Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET. Assessment as of: 8:30 PM ET.

Russian forces are resuming their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast. ISW has observed an intensified Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and vessels calling at Ukrainian ports since at least July 10. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on July 14 that Russian forces struck two Tanzanian- and Liberian-flagged merchant ships sailing along the Black Sea corridor and a Marshal Islands-flagged civilian vessel at the Odesa City Port. Ukrainian grain exporter Kernel Holding reported on July 14 that Russian strikes against the Chornomorsk Port in Odesa Oblast damaged the company’s terminal and destroyed about 25,000 tons of sunflower oil. The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against civilian infrastructure in Odesa City on the night of July 14 to 15, and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted an air strike against Odesa Oblast on the morning on July 15 following the overnight strikes. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been specifically highlighting its reported strikes against Odesa Oblast in the past few days, likely to generate informational effects.

The Russian strikes likely aim to degrade the Ukrainian economy and reduce Ukraine’s export capacity. Bohdan Kostetskyi, an operating partner at agricultural consulting agency Barva Invest, stated on July 15 that the recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports have effectively stopped deep-water grain exports. Kostetskyi stated that most major grain traders have suspended their grain purchases and that some export terminals have temporarily halted operations. Kostetskyi reported that grain prices on the domestic Ukrainian market are falling as traders are unwilling to pay higher procurement prices since they have to factor in higher logistics costs. Kostetskyi stated that shipowners are increasingly refusing to call at Ukrainian ports after the recent Russian strikes, citing force majeure. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 15 that the Russian strikes aim to reduce the number of crews and captains who are willing to sail this route. Another Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian strikes aim to reduce the Ukrainian military’s ability to use the ports for logistics.

The Russian strikes are likely also a response to Ukraine’s recent strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, but such Russian strike tactics are not new. Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck 136 Russian vessels in the seas since July 6, and Russia may be in turn striking port infrastructure and vessels at sea to push Ukraine to stop its own strike campaign. Russian forces have long been striking Ukrainian port infrastructure throughout the war, however, as part of wider efforts to hinder Ukrainian grain exports and drive up the cost of shipping via the Black Sea. Russian forces in particular tried to use its strikes against Ukrainian ports to extract Western and Ukrainian concessions after Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative—the 2022-2023 agreement that created a safe corridor for shipping from Ukrainian ports to sustain global grain shipments.

Russia appears to be struggling to deliver its rising seaborne crude oil exports as Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is reducing Russia’s refining capacity. Bloomberg reported on July 14 that Russian crude oil at sea reached about 135 million barrels by July 12 and that the equivalent of 1.9 million barrels per day is on vessels that are not yet showing a final destination. Bloomberg, citing tanker tracking data, reported that five tankers with Ural crude oil are anchored off the Mersa El-Hamra Port on the Egyptian Mediterranean coast and that another five tankers are in the Riau archipelago east of Singapore—a known gathering place for shadow fleet vessels that transport sanctioned oil. Bloomberg also reported that Russia’s four-week average seaborne crude oil shipments remained almost unchanged at 4.21 million barrels per day from June 14 to July 12. Bloomberg noted that the value of Russia’s weekly crude oil exports increased by about $40 million to $1.44 billion between July 5 and 12 despite decreasing crude oil prices. Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, including strikes against all of Russia’s major oil refineries, forcing Russia to increase its seaborne crude oil exports. Russia appears to be unable to successfully process all of the increased supply of crude oil, and Russian profit margins from crude oil exports remain unclear, however.

Polish and Baltic officials continue to report that Russia may be planning a false flag attack against NATO. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda stated on July 15 that Lithuania has unspecified intelligence about Russian plans for a “targeted kinetic operations” against unspecified NATO infrastructure. Nauseda did not specify that Lithuania is the target but stated that Lithuania has increased its protection of critical transport and energy infrastructure in response to the threat. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski also stated on July 14 that Poland suspects that Russia is planning to use drones framed as Ukrainian drones to strike a NATO country or targets in Russia, enabling Russia to “respond” to these false flag attacks. Polish outlet Onet reported on June 30, and Sikorski later confirmed on July 9, that the United States warned Poland that Russia was considering conducting provocations against unspecified NATO countries.

Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur reported that Russia, for the first time on July 9, conducted a live-fire exercise on Lake Peipus, which sits on the Russian-Estonian border. Pevkur noted that Russia did not notify Estonian authorities about the exercise in advance and that a Russian exercise on a lake—as opposed to near the land border—was “unusual.” Estonian authorities noted that the exercise nonetheless fits the larger pattern of Russian provocations along its border with NATO. ISW continues to assess that Russia is conducting a ”Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on July 15 that he is stepping down from his position. The Financial Times (FT) reported on July 15 that two sources stated that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky removed Fedorov and is preparing to put forward current Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko as his replacement. Serhii Sternenko, an advisor to Fedorov, also reported that Zelensky would nominate Klymenko as defense minister. Fedorov’s dismissal is part of anticipated wider changes to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers that Zelensky first announced on July 12. Ukraine’s parliament reportedly will vote on further changes to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, including appointing a new prime minister, on July 16.

Key Takeaways

1. Russian forces are resuming their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast.
2. The Russian strikes likely aim to degrade the Ukrainian economy and reduce Ukraine’s export capacity.
3. The Russian strikes are likely also a response to Ukraine’s recent strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, but such Russian strike tactics are not new.
4. Russia appears to be struggling to deliver its rising seaborne crude oil exports as Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is reducing Russia’s refining capacity.
5. Polish and Baltic officials continue to report that Russia may be planning a false flag attack against NATO.
6. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on July 15 that he is stepping down from his position.
7. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia on July 12. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 122 drones against Ukraine overnight.
8. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Western reporting provided battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia. Reuters reported on July 15, citing two industry sources, that the Salavat petrochemical complex in Bashkortostan halted operations on July 14 following a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of July 13 to 14. Reuters reported that the Ukrainian strike damaged the CDU-6 and CDU-4 primary refining units, which can process 17,140 and 11,430 metric tons of oil and gas condensate per day, respectively, some secondary refining units, and other equipment. Oil market intelligence firm Kpler reported on July 14 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries have caused Russian oil refining volumes to fall to a 21-year low of 3.8 million barrels per day. Kpler reported that facilities that have halted operations due to Ukrainian strikes and scheduled maintenance account for approximately 4.3 million barrels per day of potential output, representing roughly 58 percent of Russia’s total installed refining capacity. Kpler estimated that between one and a half and two million barrels per day of Russian processing capacity are effectively offline. Kpler reported that Russia’s refined petroleum product exports have fallen to 1.2 million barrels per day in July 2026 from 2.3 million barrels per day in July 2025, and crude oil exports have risen to 4 million barrels per day in July 2026 as Russia struggles to refine its oil supply.

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reportedly introduced a new anti-drone protection system to defend against Ukrainian long-range strikes. Rostec claimed on July 15 that it developed a physical anti-drone defense system called “Spiderweb” that consists of modular structures that can withstand a direct kinetic hit from a drone weighing up to 200 kilograms moving at a speed of 250 kilometers per hour. Rostec claimed that they designed “Spiderweb” to protect oil storage facilities, fuel terminals, electrical substations, warehouses, and other facilities with a height profile over 25 meters tall from long-range Ukrainian drone strikes. The Crimean channel of Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published an image on July 15 reportedly showing the “Spiderweb” system, in which the system appears to be a large reinforced net or cage.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border. Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 14 and 15 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 15 that Russian forces advanced into southern Ulanove (northwest of Sumy City). The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces reported on July 15 that Ukrainian forces control Myropillya and Zapsillya, contrary to Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlements.

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City. Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 14 and 15 but did not advance. The Ukrainian State Border Service reported on July 14 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel who continue to attempt infiltrating Ukrainian positions by crossing the Vovcha River in small groups. Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 14 and 15 but did not advance.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.

