AMR is an issue all countries — wealthy or otherwise, big or small, provider or recipient — have a vital role to play.


The article titled "Moving satellite data at laser speed" by M Ramesh, located on page 7 of the source, explores the advancements in optical communication for space technology.


Moving satellite data at laser speed

ON A LIGHT BEAM. Bengaluru-based start-up is solving for an emerging bottleneck in space-tech: Limited radio spectrum for downlinks

Recently a Bengaluru-based start-up, Quosmic, raised at least $3.33 million fundraise from a group of investors that included Accel and Lightspeed. Quosmic has an interesting technology that promises to make a big difference in a crucial aspect of space-tech — data transfer.

Today, we are seeing an explosion of data from satellites. Modern satellites are remarkably capable machines. Earth observation spacecraft can capture detailed images of vast regions in a single pass. Weather satellites continuously monitor atmospheric conditions. Scientific missions generate tons of measurements from sophisticated instruments. The challenge is in moving the data from space to the ground.

For decades, satellites have largely relied on radio frequency (RF) communications. These systems are reliable and well-understood, but they have limited spectrum and finite bandwidth. As the number of satellites in orbit grows, the communications pipeline is becoming increasingly clogged.

The solution pursued by companies such as Quosmic is laser-based optical communication. Instead of encoding information using radio waves, the system uses beams of light. At its heart, the underlying principle is similar to fibre-optic cables that have transformed terrestrial telecommunications. The difference is light travels through free space rather than glass fibres.

Unlike radio transmissions, laser beams are extremely narrow. A satellite hundreds of kilometres above Earth must point its beam with extraordinary precision at a ground station or another spacecraft. Engineers refer to the process as pointing, acquisition and tracking — the ability to find, lock on to and continuously track a moving target. Quosmic says it has field-tested its optical communications over a 10 km terrestrial link, demonstrating these capabilities outside laboratory conditions.

LOOKING BEYOND RF

RF transmission is time-tested, but it is hitting a limit. A high-resolution satellite generates one to two terabytes a day, but only gets a few short windows over a ground station; over radio, it can push down only a fraction of that. “By industry estimates, roughly two-thirds of the imagery a satellite captures is overwritten before it is ever downloaded. They have paid to collect data they cannot deliver. That is the problem we solve,” says Shreyas Jain, Co-founder and CEO, Quosmic.

Earth observation is just the first wave — the volume problem is about to become orders of magnitude larger. Jain observes that the entire industry is moving to not just computers but also computing in orbit. In the last few months, SpaceX and Nvidia have announced AI computers that will go up. This means ‘orbital data centres,’ with partners including Starcloud, Axiom Space and Quosmic, building interconnects for space. “We are seeing an explosion of compute in space,” Jain says.

Radio frequency alone cannot carry the traffic. The ground link will be the bottleneck for the orbital economy. “Our job is to create a high-speed connection between space and the ground itself,” says Jain. “In-house we call it the ‘Optical Highway,’ infrastructure built indigenously, and the technology grows from here”.

USE CASE

The clearest operational example of such a performance is the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Sentinel satellites, which are behind the Copernicus programme. Previously, a high-speed low-orbiting satellite may be forced to wait for nearly half of its roughly 100-minute orbit before it comes in sight of a ground station to transmit data. The ESA has built a dedicated laser relay, which today moves nearly 40 terabytes a day and has carried more than a petabyte of data.

The agency says optical links will prove inadequate when its next generation high data-rate missions come online. “On rare performance, NASA’s TBIRD experiment sent data from a small satellite to the ground at 200 gigabits per second, moving more than a terabyte in a single pass under five minutes, which NASA calls more than a thousand times faster than a comparable radio link,” Jain points out.

ORBITAL DATA CENTRES

Today, many companies want to put up data centres in space — perhaps encouraged by the continuous supply of free solar energy. Another Bengaluru-based start-up, TakeMe2Space, is into this venture and Quosmic is building optical terminals for TakeMe2Space’s Moio constellation.

When you put gigawatts of AI compute in orbit, the data moving between these cloud-sized clusters at a radio scale cannot touch. Imagine a system where light has demonstrated a single optical connection transferring 40 gigabits per second in the lab, while a radio terminal is hard-pressed to hit 100 megabits to a few gigabits, Jain says. Starcloud has filed for a constellation of up to 88,000 computing satellites and envisions clusters in different orbits.

“For that traffic, optical is not a better alternative,” Jain suggests — “it is the only way to land the data at all”.

He makes another telling point: Radio spectrum is licensed, and licensing can take months. Optical communication needs no spectrum licensing.

ALTERNATIVE VIEW

The user industry has a slightly varied view. Akshat Bisht, CEO and Co-founder, GalaxEye, says achieving “pointing accuracy” takes a lot of effort and energy; he would rather use the energy to take more images. He also observes that cloud cover can interfere with optical communication links, making them less reliable than radio-frequency systems under some conditions.

“Optical communications is a great technology for the future,” Singh says, but for now GalaxEye is sticking with the old reliable radio frequency.


The article titled "Canada invests in making health systems climate-resilient" is found on page 9 of the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine. It details the Canadian government's financial commitment to preparing its healthcare infrastructure for the impacts of climate change.


Canada invests in making health systems climate-resilient

Climate change poses a significant and growing risk to health, said Health Canada, adding that more frequent and severe extreme weather events are leading to injuries, loss of life and negative impacts on mental health.

The country recently announced an investment of over $17 million through the Climate Change and Health Capacity Building programme to support 24 community-designed projects that advance knowledge, capacity and strategies in adapting Canada's health sector to climate change. The programme intends to build resilient and low-carbon health systems (HealthADAPT), and protecting Canadians from extreme heat.

Many regions across Canada experience extreme heat events, often referred to as heat waves. Through HealthADAPT, over $13 million is distributed to entities such as the University of British Columbia (UBC) and BC’s Provincial Health Services Authority.

UBC is examining the complex health risks faced by individuals with schizophrenia during extreme heat waves and climate heat exposure. This will help develop critical insights into how decision-making, poverty, and other environmental quality and social inequities play into vulnerability to heat and other climate change events. BC's Provincial Health Services Authority's work will help strengthen partnerships, research and data expertise to better understand and respond to extreme heat impacts, including heat-related illness and mortality.

The Canadian government has invested more than $6.6 billion in climate change adaptation since 2011. This includes $2.1 billion in commitments since fall 2022 to implement the National Adaptation Strategy and support other adaptation-related activities. As part of HealthADAPT, nearly $4 million has been provided to organizations across Canada to support efforts to build climate-resilient and low-carbon health systems.


The article titled "How NDR built a warehouse empire" by T E Raja Simhan, published on page 8 of the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine, chronicles the growth of the Chennai-based NDR Group from its origins in rice milling to its status as a major player in India's logistics sector.


