IPO Market story in India

Introduction : Every week, a new company is ringing the bell at Dalal Street, marking another milestone in India’s IPO rush. From fintech startups to industrial giants, the pipeline is overflowing over ₹70,000 crore worth of public issues are lined up in the coming months. This surge has reignited memories of the 2021 IPO frenzy, when optimism and liquidity fuelled record-breaking listings. Yet, beneath the excitement, a critical question emerges: are we witnessing a sustainable cycle of capital formation, or a replay of overvaluation risk? The primary market is buzzing, even as the secondary market remains largely placid an unusual divergence in investor sentiment. Retail participation is at an all-time high, driven by easy digital access, strong mutual fund inflows, and rising financial awareness. At the same time, many IPOs are being used as exit routes for early investors and promoters, raising concerns about long-term value creation. Institutional investors, too, are treading cautiously, balancing opportunity with the fear of stretched valuations. The IPO boom reflects India’s growth story and investor confidence, but it also tests the market’s ability to separate substance from speculation. As the euphoria builds, the challenge for investors is clear, is it possible to find real opportunity amid the noise of overvaluation?

An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the process through which an unlisted public company offers its shares to the public for the first time and becomes listed on a stock exchange. It marks a company’s transition from private ownership typically held by founders, early investors, and venture capitalists to public ownership, where anyone can buy and sell its shares in the open market. Through an IPO, a company raises capital that can be used for business expansion, debt repayment, or other corporate purposes. In return, investors get an opportunity to become shareholders and participate in the company’s growth. IPOs are usually managed by investment bankers and regulated by SEBI in India, ensuring transparency and investor protection. In essence, an IPO serves as both a fundraising mechanism for companies and a wealth-creation opportunity for investors though the success of an IPO depends on timing, valuation, and market sentiment.

Main Board IPO vs SME IPO: Understanding the Difference A Main Board IPO refers to a public issue of shares by a company that is listed on the main platform of a stock exchange, such as the NSE (National Stock Exchange) or BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange). These IPOs are usually floated by large or well-established companies that meet specific eligibility criteria set by SEBI and the exchanges.

To qualify for a main board listing, a company must have: A minimum post-issue paid-up capital of ₹10 crore or more. A track record of profitability, net worth, and tangible assets as defined by SEBI. A minimum number of shareholders after listing and a prescribed issue size (usually ₹25 crore or above). Main board IPOs are open to all categories of investors Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs), Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs), and Retail Investors and are governed by strict disclosure, compliance, and reporting norms. While both Main Board and SME IPOs allow companies to raise funds from the public, they cater to different segments of businesses and operate under distinct listing requirements.

 An SME IPO (Small and Medium Enterprise IPO) is designed for smaller and emerging companies that wish to access public markets but may not yet meet the criteria for main board listing. These IPOs are listed on the SME platforms of the exchanges BSE SME or NSE Emerge. The issue size is smaller (as low as ₹1 crore), and compliance norms are more relaxed to encourage entrepreneurship. To qualify for an SME (Small and Medium Enterprise) IPO and get listed on BSE SME or NSE Emerge, a company must meet specific eligibility requirements set by SEBI and the respective exchanges. Post-Issue Paid-Up Capital The company’s post-issue paid-up capital must be less than ₹25 crore. If it exceeds ₹25 crore after the IPO, it must list on the main board instead of the SME platform. Sponsored Net Tangible Assets Minimum ₹1.5 crore as per the latest audited financial statements. Net Worth Minimum ₹1 crore for the preceding three years. Track Record / Operational History The company must have a track record of at least 3 years (either as the current entity or through promoters/group companies). In case of a shorter track record, it can still qualify if it has been funded by a bank, financial institution, or SEBI-registered venture capital fund. Positive Cash Flow Should have positive cash flow from operations in at least two of the last three years. Distributable Profits Must have earned profits in at least two of the immediately preceding three years. Number of Shareholders Minimum 50 allottees are required at the time of IPO allotment. 

