Iran Update Special Report, July 9, 2026
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
- Iran is threatening the resumption of large-scale conflict by striking civilian vessels and the Gulf states to try to achieve permanent control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s attacks illustrate that Iran views control over the strait as its primary strategic deterrent and that Iran is unlikely to abandon its efforts to control the strait in response to opposition from the Gulf states.
- The United States struck 90 targets across Iran on July 8 to degrade Iran’s ability to attack international shipping. Recent US strikes have had no visible effect on Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, and it is unclear when these strikes would have an effect on Iran’s ability or willingness to threaten shipping.
- Iran also likely calculates that it can use control of the strait as economic leverage to shape US decision-making and deter further US military action. ISW-CTP continues to assess that any arrangement that recognizes Iranian control over the strait would preserve Iran’s ability to close the strait at will to advance its strategic objectives.
- Some Iranian officials have threatened to change Iran’s nuclear doctrine, likely in part to try to deter the United States from conducting further strikes on Iran.
Toplines
Iran is threatening the resumption of large-scale conflict by striking civilian vessels and the Gulf states to try to achieve permanent control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has launched numerous strikes targeting commercial vessels and the Gulf states in recent days as part of a broader effort to secure control over the strait despite apparent resistance from the Gulf states. Clause 5 of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to discuss the “future administration and maritime services” of the strait with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with “applicable international law”. A senior US administration official told the Daily Wire on June 17 that clause 5 was designed with the assumption that Gulf states would moderate Iran’s position vis-a-vis the strait through the discussions required by the clause. This assumption did not take into account that Iran could fail to reach an agreement with the Gulf states and resort to using force to impose its desired “future administration” of the strait on these states. Iranian officials initially attempted to frame Iran’s post-war approach to the strait’s management as part of a new regional security framework that would ultimately benefit the Gulf states.
Iranian officials have since become much more hostile toward the Gulf states due to these states’ opposition to Iranian efforts to control the strait. Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on June 29 that Iran would implement its “sovereignty and new policy” in the strait even if Iran and Oman failed to reach an agreement on the waterway’s future management, for example. Iran’s continued attacks on civilian vessels and Gulf states in recent days demonstrate that the Iranian regime prioritizes control of the strait over avoiding renewed large-scale conflict with the United States. Iran’s attacks also illustrate that Iran views control over the strait as its primary strategic deterrent and that Iran is unlikely to abandon its efforts to control the strait in response to opposition from the Gulf states.
The United States struck 90 targets across Iran on July 8 to degrade Iran’s ability to attack international shipping. Recent US strikes have had no visible effect on Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, and it is unclear when these strikes would have an effect on Iran’s ability or willingness to threaten shipping. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 8 that US forces conducted strikes in Iran targeting air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline. These strikes were in response to Iranian strikes on civilian vessels in the strait on July 6 and 7. CENTCOM conducted similar strikes on July 7. Geolocated footage shows damage from US strikes to a reported maritime traffic control tower at Chabahar Port, which is on Iran’s southeastern border along the Gulf of Oman. Geolocated footage also shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Shahid Asarinejad barracks in Shiraz, Fars Province. The United States has repeatedly conducted limited strikes in southern Iran since the MoU came into effect, targeting similar sites as it did on July 8, including radars, communications nodes, and air defense systems. Iran has continued to attack commercial vessels, however, relying on its ability to fire only a small number of projectiles into the strait to hit individual ships and thereby compel commercial vessels to abide by Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme. A member of the Iranian negotiating team, Mehdi Mohammadi, emphasized on July 9 that recent US attacks have not changed Iran’s ability or willingness to control the strait.
The United States also struck bridges and railroads used by the Iranian armed forces to transport missiles, drones, weapons components, and other material for military reconstitution, according to US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal. The United States struck a railway in Golestan Province in northeastern Iran that Iranian media stated was used to transport goods from Russia. IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News reported that Chinese train traffic along the route has tripled since the United States launched its naval blockade on Iranian ports. Russia and China have helped Iran try to reconstitute its drone and missile programs, such as by providing Iran with drone technology and missile components, respectively.