How NDR built a warehouse empire

BRICK BY BRICK. From running a rice mill to boasting a ₹6,650-crore InvIT, the Group’s logistics-fuelled dramatic rise

India’s warehousing sector has transformed dramatically over the past decade, driven by the rollout of GST, rapid growth in e-commerce, the formalisation of supply chains, and the entry of global capital. Among the companies that have capitalised on this shift is the Chennai-based NDR Group, which launched nearly six decades ago with a rice mill and has evolved into one of the country’s largest warehousing platforms.

The group’s development pipeline includes projects currently constructing around 7 million sq ft (msf) of space across the warehousing and industrial park segment. This is part of a 12 msf land development pipeline scheduled for eventual transfer to the group’s infrastructure investment trust (InvIT), according to N Amrutesh Reddy, Managing Director, NDR.

The rice mills set up in the 1950s in Nellore by the founder, Naidu Amrutharai Reddy, worked only during peak seasons, and the storage space remained idle for a significant part of the year. Amrutharai’s sons began using the space to store cargo for others, an opportunity that eventually grew into a full-fledged dedicated warehousing business. The business subsequently expanded beyond agricultural storage. By the mid-1980s, it was a preferred choice for large consumer goods and industrial machinery companies like Hindustan Lever and Castrol.

During the 1990s, NDR entered bonded warehousing and container freight stations (CFS). Reddy says the company was the first to set up a private bonded warehouse and was one of the earliest CFS operators in Chennai. It was also an early mover in rail-linked logistics. In 2003, it developed a private freight terminal near Delhi-Gurgaon, at a time when there was no formal policy framework for such projects. The asset, which was later sold to Gateway Distriparks, provided the company with valuable experience in integrated logistics infrastructure.

ROLE OF GST

Reddy cites the introduction of GST as the turning point for the country’s warehousing industry. In the pre-GST era, companies maintained warehouses across multiple States largely for tax optimisation. GST enabled businesses to redesign supply chains around fewer, larger regional distribution centres, he says. This helped reduce inventory and transportation costs while improving operational efficiency.

Anticipating this shift, NDR focused on developing large, consolidated warehousing facilities in major consumption hubs. As demand for regional distribution centres increased, the portfolio expanded sharply from around 3 million sq ft in 2016 to more than 21 million sq ft currently.

The group’s growth received a further boost in 2021 when global asset manager Investcorp invested about ₹500 crore to accelerate the expansion of the platform’s portfolio. It hit a major milestone in February 2024 with the launch of India’s first listed warehousing InvIT, with 17 million sq ft of built warehousing space and around 2 million sq ft under development, cumulatively valued at ₹3,800 crore.

Since then, acquisitions and expansion have significantly increased the platform’s scale. The InvIT now manages around 22 million sq ft of warehouse and industrial assets, serving over 100 customers, with no single client contributing more than 5 per cent of revenue. The company recently raised around €800 crore from institutional investors for more acquisitions.

BUSINESS MODEL

NDR operates primarily as an asset owner and developer. It acquires land, develops warehouses and industrial facilities, and manages and leases them. The operational management is largely handled by third-party logistics providers and occupiers. Logistics accounts for about 10 per cent of the portfolio, or roughly 2 million sq ft. Under NDR InvIT, the focus remains on investing in infrastructure in various sectors such as electronics, engineering, and pharmaceuticals. Reddy says the company plans to add around 4 million sq ft annually through the InvIT. Expansion is underway in locations such as Coimbatore, Hosur, Pune and Varanasi.

Despite rising competition, NDR remains optimistic about the sector’s prospects. A substantial share of India’s warehouse stock does not meet modern standards for approvals, fire safety and infrastructure. Compliance requirements for tighter, organised developers are expected to benefit from the replacement and upgrading of outdated facilities. The company’s biggest challenge remains land acquisition, with large parcels becoming increasingly scarce and expensive.

NDR is also investing in sustainable practices such as rooftop solar power and exploring social infrastructure assets, including education, healthcare and hospitality, through asset-owning platforms, Reddy says.


The article titled "Human link in supply chains" by Rajesh Menon, found on page 8 of the June 29, 2026, edition of The Hindu BusinessLine, highlights the critical role of workers in the logistics sector and the progress of India's National Logistics Policy.


Human link in supply chains

HOISTING THE ECONOMY. The toil of millions of logistics workers keeps supply lines moving 24x7

RAJESH MENON

Yesterday, June 28, was Logistics Day. Observed since 2019, it acknowledges the vital role played by this network in day-to-day life. It includes everything from the last-mile movement of couriers, e-commerce agents and truck drivers to the vast network of heavy infrastructure like highways and trains hauling immense industrial bulk to ships. This ecosystem also includes warehouses. Ultimately, logistics relies on the relentless, 24/7 toil of millions of workers who keep the world’s supply lines moving seamlessly through a robust infrastructure.

India’s own ambitions gathered pace when the government launched the landmark National Logistics Policy (NLP) in 2022. It provided a clear, unified direction to a historically fragmented sector by aiming to slash high costs, boost global competitiveness and integrate multimodal networks through digital transformation.

Since the policy’s implementation, India’s logistics ecosystem has undergone a paradigm shift, validated by its climb to the 38th rank (from 54th in 2014) in the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index. This advancement, driven by infrastructural strides like the PM GatiShakti National Master Plan and the Unified Logistics Interface Platform (ULIP), has optimised part turnaround time and supply chain tracking, boosting the country’s manufacturing capabilities.

MULTIMODAL STRENGTHS

The momentum continued during the 2025-26 fiscal period, evidenced by media and government reports of multimodal execution across India. A major cornerstone is the operational growth of Vizhinjam International Seaport, which handled over two million TEUs while securing approvals to develop adjacent multimodal logistics parks (MMLPs). India’s major ports collectively handled a record 915.17 million tonnes of cargo in FY2025-26, while average vessel turnaround times plummeted below 50 hours.

On land, the ecosystem of dedicated freight corridors doubled to nearly 6,000 km, complementing along 2,741 km of track, accelerating freight speeds and decongesting traditional rail lines. Complementing this expansion is the operationalisation of MMLPs, marked by trial cargo flights at the new Noida International Airport and inland waterways cargo movement growing to nearly 180 million tonnes, respectively.

Further, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways revamped the model concession agreement for MMLPs to fast-track public-private partnerships. The MMLP at Jogighopa became fully operational in 2025, with a growing potential for inland trade to Bhutan and Bangladesh. The MMLP at Mappeddu, Chennai, embarked on the first phase of operation in 2026; work has started on MMLPs in Bengaluru, Indore and Nagpur.

Simultaneously, highway construction increased under the Bharatmala Pariyojana, expanding the National Highway Network to 1,46,572 km by March 2026, which includes the inauguration of the 213-km Delhi-Dehradun economic corridor. Parallelly, Indian Railways hauled an all-time high of 1,670 million tonnes of freight, reinforced by 35 new Gati Shakti cargo terminals.

Even as the NLP continues to make an impact across the States, the human link remains vital. Policies are being chalked up with the future in mind. Initiatives like Logistics Day affords an opportunity to salute the 20-25 million men and women who power the logistics sector, which accounts for 13-20 per cent of GDP, valued around $350 billion and enjoying a CAGR above 8 per cent.