Other Conditions Company must have a website with updated financial and corporate information. Promoters should not be wilful defaulters or barred by SEBI. The issue must be through a merchant banker registered with SEBI. What’s Driving the IPO Boom? India’s IPO boom is being powered by a mix of strong liquidity, rising investor participation, and renewed corporate confidence. 

Despite global uncertainties, the domestic market has remained remarkably resilient, attracting both institutional and retail investors. One of the key drivers is the surge in domestic liquidity, fuelled by steady mutual fund inflows, SIP investments, and pension fund participation. Retail investors, empowered by technology and simplified digital platforms like UPI-based IPO applications, are entering the markets in record numbers. The combination of rising disposable incomes and financial literacy has turned first-time investors into active market participants. 

Corporates, on the other hand, see this as an ideal window to raise capital while valuations are attractive and market sentiment is buoyant. Many startups and established firms are using IPOs to deleverage debt, fund expansion, or give exits to early investors. Another factor driving this wave is the government’s policy reforms and SEBI’s streamlined IPO framework, which have reduced timelines and improved transparency in the listing process. 

The ease of doing business and strong GDP growth have also created a favourable environment for new listings. Global investors view India as a long-term growth story, especially with its demographic dividend and digital transformation. The relative underperformance of other emerging markets has channelled more global capital towards India’s equities. 

Furthermore, corporate governance standards and disclosure norms have improved, increasing investor trust in listed companies. Analysts also credit the robust pipeline to record corporate profits and a desire to tap the markets before interest rates rise further. Many companies that delayed their IPOs post-pandemic are now executing them in a more stable market environment. In essence, the IPO boom reflects the confidence of India Inc., the enthusiasm of retail investors, and the optimism of global funds all converging to make Indian primary markets one of the most active in the world today Interesting facts about Indian IPOs in 2025. 

India’s IPO market is set for a record quarter: companies are expected to raise up to ~$8 billion in new issues during Q4 2025. In the first half of 2025 alone, 119 IPOs came to market, raising roughly ₹511.50 billion (about ₹51,150 crore). Unlike earlier years, the share of primary issuances (fresh capital) has increased in 2025, as many companies aim to raise money for growth rather than only promoter exits. The Health / Life Sciences sector has seen notable IPO momentum in Q1 2025 alone, it recorded one of its strongest first quarters for new listings in two decades. Large IPOs are dominating 2025: for example, Tata Capital’s IPO became one of the biggest in the year and was fully subscribed. 

The LG Electronics India IPO also drew heavyweight institutional interest, with domestic and global anchor investors participating. Some IPOs continue to be structured as Offers for Sale (OFS), meaning existing shareholders are selling stakes rather than raising new capital. This signals promoter interest in monetization. Retail investor interest is extremely strong: certain IPOs, especially in the SME space, have become multibaggers quickly post-listing. For example, SME IPOs in 2025 have raised over ₹6,800 crore, and 14 companies from this segment turned multi-baggers. On the large-cap side, Urban Company’s IPO was subscribed over 100 times, making it one of the most aggressively bid issues of 2025. The Opportunity Side 

The ongoing IPO boom in India presents a unique window of opportunity for both companies and investors. For corporates, it offers an efficient route to raise capital for expansion, debt reduction, and digital transformation. A successful listing not only strengthens a company’s balance sheet but also enhances its visibility, credibility, and governance standards. For investors, IPOs open doors to participate in early-stage growth stories of promising businesses that were once privately held. Many IPOs in sectors like fintech, renewable energy, and healthcare represent India’s evolving economic landscape, giving retail investors access to new-age industries. Strong domestic liquidity and rising disposable incomes have made Indian households more willing to allocate funds toward equity investments. 

The government’s reforms and SEBI’s streamlined regulations have further improved transparency and investor confidence in the primary market. Institutional participation from mutual funds, pension funds, and foreign investors reinforces the long-term potential of Indian equities. Historical data also shows that well-chosen IPOs often generate strong long-term wealth, provided investors focus on fundamentals rather than short-term listing gains. Overall, the opportunity side of the IPO boom reflects India’s economic maturity where growth capital meets investor aspiration in a market full of possibilities. 

