Iran Military Reorganization and Regional Proxy Conflict Report

 

Iran Update Special Report, August 10, 2026

Analyst Notes Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. These updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran.

Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. However, Iran is not merely responding to US strikes; it is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives.

Key Takeaways

1. The Iranian armed forces are undergoing an extensive reorganization reflecting lessons learned from the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars. On August 10, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei instructed Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi to merge the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters (KOACH).
2. The regime aims to streamline coordination between the Artesh and the IRGC, reduce redundancies, and enable faster wartime decision-making.
3. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed several officials to senior military positions on August 10, formalizing the existing military structure and consolidating the authority of his inner circle.
4. Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces and the Houthis exchanged fire across multiple governorates between August 7 and 10 following reports of a potential Saudi-led offensive to end the Houthi "chokehold" on oil exports.
5. The Iraqi federal government is taking limited steps to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against Saudi Arabia to avoid retaliatory strikes on Iraq.
6. A Shia Coordination Framework source claimed Iraqi militias will hand over weapons to the PMF before a September 30 disarmament deadline. This transfer would harm US interests by moving weapons into an organization heavily infiltrated by Iran.
7. Iranian-backed militias may have conducted a drone strike on August 2 at Camp Taji, destroying ammunition for US-provided Iraqi tanks. This indicates an effort by militias to strip the Iraqi military of assets that could be used against them.
8. The IRGC reportedly operates small cells of Iraqi fighters who maintain a "lower profile" and bypass militia leadership to conduct drone strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan and neighboring countries.

Toplines

Extensive Reorganization of the Iranian Armed Forces

The reorganization reflects lessons from recent conflicts. Mojtaba Khamenei's order to merge the AFGS (responsible for strategic guidance) and KOACH (responsible for joint operations) reverses a 2016 decision by the former Supreme Leader to separate them. This move was likely necessitated by US-Israeli decapitation campaigns that killed senior leaders and fractured the regime's ability to coordinate effectively. Efforts to improve coordination began in August 2025 with the formation of the Defense Council.

Senior Military Appointments

The August 10 appointments consolidate the power of Mojtaba Khamenei and his associates.

• Major General Ahmad Vahidi: De facto leader of the IRGC since February 2026 after the death of Major General Mohammad Pakpour. Vahidi has advocated for using force against the US and Israel and is implicated in the 1994 AMIA bombing.
• Major General Mostafa Izadi: Appointed as IRGC Deputy Commander; he previously headed the KOACH Cyber and Emerging Threats Headquarters.
• Hossein Taeb: Appointed Basij Commander. Taeb has deep personal ties to Mojtaba, having served with him in the Iran-Iraq War and assisted in engineering previous elections.
• Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi: Appointed AFGS Chief. He has extensive experience in internal security and has been criticized by President Pezeshkian for "unilaterally" escalating strikes against Gulf states.
• Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari: Appointed AFGS Deputy Chief. He has experience in the Artesh Ground Forces and previously confirmed the Artesh’s role in protest suppression.
• Rear Admiral Ali Ozmaei: Appointed IRGC Navy Commander on July 4.
• Major General Mohsen Rezaei: Appointed SNSC Secretary on August 9.

These appointments reinforce maximalist and hardline positions, including absolute control of the Strait of Hormuz, removal of US troops, and further nuclear development.

Conflict in Yemen

ROYG and Houthi forces exchanged fire in several governorates. ROYG units targeted Houthi positions in retaliation for attacks in Marib and Hadramawt. In response, the Houthis conducted a drone and missile attack on Mocha Port, killing seven people. This escalation comes amid a Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia that has restricted oil exports since July 20.

Developments in Iraq

The Iraqi government formed the Badia Operations Command to prevent militias from launching attacks into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Despite these efforts, some PMF leaders, such as Abu Zainab al Lami, are attempting to frame the closure of "fake" offices as part of a general weapons registration process rather than a militia-focused disarmament.

There is concern that transferring militia weapons to the PMF—an organization infiltrated by Iran—will only strengthen Iranian influence. Leaders like Hadi al Ameri have discussed redistributing fighters among PMF brigades, which may not reduce Iranian influence if the units still answer to Tehran. Some militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, continue to refuse to disarm.

Intelligence suggests the IRGC uses small cells (5-10 fighters) reporting directly to Haji Hamed (head of the IRGC mission in Iraq) to conduct drone attacks while maintaining a low profile. Recent US-Saudi strikes reportedly killed at least four IRGC Quds Force officers.

Assessed Iranian War Aims

• Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
• Degrade US ability and willingness to continue the war.
• Restore deterrence against the US and regional partners.
• Divide the US and Israel from Arab states.

Negotiations, Domestic Affairs, Lebanon: Nothing significant to report.