The writer is a maritime expert. Views are personal.



EY Economy Watch: India Macro-Fiscal Performance June 2026

 As of June 2026, India's economic growth and output demonstrate a robust post-COVID recovery characterized by strong domestic demand, though performance is expected to face short-term headwinds from global and environmental factors.

FY26 Performance and Quarterly Trends

India's real GDP grew by 7.7% in FY26, an increase from 7.1% in FY25. This performance was underpinned by significant output across various sectors:

  • Gross Value Added (GVA): The overall real GVA grew by 7.9% in FY26. Exceptional growth was seen in manufacturing (10.7%), trade and transport services (11.0%), and financial and real estate services (10.4%).
  • 4QFY26 Moderation: Growth in the final quarter of FY26 moderated marginally to 7.8% (GDP) and 7.9% (GVA) from 8.0% each in the previous quarter.
  • Demand Drivers: Growth was largely domestic-led, with private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) growing at 7.7% and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) at 8.2% in FY26. Notably, GFCF surged to 10.8% in 4QFY26.

High-Frequency Indicators of Output

Data from early FY27 indicates continued resilience in private sector activity:

  • Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI): In May 2026, manufacturing PMI reached a three-month high of 55.0, and services PMI hit a six-month high of 59.8.
  • Index of Industrial Production (IIP): Using a new 2022-23 base series released in June 2026, IIP growth reached a four-month high of 4.9% in April 2026. This new series incorporates emerging products like vaccines and aircraft parts while expanding coverage to include gas and water supply.
  • Index of Aggregate Demand (IAD): This index, which combines demand conditions across agriculture, manufacturing, and services, posted a stable growth of 5.4% in April 2026.

Projections and Risks for FY27

While FY26 showed impressive momentum, a short-term setback is anticipated in FY27 due to exogenous shocks.

  • Growth Projections: Estimates for FY27 real GDP growth range from 6.3% (OECD) to 6.6-6.8% (EY estimate).
  • Primary Risks:
    • Geopolitical Stress: The West Asian crisis has created supply bottlenecks and price shocks for crude oil, gas, and fertilizers.
    • Environmental Factors: A deficiency in monsoon rainfall due to El Niño—estimated at 90% of the long-period average—poses a risk to agricultural output.
  • Nominal Growth: Nominal GDP growth is expected to be higher in FY27 at approximately 12.5%. This is driven by an expected rise in the implicit price deflator (IPD) to 5.4%, up from just 1.1% in FY26.

Wider Macro-Fiscal Context

India's output is becoming more energy-efficient; the energy intensity of GDP has fallen over time, which supports long-term growth sustainability. On the fiscal front, the Government of India met its FY26 fiscal deficit target of 4.4% of GDP. However, there was a substantive compression in capital expenditure growth, which slowed to just 1.6% in FY26 compared to a multi-year average of 25.9%. Restoring this growth to the budgeted 11.5% for FY27 is considered desirable for maintaining long-term output momentum.


As of June 2026, India's inflation dynamics are characterized by rising supply-side pressures from food and fuel, even as core inflation remains relatively contained. This surge in price levels is a critical component of the broader macro-fiscal landscape, as it is expected to significantly drive nominal growth in FY27.

Consumer Price Index (CPI) Dynamics

Headline CPI inflation increased to 3.9% in May 2026 from 3.5% in April 2026. While this remains below the RBI’s medium-term target of 4%, the trajectory is being pushed upward by specific sectors:

  • Food Inflation: This rose for the fourth consecutive month to 4.5% in May, driven primarily by vegetables and pulses (up to 4.3% from 2.3% in April) due to weather-related supply disruptions and sub-normal monsoon trends.
  • Fuel and Transportation: Transportation services inflation rose to 1.8% in May, mirroring high global crude prices. Airfares saw a significant jump of 15.1% during the month.
  • Personal Care: This segment saw persistently high inflation at 18.5%, largely due to strong global bullion prices; silver jewelry inflation reached a three-month high of 155.2% as investors sought financial hedging.
  • Core Inflation: In contrast, inflation moderated in categories like health, education, and communication, suggesting that underlying core demand remains soft.

Wholesale Price Index (WPI) Surges

Using the new 2022-23 base series, headline WPI inflation surged to 9.7% in May 2026 from 8.3% in April. The pressures here are more broad-based:

  • Fuel and Power: This remains the dominant contributor, with inflation at 30.3% in May. Crude petroleum and natural gas inflation reached 61.5%, reflecting a strong pass-through of global energy market shocks.
  • Manufactured Products: Inflation in this segment rose to 7.5%, indicating that input cost pressures are being transmitted to output prices.
  • Core WPI: This reached 7.7%, its highest level since the start of the new series in April 2024, signaling that inflation is becoming generalized beyond just energy shocks.

Inflation in the Larger Macro-Fiscal Context

The interplay between inflation and output is a defining feature of the June 2026 performance:

  • Impact on Nominal Growth: While real GDP growth is expected to moderate in FY27, nominal GDP growth is projected to rise to 12.5%. This is because the implicit price deflator (IPD)—which is derived from WPI and CPI—is estimated to jump to 5.4% in FY27 from just 1.1% in FY26.
  • Fiscal Implications: Higher nominal growth is expected to help the Government of India contain fiscal pressures by boosting tax revenues, potentially allowing the government to meet its FY27 fiscal deficit target of 4.3%–4.4% of GDP despite higher subsidy requirements.
  • Monetary Policy Stance: Facing a "dilemma" where price pressures might warrant a rate hike while slowing GDP growth might call for a cut, the RBI maintained the repo rate at 5.25% in June 2026 with a neutral stance.
  • External Vulnerabilities: A significant portion of current inflation is "exogenously generated" by the West Asian crisis and its impact on the Strait of Hormuz. Projections for FY27 headline CPI inflation range from 4.5% (EY estimate) to 4.8% (OECD) and 5.1% (RBI), with much depending on the normalization of global oil markets.

In June 2026, India's fiscal performance is characterized by successful deficit management in the face of slowing tax revenue growth and a significant compression in capital expenditure.

FY26 Fiscal Achievement

The Government of India (GoI) successfully met its key fiscal targets for the fiscal year ending March 2026:

  • Fiscal Deficit: Reached the target of 4.4% of GDP, down in magnitude to INR 15.2 lakh crore from INR 15.8 lakh crore in the previous year.
  • Revenue Deficit: Met the target of 1.5% of GDP.
  • Index of Macro Imbalance: Despite meeting targets, the Index of Macro Imbalance increased to 44.5 in 4QFY26 (from 1.2 in 3QFY26), primarily because the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio for that specific quarter rose to 7.0%, well above the 3% benchmark.