The IPO boom has opened up a fresh wave of investment opportunities for retail investors, who are now more empowered and financially aware than ever before. With simplified digital platforms like UPI-based IPO applications and online demat onboarding, retail participation in primary markets has reached record highs. Investors can now access promising businesses in sectors like renewable energy, pharmaceuticals, technology, FMCG, and logistics, many of which were once limited to private equity players. IPOs provide retail investors with the chance to enter growth-oriented companies at the ground level often before they achieve full market valuation. 

Beyond IPOs, retail investors also have diversified opportunities across mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), sovereign gold bonds, and NPS, allowing them to build balanced portfolios. The growing SME IPO segment has further expanded access, enabling small investors to tap into the entrepreneurial side of India’s economy. With SEBI tightening disclosure and governance norms, investor protection has improved, enhancing trust in new listings. 

The key, however, lies in informed decision-making analysing fundamentals, valuation, and long-term potential instead of chasing short-term hype. As India’s financial ecosystem deepens, retail investors stand to become major wealth creators by aligning their investments with disciplined financial planning. In short, the Indian market today offers retail investors not just participation, but genuine ownership in the nation’s growth story. Why Retail Investors often don’t get IPO allotments. Retail investors frequently face disappointment in IPO allotments because of the massive oversubscription levels seen in popular issues. In India, only 35% of an IPO’s total shares are reserved for the retail investor category (applications up to ₹2 lakh), and when lakhs of investors apply for a limited number of shares, the probability of allotment drops sharply. SEBI mandates that allotments must be made through a lottery system when retail demand exceeds supply, ensuring fairness but not guaranteed success for every applicant. 

For example, in highly sought-after IPOs that are oversubscribed 50 to 100 times, only a small fraction of applicants receive a single lot, while the rest receive none. Many retail investors also make mistakes such as applying for multiple lots under the same PAN or using improper ASBA details, leading to rejections. Furthermore, high retail enthusiasm driven by expectations of “listing gains” often causes speculative applications rather than informed investing. Another factor is that Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs) and Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs) typically subscribe first, influencing pricing and sentiment, which later floods the retail category with last-minute applications. 

Some IPOs with smaller issue sizes or SME listings have fewer shares reserved for retail investors, further reducing the odds. Although SEBI has introduced uniform allotment rules to make the process more equitable, sheer demand in blockbuster IPOs continues to make allotment a matter of luck for many. In essence, the growing popularity of IPOs among retail investors is both a positive sign of financial inclusion and a practical reminder that scarcity and high demand make allotment highly competitive in India’s booming primary market. The Risk / Overvaluation Angle in IPO 2025. 

While the IPO boom of 2025 has created excitement across markets, it also carries signs of overvaluation and speculative enthusiasm that warrant caution. Many companies are launching IPOs at aggressive pricing, banking on strong investor sentiment rather than sustainable fundamentals. Analysts have pointed out that valuations in some sectors =especially fintech, consumer tech, and renewable energy appear disconnected from earnings growth or profitability metrics. A large share of new issues are structured as Offers for Sale (OFS), promoters and early investors are simply cashing out rather than raising fresh capital for expansion, raising questions about long-term value creation. Several IPOs have debuted with impressive listing-day gains, only to correct sharply within weeks as post-listing reality set in. The secondary market’s subdued performance in 2025 adds another layer of risk  while the primary market is euphoric, the broader indices are moving flat, indicating a potential divergence between price and performance. The liquidity-driven rally has also encouraged herd behaviour among retail investors, many of whom apply for IPOs without analysing fundamentals, hoping only for listing gains. This behaviour mirrors the 2021 IPO frenzy, when companies like Paytm and Zomato saw massive initial interest but later struggled to justify their valuations. Moreover, interest rate uncertainty and global geopolitical tensions can easily trigger volatility, affecting investor appetite for high-priced offerings. With mutual funds and institutional investors becoming more selective, many recent IPOs risk undersubscription or muted post-listing performance if sentiment cools. Analysts caution that while India’s growth story remains intact, valuation discipline must not be compromised in the rush to go public. SEBI’s tighter disclosure norms and enhanced scrutiny are steps in the right direction, but market euphoria can often outpace regulation. 