Russian forces are achieving tactical success in the Kupyansk direction with small infiltration missions but at the cost of significant manpower and undermining Russian forces’ long-term position in this direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 15 that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District) reinforced with units from the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District) and 11th Army Corps (AC, both of the Leningrad Military District) are operating in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command seeks to split the Russian Kupyansk foothold into northern and southern parts by advancing forward elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division’s (1st GTA) elements along the Pishchane-Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi area (southeast of Kupyansk). Mashovets reported that Russian forces seek to capture eastern Kupyansk, including Petropavlivka and Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), with elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) and 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) before clearing northern and eastern Kupyansk. Mashovets acknowledged that small Russian infiltration groups are in Kupyansk but emphasized that Russian forces do not exercise physical control over the areas where they operate.

Mashovets reported that Russian numerical superiority, Russian use of foliage for concealment, and the dense urban environment are slowly deteriorating the Ukrainian tactical situation near the Russian foothold in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets stated that Russian claims of a massive Russian breakthrough are premature, however. Mashovets noted that while Russian forces deployed a formation comparable to a reinforced army corps (two reinforced divisions and a full separate motorized rifle brigade) in the Kupyansk direction, Russian infiltration tactics will require Russian forces to continually replenish these units’ forward battalions and regiments as these units take on attrition to conduct infiltration missions and frontal assaults. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command appears unwilling to redirect forces from other areas to support Russian efforts toward Kupyansk and therefore concluded that Ukrainian forces will likely have the opportunity to strengthen their defenses in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Borova direction on July 15 but did advance.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. A special forces unit of the Ukrainian National Guard reported on July 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted a Hornet drone strike against a Russian Tor air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 14 shows multiple damaged trucks in Luhansk City (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) following reported Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 14 and 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces continue conducting guided glide bomb strikes against river crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River. Geolocated footage published on July 14 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian pontoon bridge across the Siverskyi Donets River near Mayaky (north of Slovyansk) with FAB-500 guided glide bombs. Russian forces previously struck the same location on July 10.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on July 14 and 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces are continuing infiltration missions and strikes in Kostyantynivka but have not seized the city. A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on July 15 that Russian forces do not fully control the city despite Russian officials' claims that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka. The officer stated that Russian forces continue infiltration missions in small infantry groups and air and drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and positions. The officer added that Russian forces are striking both military and civilian infrastructure in what the officer characterized as ”scorched earth” tactics. A spokesperson for the Donetsk Oblast Police reported that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb and Smerch multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Kramatorsk on July 14, injuring one person and damaging 17 houses.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and Pokrovsk direction on July 14 and 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on July 14 and 15 but did not advance. Geolocated footage published on July 14 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Russian Grad-1 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka and 12 kilometers from the frontline).

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position south of Piddubne (south of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the area.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 14 and 15 but did not advance.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov. A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on July 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian vessel docked at the port in occupied Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline).

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 14 and 15 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 14, citing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) maps, that Russian forces are unable to conduct FAB glide bomb strikes near Stepnohirsk because the settlement is too deep in the Ukrainian rear. The settlement of Stepnohirsk itself is currently at least one kilometer from assessed Russian positions, indicating that Ukrainian operations in southern Ukraine have degraded Russian aviation’s ability to conduct air support missions.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 15.

A prominent Russian milblogger responded to the recent Ukrainian use of an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to deploy an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, complaining that the Russian military is technologically behind Ukraine. The milblogger criticized Russian UGVs’ lack of complexity and noted that Russian forces have issues organizing command and control (C2) without technology such as Starlink satellites. The milblogger lamented that the Russian military writ large often delays its responses to Ukrainian technological innovations, citing the ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Ukraine and Russia and Russia’s inability to create mobile fire groups and sufficient air defense coverage as an example.