Revenue Dynamics

Fiscal stability in FY26 was supported by non-tax windfalls rather than tax buoyancy:

  • Gross Tax Revenues (GTR): GTR grew by only 6.0% in FY26, falling short of the revised estimate (RE) of 7.4%. Tax buoyancy stood at a low 0.7.
  • Direct vs. Indirect Taxes: Direct tax growth slowed significantly to 5.2%, with personal income tax (PIT) showing near-zero growth due to rate rationalization measures. Indirect taxes grew by 7.2%, though GST growth moderated to 4% following rate reductions in late 2025.
  • Non-Debt Buffers: The shortfall in tax revenue was offset by strong growth in non-tax revenues (26.3%) and non-debt capital receipts, which both exceeded revised estimates.
  • Early FY27 Trends: Data for April 2026 shows a contraction in GTR of (-)1.9%, largely driven by a (-)17.2% drop in GST revenues.

Expenditure Trends and the CapEx Slowdown

A notable feature of the FY26 fiscal performance was a shift in spending priorities:

  • Overall Spending: Total expenditure grew by 5.4%.
  • Revenue vs. Capital Expenditure: Revenue expenditure (daily operational costs) grew by 6.5%, but capital expenditure (CapEx) growth slowed drastically to just 1.6%. This is a sharp departure from the multi-year average growth of 25.9% seen between FY22 and FY25.
  • Desired Recovery: The sources indicate it is "desirable" to restore CapEx growth to the budgeted 11.5% for FY27 to maintain long-term output momentum.

Fiscal Outlook for FY27

The fiscal strategy for FY27 relies heavily on inflation-driven nominal growth to manage pressures:

  • Nominal Growth Impact: While real GDP growth may slow, nominal GDP is projected to grow by 12.5% due to higher expected inflation (IPD at 5.4%). This higher nominal base is expected to help contain fiscal pressures by boosting the absolute value of tax collections.
  • Subsidy Risk: On the expenditure side, the West Asian crisis and supply shocks mean subsidies may be higher than budgeted.
  • Deficit Projections: The GoI is expected to either realize its FY27 budgeted fiscal deficit of 4.3% of GDP or marginally exceed it at 4.4%.

India’s petroleum economy in June 2026 is defined by a dichotomy between high strategic vulnerability due to import dependence and industrial strength in refining capacity, both of which significantly influence the nation's broader macro-fiscal performance.

1. Strategic Vulnerabilities: Import Dependence and Falling Production

India’s dependence on imported crude oil has increased in a "secular way," rising from 55% in FY1999 to more than 90% in FY26. This vulnerability is compounded by two factors:

  • Declining Domestic Output: Volume of domestic crude production peaked at 35.9 million metric tons (MMT) in FY12 but has steadily eased to 26.0 MMT in FY26.
  • Rising Consumption: Domestic consumption of Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (PoL) products surged from 90.6 MMT in FY1999 to 243.2 MMT in FY26.

2. Industrial Strengths: Refining and Energy Efficiency

While crude sourcing is a weakness, India has built an impressive capacity to refine crude into petroleum products, which serves as a macroeconomic cushion.

  • Refining Efficiency: There has been a 33% improvement in refining efficiency since FY1998, with the conversion ratio of crude to products reaching 1.27 in FY26. This capacity saves refining costs and allows India to diversify its crude sources.
  • Energy Intensity: A positive long-term trend is the falling energy intensity of India's GDP. Growth in PoL consumption is generally lower than real GDP growth, suggesting that India’s output is becoming more energy-efficient over time.

3. Impact on Macro-Fiscal Performance

The petroleum sector is currently a primary driver of inflation and trade imbalances:

  • Inflation Dynamics: High global crude prices—averaging US$100.4/bbl. in May 2026—have pushed wholesale fuel and power inflation to 30.3%. This energy-led shock is a major contributor to the surge in headline WPI inflation.
  • Trade and Currency: The merchandise trade deficit remained wide at US$28.2 billion in May 2026, largely reflecting elevated crude prices. Increased oil imports were also a key factor in the Indian Rupee weakening to an average of INR 95.6/US$ in May 2026.
  • Fiscal Pressures: While higher nominal growth (driven by fuel-led inflation) may boost tax revenues, the sources warn that subsidies for fuel and fertilizers may be higher than budgeted for FY27 due to the West Asian crisis.

4. Strategic Imperatives for FY27 and Beyond

The sources emphasize that India must prepare for "unanticipated shocks" by building strategic reserves.

  • Reserve Shortfall: India’s strategic oil inventories (21 million barrels) suffice for only about five days of consumption, significantly lower than China (92 days) or Japan (77 days).
  • Diversification: The sources recommend a multi-pronged strategy: augmenting refining capacity, exploiting more domestic crude, and accelerating the shift toward alternative energy sources, including nuclear and green options.

As of June 2026, India’s external sector is characterized by a structural dependence on energy imports and capital volatility, which are being successfully countered by unprecedented highs in service exports and remittances.

Current Account Balance (CAB) and Projections

India’s current account position has shown significant recent fluctuations:

  • 4QFY26 Surplus: The current account turned into a surplus of 0.7% of GDP in the final quarter of FY26. This was a sharp improvement from the 1.5% deficit in 3QFY26, driven by a narrowing merchandise trade deficit and a substantial rise in net invisibles.
  • FY26 Annual Deficit: On an annual basis, the Current Account Deficit (CAD) remained contained at 0.6% of GDP for FY26, unchanged from FY25.
  • FY27 Outlook: Projections for FY27 vary based on global conditions. While the RBI’s Professional Forecasters estimate a deficit of 2.1% of GDP, the sources suggest that if global oil markets and the Strait of Hormuz normalize, the CAD could be limited to 1.5% of GDP.

The Role of "Invisibles"

A critical pillar of India’s external sector is the performance of "net invisibles," which reached an unprecedented high of 8.7% of GDP in 4QFY26.

  • Services Surplus: Net services surplus rose to 5.8% of GDP, reflecting continued strength in global demand for Indian services.
  • Remittances: Net transfers increased sharply to 4.0% of GDP in 4QFY26, the highest level since 4QFY10. This surge was likely driven by higher "precautionary remittances" from Gulf economies amidst regional instability.

Merchandise Trade Dynamics

Despite the surplus in services, the merchandise trade balance remains a point of pressure:

  • Surge in Activity: In May 2026, merchandise exports and imports grew by 18.0% and 20.6%, respectively.
  • Export Drivers: Growth was led by engineering goods (up 24.5%) and oil exports (up 54.9%), though the latter was largely price-driven. Electronics exports also maintained double-digit growth at 11.6%.
  • Import Pressures: Crude imports surged by 53.8% in May 2026, reflecting elevated global energy prices (averaging US$100.4/bbl) and resilient domestic demand.
  • Wide Deficit: The merchandise trade deficit remained wide at US$28.2 billion in May 2026.

Capital Flows and Currency Performance

India is navigating a complex environment regarding foreign investment and currency stability:

  • FDI vs. FPI: In April 2026, net FDI inflows surged to US$6.6 billion (reaching a 68-month high for gross inflows), which helped offset heavy net FPI outflows of US$7.3 billion.
  • Rupee Depreciation: The Indian Rupee weakened to an average of INR 95.6/US$ in May 2026. This depreciation is attributed to the widening trade deficit, capital outflows, and elevated US yields.
  • Policy Response: To attract foreign capital and manage these pressures, the RBI announced measures in June 2026 to ease foreign access to government bonds and support banks in hedging currency risks.

