Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2026

Analysts: Jakub Kostka, Tetiana Trach, Christina Harward, Arielle Sher, Anjou Kang-Stryker, and Frederick W. Kagan August 10, 2026, 8:20 PM ET (Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET)

Russian Missile and Drone Production Reprioritization

Russian forces are currently reprioritizing the production of their long-range strike systems to focus on those that can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and accurately strike targets. Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), stated on August 10 that Russia has been shifting production priorities for ballistic and cruise missiles since April 2026 to exploit Ukrainian shortages of Patriot interceptor missiles. Furthermore, Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities with ballistic missiles to prevent Ukraine from developing its own ballistic missile capabilities.

Between April and July 2026, Russian forces more than tripled the monthly launches of ballistic missiles against Ukraine. As of August 3, Russia had already fulfilled its annual production plan for Zirkon and Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles. Currently, Russia is exceeding its monthly production plans for key missile types by 10 to 20 percent. To ramp up ballistic missile production, Russia has reportedly suspended the production of less accurate systems, such as Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and Kh-32 cruise missiles. Additionally, Russian forces are utilizing S-400 air defense system launchers to fire specially developed RM-48U surface-to-surface missiles that fly on ballistic trajectories.

Skibitskyi’s report suggests that Russian forces are primarily firing newly produced missiles rather than drawing from existing stockpiles. This strategy aims to increase production capacity to support larger and more frequent strike packages while maintaining stockpiles for potential very large-scale operations. Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), reported that Russia can currently fire a simultaneous salvo of 77 missiles and is working to increase this capacity to 200 missiles of various types. Meanwhile, Russian forces are stockpiling Kalibr ship-launched cruise missiles outside the Black Sea because the Ukrainian interception rate for Kalibrs has reached nearly 100 percent and Ukrainian forces continue to successfully target Black Sea Fleet (BSF) launch platforms and infrastructure.

Russia is also refocusing drone production toward faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones. These models are harder to intercept than earlier piston-engine versions, shortening Ukraine’s interception window. Russia plans to produce 11,000 various strike and seeker drones (including Geran, Garpiya, and Gerbera variants) in August 2026.

Winter 2026/2027 Strategy

Experts and officials warn that Russia will increasingly target Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the upcoming winter of 2026/2027. President Volodymyr Zelensky has identified the protection of critical infrastructure, the quality of shelters, and increasing anti-ballistic capabilities as top priorities for the winter. Zelensky stated on August 8 that almost no undamaged power plants remain in Ukraine due to persistent Russian strikes. The Kremlin is reportedly planning a large-scale strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Kyiv City in the coming weeks to disrupt facility strengthening and exploit interceptor shortages.

This reprioritization toward ballistic missiles supports Putin's theory of victory, which rests on winning a war of attrition and breaking Ukraine's will to fight. The Kremlin believes it can use the Patriot missile shortage to pressure Ukraine into submitting to maximalist demands. As long as Putin believes a military path to his full objectives exists, the Kremlin is unlikely to enter serious negotiations or make meaningful compromises.

Key Takeaways

1. Russian forces are reprioritizing the production of long-range strike systems to more reliably penetrate air defenses and hit targets.
2. Russia is refocusing drone production toward jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones that are harder to intercept.
3. Russia will increasingly target Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the winter of 2026/2027.
4. Reprioritizing ballistic missile production supports Russian efforts to break Ukraine’s will, exploiting interceptor shortages to avoid negotiations on maximalist demands.
5. Ukrainian forces continued a long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on August 10.
6. Russia launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, three Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 126 drones overnight.
7. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on August 10.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

On August 10, Ukrainian forces targeted Russian oil infrastructure, including the Tobolskneftekhim petrochemical plant in Tyumen Oblast—roughly 2,200 kilometers from the border—damaging a unit with an annual capacity of 6.6 million tons. They also struck the Taneko oil refinery in Tatarstan, which has a refining capacity of 13 million tons per year. Updated damage assessments confirm that an August 8 strike damaged the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, and an August 3 strike on the Hvardiiske Airfield in Crimea destroyed nine fuel tanks and two equipment hangars. Satellite imagery from August 9 also shows that a recent strike in Gelendzhik destroyed four S-400 air defense launchers.

Regional Assessments

• Northern Axis: Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast near Ryasne.
• Kharkiv Oblast: Claims that Russian forces are on the verge of encircling Ukrainian troops between Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk remain highly unlikely, as the sectors are roughly 45 kilometers apart. Russian drones have continued targeting Ukrainian police vehicles during evacuations.
• Oskil River: Russian forces continued attacks near Kupyansk and Borova but did not advance. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit in occupied Khrustalne and substations in Holubivka and Donetskyi.
• Donetsk Oblast:
  • Lyman: A Russian milblogger acknowledged a deteriorating situation for Russian forces, noting Ukrainian presence in Yampil and small groups reaching Dibrova and Ozerne.
  • Kostyantynivka: Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from parts of the city.
  • Dobropillya: Russian advances have increased in recent weeks, with infiltration groups reaching southeastern Dobropillya. Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign using glide bombs and 50-kilometer-range fiber-optic drones to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.
  • Pokrovsk/Novopavlivka: Offensive operations continued without confirmed advances.
• Southern Axis:
  • Zaporizhia: Conflicting reports exist regarding Orikhiv, but no confirmed Russian advances were made. Ukrainian drones struck a substation in Prymorsk and vehicles along the M-18 highway.
  • Crimea: Ukrainian forces struck two S-400 launchers, an Orion drone antenna, and a radar dome near Vityne.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Overnight on August 9-10, Russian forces launched one Kh-59/69 missile, three Banderol loitering munitions, and 126 Shahed, Gerbera, and Parodiya drones. Ukrainian forces downed 92 drones and all three Banderols; however, 31 strike drones hit 22 locations. Strikes targeted residential and business infrastructure, leaving no working gas stations in the Opishnyanska Hromada of Poltava Oblast. Additionally, Russian forces reportedly destroyed a WHO humanitarian warehouse in Dnipro City on August 7.

Activity in Belarus

Belarusian Special Operations Forces have departed for Hubei Province, PRC, to participate in the joint tactical exercise “Swift Eagle – 2026”. The training will focus on drone piloting, assembly, and counter-drone tactics, likely incorporating lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

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Note: ISW uses only publicly available information and draws on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting as well as geospatial data.