Another red flag is the concentration of IPO activity in a few hot sectors, leaving investors exposed to cyclical corrections. The sustainability of this boom will depend on how many of these companies can actually deliver profits and justify their lofty valuations over the next few quarters. In essence, the IPO boom of 2025 presents both opportunity and risk a fine line separating financial optimism from speculative excess. Aggressive Pricing & Overvaluation. Many IPOs in 2025 are priced at “aggressive multiples” driven more by hype than strong fundamentals, leading to sharp corrections post-listing. Some IPOs listing gains have been fleeting, with prices falling within hours of listing, revealing a mismatch between issue pricing and investor willingness to hold. Offer for Sale (OFS) Dominance. The IPO of WeWork India was structured entirely as an OFS meaning no fresh capital raised; existing shareholders sold their stakes. This underscores that some IPOs are more about promoter exit rather than business expansion, raising questions about future growth and value. Investor & Market Warnings / Skepticism. Governance advisory firm InGovern flagged WeWork India’s disclosures just days before listing, citing weak financials, high costs, and promoter share pledges  red flags for valuation and governance risks. Media coverage describes “valuation fatigue” among merchant bankers, global volatility, and concerns over unpredictable regulations as dampeners to the exuberance. Regulatory Signals / Warnings SEBI’s officials have urged merchant bankers to adopt “realistic valuations” for large IPOs, warning that excessive valuations could erode retail investor trust and lead to post-listing corrections. 

Conclusion As the dust settles on India’s bustling IPO season, Dalal Street once again echoes with stories of triumph and caution. For some investors, it has been a season of golden opportunities  quick gains, new listings, and the thrill of discovery. For others, it’s been a reminder that not every shiny debut turns into a lasting success story. Like every wave in the market’s long tide, this IPO boom too will separate the speculative from the steadfast. In the end, the winners will be those who invest with patience, research, and discipline not those chasing noise or hype. The Indian IPO journey of 2025 will be remembered not just for its record numbers, but for teaching investors that real wealth is built on understanding, not excitement. 

- Neeraj Vasudevan

High Fuel Prices and Oil Bonds - Vivek Kaul

Explained: Why the Govt is Misleading Us on High Fuel Prices and Oil Bonds

The reason why doesn’t matter. The only thing that matters is controlling the narrative – Fabian Nicieza in Suburban Dicks.

Over the last few years, several government ministers have blamed the oil bonds issued during the era of the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, for the high petrol and diesel prices, which have prevailed for a while now.

The then oil minister Dharmendra Pradhan had tweeted in 2018 that: “The country and our OMCs [oil marketing companies} are also yet to recover from the shock of Oil Bonds worth Rs 1.4 Lakh Crores issued during the UPA regime.”

The finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman rblamed the oil bonds for the high prices of petrol and diesel, in a recent statement. This is not true. I have explained this issue in great detail on earlier occasions. Nevertheless, I will try and offer a broader summary here, before getting on to the new points I want to make.

Oil bonds were largely issued by the previous UPA government. This was done in order to compensate oil marketing companies, like Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum, for selling petrol, diesel, kerosene and domestic cooking gas, at a price which wasn’t monetarily feasible for them.

The argument offered by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government is that since interest has to be paid on these bonds and that these bonds have to be repaid, the government needs to charge a high excise duty on petrol and diesel. This leads to high petrol and diesel prices.

In that sense, the NDA government and you and me are paying for the sins of the UPA government. This argument is never made in as clear words as I am making it here. Things are left vague enough for people to fill in the gaps and make their own WhatsApp forwards.

As of March 2014, before the NDA government came to power, the total oil bonds outstanding stood at Rs 1,34,423 crore. By March 2015, this had come down to Rs 1,30,923 crore, which is where it has stayed up until March 2021.