Global Context and Resilience

The external sector's performance is deeply tied to the West Asian crisis. The sources note that India's ability to maintain a growth rate of 6.3% (OECD estimate) while global growth potentially slips to 2.1% in a "prolonged disruption" scenario highlights the country's underlying resilience to exogenously generated shocks. However, a speedy normalization of global crude supply remains the primary factor for restoring positive momentum to India’s external and overall growth prospects.


As of June 2026, India’s future outlook is characterized by a temporary moderation in growth due to global and environmental headwinds, even as the economy demonstrates significant underlying resilience to external shocks.

Economic Projections for FY27

While India achieved a robust 7.7% real GDP growth in FY26, a "short-term setback" is expected in FY27.

  • Real Growth: Projections for FY27 real GDP growth range from 6.3% (OECD) to 6.6-6.8% (EY and World Bank estimates). Despite this moderation, India is forecasted to grow by more than double the global growth rate.
  • Nominal Growth: A notable feature for FY27 is the likelihood of higher nominal GDP growth (estimated at 12.5%) compared to FY26. This is driven by a jump in the implicit price deflator (IPD) to 5.4%, resulting from higher expected WPI and CPI inflation.
  • Fiscal and External Balance: The Government of India is expected to meet its fiscal deficit target of 4.3%-4.4% of GDP. The current account deficit (CAD) is projected to settle at 1.5% of GDP, provided the global oil market normalizes.

Key Downside Risks

The sources identify several critical risks that could derail this outlook:

  • West Asian Crisis: This remains the primary exogenous risk, causing supply bottlenecks and price shocks in crude oil, gas, and fertilizers. A "prolonged disruption" scenario could see global growth slip to 2.1%, further sapping domestic demand.
  • Environmental Factors: There is a significant risk to agricultural output due to an expected deficiency in monsoon rainfall (El Niño), which is estimated to be only 90% of the long-period average.
  • Strategic Vulnerabilities: India’s dependence on imported crude has reached more than 90%, making the economy "strategically dependent" on global supply chains. Furthermore, India’s strategic oil inventories only suffice for about five days of consumption, which is significantly lower than other major economies like China (92 days) or Japan (77 days).
  • Monetary Policy Dilemma: The RBI faces a difficult balance where inflationary pressures might warrant a rate hike, while slower growth might call for a rate reduction; consequently, it has maintained a neutral stance with the repo rate at 5.25% as of June 2026.

Long-Term Outlook and Strategy

The sources highlight several factors that support India's long-term "growth story":

  • Energy Efficiency: The energy intensity of India's GDP has fallen over time, meaning the country can sustain higher output with lower relative levels of imported energy.
  • Industrial Strength: India has built a massive refining capacity that provides a cushion against pressure on foreign exchange reserves and allows for the diversification of crude sources.
  • Policy Recommendations: To minimize the impact of future shocks, the sources recommend building larger strategic reserves for crude oil, gas, and fertilizers once global prices normalize. Additionally, there is a call to accelerate the shift toward greener energy options and nuclear power.

Growth is expected to strengthen again in FY28, with the World Bank projecting a rebound to 7.2% as current global challenges gradually diminish.



India-Japan Partnership for Economic Security

 The India-Japan partnership for economic security is situated within an increasingly fragmented global environment where economic security has become a fundamental organizing principle for policy. The sources highlight that the strategic context of this relationship is defined by rising geopolitical tensions, great-power rivalry, and the emergence of "spheres of influence," which pose a constant danger to countries thriving under a rules-based order.

The Indo-Pacific as a Strategic Theater

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a vital strategic geo-economic arena, driven by the rapid growth of regional economies and the presence of critical trade routes.

  • Converging Visions: India and Japan share a vision for a "free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific". This vision is anchored in shared values, such as democracy and a commitment to a rules-based economic order.
  • Strategic Security Risks: The region faces heightened maritime and strategic risks due to escalating competition over critical resources, infrastructure, and strategic influence.
  • Inclusive Cartography: The sources suggest that discussions on Indo-Pacific cooperation must be inclusive, extending to the African littoral and the Middle East, which are vital geo-economic poles.

Economic Security Imperatives

In this context, economic security is no longer just about trade and investment; it is a strategic necessity for stability.

  • Reducing Vulnerabilities: Both nations seek to reduce common vulnerabilities and strengthen mutual resilience to sustain their strategic autonomy. This involves diversifying supply chains and protecting industries from external shocks.
  • Trusted Value Chains: The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent trade restrictions exposed the fragility of global production networks, pushing India and Japan to build "trusted value chains" with like-minded partners in sectors like semiconductors and critical minerals.
  • The "Middle Power" Responsibility: As uncertainty grows regarding the global rules-based order and perceived "US retrenchment," a greater responsibility falls on middle powers like India and Japan to maintain regional strategic equilibrium through alternative mechanisms of cooperation.

Regional Frameworks and Cooperation

The partnership operates through various bilateral and plurilateral frameworks:

  • Overlapping Initiatives: India and Japan engage through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Quad, though the sources note that the effectiveness of these can be diminished by global policy shifts.
  • Stability Amidst Rivalry: The bilateral relationship is described as reliable and dynamic, having withstood past economic crises to become a template for how stable democracies can coordinate to protect shared interests in a "more anarchic world".
  • Infrastructure and Connectivity: Strategic priorities include improving connectivity in regions like Northeast India and securing critical digital infrastructure, such as undersea cable networks, which are essential for Indo-Pacific stability.

In the larger framework of the India-Japan Partnership for Economic Security, semiconductors and critical minerals are identified as the "backbone" of 21st-century technologies and modern industries. The sources emphasize that securing these supply chains is a strategic necessity to ensure economic prosperity and national resilience in an increasingly fragmented global landscape.

Strategic Significance and Missions

Both nations have launched major domestic initiatives that intersect in this sector. India has established the National Critical Minerals Mission and the India Semiconductor Mission, while Japan’s efforts are guided by its Strategic Energy Plan. In late 2024, they inaugurated the Dialogue on Economic Security to deepen strategic cooperation and build resilient supply chains, a commitment further reinforced through plurilateral frameworks like the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, the Mineral Security Partnership, and Pax Silica.