Ukraine’s strike campaign against energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea continues to create widescale power outages and water supply issues. Ukraine’s Special Operation Forces (SSO) confirmed on July 15 that Ukrainian forces struck the Balaklava Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in occupied Sevastopol (about 240 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 13 to 14. The SSO reported that the strikes damaged the machine shop with the cooling system and that damage to the pumping equipment may take two to five months to repair. The SSO reported that the Balaklava TPP produces almost half of Crimea’s electricity. Kerch City Administration Head Ivan Koshel claimed on July 15 that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a complete power outage in Kerch. Russian opposition source Agentstvo claimed that there have been reports of power outages for at least eight of the past ten days (since July 6) in Dzhankoi, Yany Kapu, аnd Armyansk and for seven days in Sevastopol. Agentstvo noted that water supply issues have affected Alushta for seven of the past ten days, Simferopol for six days, and Yevpatoriya for five days. The Crimean occupation water operator announced on July 15 limits on water supply throughout Crimea as authorities work to repair power grid failures—likely after Ukrainian drone strikes on energy infrastructure. Agentstvo reported on July 15 that locals, charities, and businesses in Crimea are collecting drinking water as aid for residents in northern Crimea.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea, prompting more Russian milblogger criticisms about Russia’s inadequate defense systems. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck 17 Russian oil tankers, two gas tankers, and one tugboat on the night of July 14 to 15, for a total of 136 vessels in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea since July 6. The Rostov Oblast Ministry of Agriculture and Food announced on July 14 that it is developing alternative shipping routes in the Sea of Azov for agricultural products—likely due to Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign against Russian vessels.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to the recent Ukrainian USV strike against a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) board guard ship near Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai, questioning why there were no boom nets protecting the port and why Russian forces did not detect the USVs ahead of time. The milblogger criticized officials’ inattentiveness to strengthening Russia’s defenses against Ukrainian unmanned systems. Another Russian milblogger similarly questioned how the Ukrainian USVs penetrated so far undetected before striking the FSB vessel.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line. Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Crimea and 122 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvariidske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones, that the missiles and 18 strike drones hit 19 locations, and that debris fell at seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, agricultural, and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Zhytomyr Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaliy Bunenchko stated that Russian forces struck a gas station in Malyn Hromada on the morning on July 15. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts on the morning on July 15.

Russian forces are increasing its use and production of updated Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones that are more difficult to intercept. Forbes reported on July 14 that Russia is increasingly using jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones after Ukrainian forces learned to effectively suppress and down earlier Geran-2 drone variants with electronic warfare (EW) and cheap, mass-produced interceptor drones. Forbes noted that the newer jet-powered drones’ higher altitudes and speeds make interception more difficult, the use of radio repeaters and relay drones extends ranges, and the use of electro-optical cameras allows the drone operators to detect interceptor drones and air defense positions. The “Seeker” Gerans reportedly also use infrared sensors to track moving targets. Forbes stated that Russian forces were using Geran-2 drones in large salvos to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses but that this tactic became ineffective as Ukraine found inexpensive and effective defensive measures. Russian forces have reportedly changed their tactics with the development of the newer drones, using the Geran-2 drones for strikes against frontline areas while reserving the Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones for higher-value targets in the Ukrainian rear. Forbes reported that Russian forces are conducting extensive reconnaissance of the targets and flight paths before conducting long-range strikes. Forbes reported that Russia is diverting resources from the production of older Geran variants to increase the production of more advanced Geran-4 drones.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian-installed signal repeaters may be active on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border despite continuous Ukrainian warnings. Former Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on July 15 that a Russian-guided Shahed drone flew along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, changed its trajectory above the M-07 Korosten-Kyiv City highway in Korosten, and struck a gas station in Malyn, Zhytomyr Oblast, at a distance of 260 kilometers from the Russian border. Beskrestnov noted that such flight characteristics are typical of a drone that is being manually piloted and that the drone flew at a range too far for a direct radio channel to work, implying that Russia may continue to use signal repeaters located in Belarusian territory near the Belarusian-Ukrainian border to facilitate higher-precision strikes against northern Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeatedly warned Belarus to dismantle signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. Belarus had not dismantled Russian-installed signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border as of June 30, after reportedly having turned the repeaters off on June 22.

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Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.