Iranian forces launched missiles and drones at Bahrain, Kuwait, and a US base in Jordan in response to the US strikes. All of the Iranian projectiles were intercepted. Iran likely calculates that attacks against Gulf states will increase pressure on the United States to avoid further military escalation by threatening US forces and raising the costs for US allies.
Iran also likely calculates that it can use control of the strait as economic leverage to shape US decision-making and deter further US military action. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the strait in response to US attacks. The IRGC Navy stated on July 9 that continued US military operations would disrupt the strait’s “reopening process” and threaten Gulf states’ economic interests. Mohammadi similarly warned that Iran could block the strait quickly if necessary. Vessel traffic has increased since the United States and Iran signed the MoU but has fallen in recent days. Iran likely calculates that it can use the threat of “re-closing” the strait and disrupting global commerce to put economic pressure on the United States and discourage the United States from conducting further military action against Iran. ISW-CTP continues to assess that any arrangement that recognizes Iranian control over the strait would preserve Iran’s ability to close the strait at will to advance its strategic objectives.
Some Iranian officials have threatened to change Iran’s nuclear doctrine, likely in part to try to deter the United States from conducting further strikes on Iran. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei stated on July 8 that Iran may consider changing its nuclear doctrine if the United States launches another “all-out attack”. Rezaei previously stated on July 3 that Israeli officials’ threats to kill Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei constitute a “valid and compelling reason” to reconsider Iran’s nuclear doctrine. Parliamentary Economic Commission member Hossein Samsami separately stated on July 9 that Iran must change its nuclear doctrine because Iran is currently engaged in an “existential war”. Samsami was one of 85 Iranian parliamentarians who implicitly called for Iran to develop intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities in a letter to Mojtaba on May 31. An expert close to the regime also told IRGC-affiliated Fars News on July 9 that repeated US threats against Iran would force the regime to review its defense doctrine, including the “military use of nuclear technology”. Parliamentarians in Iran do not yield significant decision-making authority, but these comments nevertheless reflect discussions among Iranian leaders over how Iran should restore deterrence after Iran’s traditional forms of deterrence, such as the Axis of Resistance and the Iranian missile program, have failed to prevent repeated attacks on Iranian territory and senior leaders.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
See topline section.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
The United States is taking steps to support the implementation of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement in Lebanon. US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa told Lebanese President Joseph Aoun that the United States will send a military delegation to Lebanon “within days” to support the implementation of the agreement during a meeting with Aoun on July 9. Issa also stated that a start date for implementing the agreement’s “pilot zones” plan will be determined following the upcoming US-Israel-Lebanon negotiations in Rome, Italy, on July 15 and 16. An unspecified US official told Axios that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will begin to withdraw from the two recently announced pilot zones “in a matter of days,” however. Clause two of the agreement’s security annex stipulates that Israel and Lebanon will establish the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon to verify disarmament progress in southern Lebanon and operate as an indirect backchannel between the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Israeli media reported on June 30 that the IDF postponed its withdrawal from the pilot zones until the United States, Israel, and Lebanon established the coordination group with US military participation in order for the group to vet participating LAF soldiers. This step is intended to prevent Hezbollah from receiving sensitive information from the coordination group.
Hezbollah leaders and Hezbollah-allied politicians have continued to condemn the framework agreement and call for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected the framework and claimed that it only serves Israel’s interests in a speech on July 8. Qassem also demanded that the IDF completely withdraw from southern Lebanon and allow the LAF to deploy south of the Litani River. Lebanese media reported that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berrih told Issa on July 9 that he seeks an immediate and complete Israeli withdrawal from the pilot zones, while Issa called for a gradual withdrawal from the zones with US oversight.
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
The Iraqi federal government has agreed to implement unspecified safeguards to prevent Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from obtaining US dollars from Iraqi currency exchanges and Iraqi federal government salary payments, according to unspecified US and Iraqi officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal on July 8. The US government has resumed US dollar shipments to Iraq in exchange. The Iraqi Central Bank has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve that has held the Iraqi federal government’s oil export revenue in US dollars since 2003. The US Treasury Department initially halted US dollar shipments to Iraq in April 2026 due to concerns about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the war and reportedly resumed some payments on June 17 and July 2, excluding payments to Iraqi counterterrorism and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) training programs. Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister, receive a salary from the Iraqi federal government.
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