Key Areas for Bilateral Cooperation

The sources outline several pathways to strengthen this partnership:

  • Joint R&D and Innovation: A critical gap exists in semiconductor innovation compared to the US and China. The sources suggest leveraging Japan's high R&D intensity (over 3 percent of GDP) alongside India’s vast human capital and startup ecosystem to co-create next-generation technologies.
  • Infrastructure for Testing and Certification: India currently lacks sufficient testing and validation labs, which limits the commercialization of new technologies. Collaborative testing facilities, such as the battery materials testing facility involving Japan’s KRI and India’s Epsilon Advanced Materials, serve as a template for shortening product development cycles.
  • Joint Exploration and Stockpiling: Because mineral exploration is capital-intensive and lacks guaranteed returns, the sources advocate for joint explorations to compete with major players like China. Furthermore, aligning India’s stockpiling efforts with Japan’s National Stockpiling System could create a mutual buffer against supply shocks.
  • Processing and Refining: A major bottleneck is China’s dominance in refining capabilities; for instance, Japan remains 60 percent dependent on China for rare-earth supplies. The sources suggest that India and Japan co-invest in refining and processing facilities within India, combining Indian scale with Japanese technology to reduce this dependence.

Overcoming Structural Challenges

Despite the strong strategic alignment, several hurdles remain for the partnership:

  • Policy Time Horizons: Indian incentives are often structured around five-year cycles, which are considered inadequate for capital-intensive sectors like rare earths that have low initial returns. Aligning these time horizons and standards is essential to reduce friction for long-term investors.
  • Institutional Coordination: The partnership requires a multifaceted approach involving Government-to-Government (G2G) coordination (like the 2025 MoU on mineral resources), Government-to-Business (G2B) de-risking by institutions like the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and direct Business-to-Business (B2B) execution.
  • Regulatory Alignment: Issues like regulatory misalignment and the lack of mutual recognition for certifications create friction for large-scale projects.

The sources conclude that for the 2030s, critical minerals must play the same central role in India-Japan collaboration that the automobile sector did in previous decades, transforming fragmented national policies into a collective regional security action.


In the India-Japan partnership, clean energy supply chains have evolved from being purely environmental goals to central components of economic security and national resilience. The sources argue that the green transition is a strategic necessity, as over-dependence on a limited number of countries for critical raw materials and specialized equipment leaves both nations vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.

Strategic Challenges and Market Realities

The transition to clean energy faces several structural hurdles that India and Japan aim to address together:

  • Operational Mismatches: There is often a gap between high government ambitions and the operational reality, where manufacturing tends to cluster only where demand is "captive" or assured.
  • High Entry Barriers: Building resilient supply chains requires massive upfront investment and long construction timelines with uncertain returns. New entrants also face challenges like predatory pricing and dumping from established dominant players.
  • Ecosystem Gaps: A successful transition requires more than just factories; it needs a supporting ecosystem of skilled labor, clear standards, and advanced testing facilities, which are currently underdeveloped in some regions.

Complementary Strengths

The partnership leverages the unique advantages of both nations:

  • India’s Scale: India offers one of the world's fastest-growing clean energy markets, a massive demographic dividend, and ambitious manufacturing targets.
  • Japan’s Expertise: Japan provides deep expertise in materials science, precision manufacturing, and industrial R&D. Japan’s “S+3E” framework—which prioritizes Energy Security, Economic Efficiency, and Environmental Protection under the umbrella of Security—serves as a model for this collaboration.

A Five-Point Agenda for Resilience

To move beyond pilot projects, the sources propose a structured strategic agenda:

  1. Dedicated Financial Instruments: Creating an India-focused fund to support Japanese investment is recommended to rectify the current imbalance where most Japanese supply chain diversification funding has gone to ASEAN countries.
  2. De-risking Private Investment: Through Government-to-Government (G2G) coordination, institutions like JBIC and JOGMEC can provide concessional finance to mitigate early-stage technological and capital risks.
  3. Anchoring Manufacturing to Demand: Midstream manufacturing—such as mineral processing, refining, and battery chemicals—should be anchored in India, where long-term demand is more assured, making projects commercially viable.
  4. Decarbonization as a Supply Chain Strategy: Decarbonization is treated as a security goal. This includes promoting circular economy practices, recycling, and transitional technologies like ammonia co-firing in coal plants to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.
  5. Building Industrial Ecosystems: The focus is on creating human capital through joint centers of excellence and industry-academia partnerships, ensuring that manufacturing is supported by a highly skilled workforce and common quality standards.

Ultimately, the sources suggest that by combining India’s talent for scaling and reducing costs with Japan's green industrial technologies, the two countries can bring affordable, secure energy solutions to the global market.


In the India-Japan Partnership for Economic Security, critical and emerging technologies (CET) are viewed as strategic necessities for Indo-Pacific stability and national resilience, extending far beyond simple technological development. As these technologies reshape global competition and redefine national priorities, both nations are moving toward a more systematic, policy-driven approach to innovation collaboration.

Digital Infrastructure and Undersea Cables

Digital infrastructure is now considered a vital strategic asset, with submarine communications cables serving as the backbone of global connectivity.

  • Vulnerabilities and Risks: Over 450 submarine cable systems carry nearly all international data traffic, but their remoteness makes them vulnerable to accidental damage or deliberate interference amidst rising geopolitical tensions.
  • Collaborative Security: Japan’s long-standing experience in precision infrastructure deployment complements India’s massive demand for digital connectivity. The sources emphasize the need for a bilateral mechanism to ensure the security, redundancy, and quick recovery of these networks.

Key Technology Frontiers: AI and Quantum

Economic security is increasingly dependent on breakthroughs in specific high-tech sectors:

  • Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI is identified as a "make-or-break" sector for economic security. There is a call to develop a shared view on AI safety that balances innovation with democratic and sovereign regulatory principles.
  • Quantum Computing: The sources highlight a promising avenue for joint research by converging India’s Quantum Mission with Japan’s Q-LEAP initiative.
  • Research Initiatives: Programs like the Lotus initiative (launched in 2024) provide a framework for Indian talent to receive technological backing and research support from Japan.

Cybersecurity and Resilience

As digital infrastructure and financial systems become deeply interlinked, cybersecurity weaknesses in one area can create cascading geopolitical risks.

  • Shared Standards: India and Japan have common interests in building cyber resilience through shared standards and incident response systems.
  • Operational Coordination: Recommendations include increasing collaboration between national cybersecurity authorities through joint exercises and universal "secure design" principles.

Innovation, R&D, and Human Capital

A central theme of the partnership is the complementarity of strengths: Japan’s world-leading R&D intensity and institutional know-how combined with India’s dynamic startup ecosystem and human capital.

  • Closing the Innovation Gap: To compete with the US and China, the two countries must move toward the co-creation of intellectual property.
  • Knowledge Transfer: Mechanisms are needed to integrate Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) into India’s manufacturing ecosystem to transfer "process knowledge" that is often undocumented.

Governance and Data Flow

The governance of data and sovereign digital ecosystems is a foundational pillar of the partnership.

  • Data Protection: Both nations have recently improved their data protection regimes, indicating a mutual understanding of the need for secure and appropriate data use.
  • Regulatory Harmonization: The sources argue for the harmonization of data governance and intellectual property (IP) regulations to reduce legal uncertainties and barriers to trade and cooperation.

Strategic Challenges

The sources note that technology often evolves faster than policy, creating a need for more structured and regular dialogue through working groups to maintain momentum. Additionally, while Japan has a more mature, cabinet-level economic security framework, India’s approach is still evolving, presenting an opportunity for India to draw on Tokyo’s experience to build its own resilience.


The sources outline a comprehensive set of future policy directions for the India-Japan partnership, emphasizing a transition from pilot projects to a systematic, long-term strategic alliance. This future-oriented approach focuses on streamlining policy coordination, co-creating technology, and building resilient industrial ecosystems to ensure regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

1. Structural Policy and Governance Coordination

To move beyond current limitations, the sources recommend a more streamlined and targeted approach to policy coordination.

  • Multifaceted Engagement: Future cooperation must combine government-to-government (G2G) setting of intent with government-to-business (G2B) de-risking and business-to-business (B2B) execution.
  • Harmonization of Standards: Governments should take the lead in bringing order to the current "proliferation of overlapping partnerships" and standards. This includes aligning data governance and intellectual property (IP) frameworks to reduce legal uncertainties and barriers to trade.
  • Aligning Time Horizons: Policy should shift toward longer investment horizons—beyond the typical five-year cycles—to support capital-intensive sectors like critical minerals that have low initial returns.

2. Joint Research and Development (R&D)

A central pillar of future policy is a "quantum leap" in joint R&D.

  • IP Co-Creation: Instead of simple technology transfers, the partnership should focus on the co-creation of intellectual property, leveraging Japan's R&D intensity and India's dynamic startup human capital.
  • Joint Financial Instruments: Recommendations include expanding funding mechanisms, such as the Lotus initiative, to facilitate collaborative scientific missions in AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors.
  • Institutionalizing Knowledge Transfer: New mechanisms are needed to integrate Japanese MSMEs into India’s manufacturing ecosystem to transfer "process knowledge" that is often undocumented.

3. Sector-Specific Strategic Directions

The sources detail specific policy agendas for key sectors:

  • Critical Minerals: For the 2030s, minerals should be as central to the partnership as the automobile sector was in previous decades. Policy directions include joint exploration, shared stockpiling systems, and co-investing in refining and processing facilities in India to reduce dependence on China.
  • Clean Energy: A "five-point agenda" is proposed, including the establishment of a dedicated India-focused fund to support Japanese investment and anchoring midstream manufacturing (like battery chemicals) in India where long-term demand is high.
  • Digital Infrastructure: Policy must institutionalize cooperation on submarine cable network resilience, creating shared contingency plans and common technology standards for digital continuity.

4. Human Capital and Industrial Ecosystems

Future policies must focus on building entire industrial ecosystems, not just individual factories.

  • Centers of Excellence: The creation of joint centers of excellence and industry-academia partnerships is recommended to build a skilled workforce in metallurgy, geology, and advanced material science.
  • Cyber Resilience: National cybersecurity authorities should increase operational collaboration through information sharing and the adoption of universal secure design principles.

5. Regional Inclusivity and Strategy

Finally, the strategic cartography of the partnership is expected to expand.

  • Inclusive Indo-Pacific: Future conversations on economic cooperation should be inclusive of the African littoral and the Middle East, recognizing them as vital geo-economic poles.
  • Strategic Equilibrium: As middle powers, India and Japan are urged to use these bilateral mechanisms to maintain regional stability and a strategic equilibrium in the face of global uncertainty and great-power rivalry.

Saturday, June 27, 2026

Pakistan in Perspective: A Post-Operation Sindoor Analysis

 In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor (May 2025), the sources describe Pakistan as a nation at a critical juncture, where its status as a nuclear-armed state with the world’s twelfth-largest military contrasts sharply with a flailing economy, a polarized society, and a fragile hybrid political system.

The domestic landscape as of June 2026 is characterized by the following key developments:

1. Human Development and Social Challenges

Pakistan is struggling to convert its young population into a "demographic dividend," instead facing a mounting demographic challenge.

  • Declining Literacy: The overall literacy rate dropped from 63 percent in 2024 to 60 percent in 2025, with significant gender and provincial disparities. Approximately 44 percent of children between ages five and 16 remain out of school.
  • Low Human Development: The country remains in the "low human development category" of the UN Human Development Report, ranking 168 out of 193 countries. Public spending on health and education is alarmingly low, at 1 percent and 0.8 percent of GDP, respectively.
  • Brain Drain: High levels of youth unemployment (estimated at 34 percent) have led to significant human capital migration, with Pakistan ranking sixth globally in this regard.

2. Fragility of the Hybrid Political System

The political structure is described as an inherently unstable "hybrid" system dominated by the Pakistani Army.

  • Institutional Capture: Other pillars of the state—the judiciary, legislature, and executive—have been "emasculated" or have acquiesced to the military's power grab. The 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendment Acts have been used to subjugate the judiciary and grant the military chief unprecedented legal immunities.
  • Political Vacuum: Traditional mainstream parties (PML-N, PPP) have lost national relevance and are seen as competing for the military's favor rather than offering popular solutions. This has created a vacuum being filled by peoples' movements (like the BYC and PTM) and armed insurgencies, both of which have faced brutal state crackdowns.

3. Economic Predicament and "Managed Fragility"

By 2026, Pakistan's economy moved from immediate default avoidance to a state of managed fragility.

  • IMF Dependence: The country is currently under its 24th IMF program. While macroeconomic indicators like inflation and foreign reserves showed temporary recovery by early 2025, structural weaknesses—such as a narrow tax base (only 2.7 percent of the population) and a massive energy-sector "circular debt"—persist.
  • Rising Poverty: Macroeconomic stabilization has not reached the general populace; poverty at the lower-middle-income line rose from 44.7 percent to 47.9 percent between FY2019 and FY2025.
  • Elite Capture: Over 37 percent of public expenditure benefits the wealthiest 1 percent, while less than 15 percent reaches the poorest, exacerbating internal instability.

4. Security and the Baloch Insurgency

The sources highlight a significant deterioration in internal security, with terrorism-related fatalities rising from 284 in 2019 to 1,720 in 2025.

  • Evolution of the Baloch Insurgency: The insurgency in Balochistan has transitioned from isolated rural raids to sophisticated urban warfare, employing high-profile hijackings and suicide bombings.
  • Targeting CPEC: Insurgents increasingly target Chinese investments and personnel (CPEC), viewing them as complicit in the state's exploitation of regional resources.
  • State Response: Islamabad continues to rely on heavy-handed military tactics rather than political dialogue, which critics argue further alienates local communities and radicalizes a new, educated generation of Baloch youth.

5. Controlled Media Landscape

While Pakistan has a diverse media environment with high internet penetration (116 million users), it is deeply controlled in function.

  • Narrative Management: The state uses both digital and traditional media to reinforce its narratives, particularly following Operation Sindoor, often masking deep-seated domestic challenges.
  • Erosion of Press Freedom: Journalists face significant risks, including harassment, imprisonment, and weaponized blasphemy laws, leading Pakistan to rank 158th out of 180 on the World Press Freedom Index.

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor (May 2025), the military’s role in Pakistan has transitioned from a behind-the-scenes "hybrid" partner to an overt and legally consolidated dominance over all state functions. The sources describe a landscape where civil-military ties are no longer a partnership of equals but a system of "institutional capture" by the Pakistan Army.

1. Consolidation of Military Power

The most significant domestic shift by June 2026 is the unprecedented concentration of power in the office of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir.

  • Legal Supremacy: Through the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendment Acts and revisions to the Army Act of 1952, the COAS has been made the functional head of all defense forces, including the Navy and Air Force.
  • Immunity and Longevity: These legal changes have granted the COAS and other top military officers (as well as the President) lifelong immunity from prosecution or arrest. Furthermore, Munir’s term has been extended until 2030, reinforcing his position as a "de jure generalissimo".
  • Subjugation of Civilian Pillars: The judiciary, legislature, and executive are described as having been "emasculated" or having "acquiesced" to the military's power grab. The legislature is often reduced to a "rubber stamp" for laws that sanctify military control.

2. The "Hybrid" System and Political Vacuum

The sources argue that while Pakistan maintains a facade of democracy, the system is an inherently unstable hybrid structure resting solely on the pillar of the Army.

  • Compromised Civilian Leadership: Mainstream political parties like the PML-N and PPP are seen as "ruling cliques" installed by the military rather than by popular mandate. Consequently, these parties compete for the "affection of the military" rather than offering solutions to the public.
  • Dismantling Opposition: The military has systematically dismantled the principal opposition, Imran Khan’s PTI, through imprisonment and legal manipulation, viewing them as a threat to the established order.
  • Rise of Peoples' Movements: As traditional politics loses relevance, a political vacuum has emerged, filled by grassroots movements like the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) and the Baloch Yakjheti Committee (BYC). The military has responded to these non-violent movements with brutal crackdowns, labels of "terrorism," and enforced disappearances.

3. Military Control Over the Economy

The military's influence has expanded deeply into the economic domain, a phenomenon referred to as "Mil Bus" (Military Business).

  • SIFC Influence: The establishment of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), headed by a two-star general, has formalized the military’s influence over national economic policies.
  • Budgetary Competition: Despite a flailing economy, Pakistan increased its defense spending by 20 percent for FY2025–26, even as overall federal spending was cut by 7 percent. This highlights how security priorities consistently override development and human capital investment.

4. Post-Operation Sindoor Doctrinal Shifts

The military has utilized the narrative of Operation Sindoor to reinforce its "victory" and "defender" status, despite having suffered losses during the conflict.

  • Quid Pro Quo Plus: To restore deterrence after the May 2025 strikes, the Army has adopted a "Quid Pro Quo Plus" strategy, declaring it will respond to any future Indian limited strike with a retaliatory response "one notch higher" to impose greater cost.
  • Nuclear Brinkmanship: Pakistan continues to use nuclear brinkmanship to deter Indian conventional responses to state-supported terrorism. This includes the development of "zero-km range" nuclear weapons (like nuclear landmines) to signal immediate escalation in the event of an Indian ingress.
  • Service Imbalance: The Army's dominance continues to shadow the Air Force (PAF) and Navy. For example, the COAS—not the Chief of Air Staff—ultimately determines air power policy.

5. External Validation and Dependence

The military establishment successfully leverages its strategic location and manpower to remain relevant to global powers:

  • U.S. Relations: Frequent meetings between Field Marshal Munir and the Trump administration have rekindled ties, with the U.S. praising Pakistan as a "phenomenal partner" in counterterrorism while providing technical upgrades for F-16s.
  • China Nexus: The relationship with China remains an "iron-clad friendship" focused on balancing India. This includes the integration of advanced Chinese military hardware and the creation of a China-backed Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing to support networked warfare.

By June 2026, in the wake of Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has found itself in a position of renewed diplomatic relevance, leveraging a shifting global order and its internal military consolidation to navigate complex relationships with major world powers and regional neighbors.

1. The United States: A Transactional Upswing

Relations with the U.S. have seen a significant upswing under the second Trump administration.

  • Tactical Re-engagement: Pakistan has successfully utilized a familiar "playbook" of personal praise and tactical cooperation to win favor. A key milestone was the March 2025 arrest and extradition of an ISIS-K attack planner, which led to a public commendation from President Trump during his State of the Union address.
  • Strategic Offerings: Islamabad has courted the U.S. by offering exclusive access to its mining and energy sectors, specifically focusing on critical minerals.
  • Military Ties: Despite a lack of new major equipment sales, the U.S. approved a US$686-million upgrade package for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet in December 2025. U.S. Central Command has praised Pakistan as a "phenomenal partner" in counterterrorism.
  • Transactional Nature: Analysts warn the relationship remains strictly transactional, with the U.S. primarily viewing Pakistan through the lens of manpower for regional stability rather than a strategic convergence of interests.

2. China: The "Iron-Clad" Asymmetry

The relationship with China remains Pakistan's most critical, though it is characterized by deep structural asymmetry.

  • Strategic Dependence: Pakistan relies almost entirely on Beijing for economic lifelines, military hardware, and diplomatic protection at the UN. Between 2020 and 2024, 81 percent of Pakistan's arms imports were from China.
  • CPEC Challenges: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) remains the "all-weather" bond's fulcrum, but it faces severe delays and security threats. In 2024 alone, there were 14 attacks on Chinese-linked projects in Balochistan, leading to increased pressure from Beijing on Islamabad to safeguard its personnel.
  • Technological Nexus: Cooperation has expanded into advanced warfare, including a China-backed Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing to support the Pakistan Air Force.

3. Regional Relations: Flux and Friction

  • India: Ties remain in a "permanent state of crisis," with Pakistan utilizing nuclear brinkmanship to deter Indian conventional responses to state-supported terrorism. Operation Sindoor created a "new normal" where India has demonstrated a willingness to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail and conduct punitive strikes.
  • Afghanistan: Ties with the Taliban regime have frayed significantly due to the Afghan Taliban’s patronage of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which uses Afghan soil to launch attacks into Pakistan.
  • Bangladesh: Following the overthrow of the Sheikh Hasina government in July 2024, there has been a notable thaw in ties between Islamabad and Dhaka, including potential sales of JF-17 combat aircraft to Bangladesh.

4. The European Union and Russia

  • European Union: The relationship is a "paradox," centered on the GSP+ trade status, which has made the EU Pakistan’s top export destination. However, this status is under increasing scrutiny due to Pakistan’s human rights record and blasphemy laws.
  • Russia: Moscow is actively courting Islamabad as part of its "Greater Eurasian Partnership," seeking to use Pakistani ports like Karachi as an alternative gateway to the Indian Ocean to bypass Western-sanctioned routes.

5. Middle East Mediatory Role

Pakistan has sought to project itself as a diplomatic heavyweight by mediating in the ongoing Middle East crises, specifically between Iran and the U.S.. It has also offered to contribute troops to a proposed International Stabilization Force for Gaza, further cementing its relevance at "Trump’s high table".