This means that between end March 2015 and end March 2021, no oil bonds matured and hence, the NDA government didn’t need to repay a single rupee of oil bonds. Of course, interest had to be paid on these bonds. An interest of Rs 9,990 crore has to be paid on these bonds every year. This means, over a period of six years, between end March 2015 and end March 2021, the government has paid Rs 59,940 crore as interest on these bonds.

During the same period, it earned Rs 14,60,036 crore as excise duty on petroleum products. As the government told the Lok Sabha in early August this year: “Central excise duty is contributed largely by Petrol and Diesel.” So, excise duty earned on the sale of petrol and diesel makes up for a bulk of the excise duty earned on sale of petroleum products.

In total, during this period, 4.1% of the excise duty collected on petroleum products has gone towards paying interest on oil bonds. In 2020-21, this stood at just 2.7% (Rs 9,990 crore of interest against excise duty of Rs 3,71,726 crore earned on petroleum products).

In fact, if were to look at excise duty collected on just petrol and diesel, between end March 2015 and end March 2021, it amounts to around Rs 13.7 lakh crore. The interest paid on oil bonds amounts to 4.4% of this amount.

In 2021-22, the current financial year, Rs 10,000 crore worth of oil bonds are maturing and hence, need to be repaid. The interest that needs to be paid on the oil bonds during the year should amount to around Rs 9,500 crore. So, during 2020-21, around Rs 19,500 crore will be needed by the government to service these bonds.

In an answer provided to the Lok Sabha recently, the government had said that the total excise duty earned on petrol and diesel, between April and June this year, had stood at Rs 94,181 crore.

Given that, the second Covid wave was on during this period, and that it would have negatively impacted the consumption of petrol and diesel to some extent, it is safe to say that if excise duty on petrol and diesel continue to be where they are, the total collections this year can easily touch Rs 4 lakh crore. Of course, the collections on petroleum products will be even greater.

Rs 19,500 crore works to around 4.9% of Rs 4 lakh crore. So, the government is likely to spend one-twentieth of the excise duty earned on petrol and diesel, in servicing the oil bonds (both repaying maturing bonds and paying interest on the outstanding bonds).

The remaining bonds worth Rs 1,20,923 crore (Rs 1,30,923 crore minus Rs 10,000 crore worth of bonds maturing this year), will mature between November 2023 and March 2026.

The other argument that is being made is that the government needs to save money in order to repay these bonds in the years to come. It is worth clarifying here that the government meets the expenditure of a given year from the revenue earned during that year. Hence, bonds maturing in 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026, will be repaid using taxes earned during that year. This nullifies the argument about the government having to save in order to repay these bonds.

Hence, the entire argument that the oil bonds have led to a situation where the government has had to charge a high excise duty on petrol and diesel, is totally wrong. In fact, as I have explained earlier, the reason for this lies in the fall of corporate tax collections.

In 2018-19, the total corporate tax or the income tax paid by corporates had stood at Rs 6.64 lakh crore. This fell to Rs 5.57 lakh crore in 2019-20. It fell further to Rs 4.57 lakh crore in 2020-21.

This fall was on account of the base rate of corporate tax being cut from 30% to 22% in September 2019. It can also be argued that Covid must have led to lower profits for corporates in 2020-21 and hence, lower corporate tax collections for the government.

Data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy tells us that in 2020-21, the net profit of listed corporates (more than 5,000 companies) increased by 120.3% in comparison to 2019-20. So, Covid didn’t impact profits among the listed corporates. While net profit went up by 120.3%, the corporate tax paid by these companies went up just 13.9%.

Covid has negatively impacted smaller businesses and that must have impacted corporate tax collections to a certain extent. But a bulk of the fall in corporate tax collections seems to have come from a lower rate of tax. This has been compensated through higher excise duty on petrol and diesel.

In 2018-19, excise duty earned on petroleum products by the central government brought in Rs 2.14 lakh crore. This jumped to Rs 3.72 lakh crore in 2020-21, thanks to a higher excise duty on petrol and diesel.

The corporate tax cut was supposed to boost consumption and lead to an increase in corporate investment. But that hasn’t really happened. Expecting consumption to increase thanks to lower corporate taxes was kite-flying at its very best.

Consumption increases when people see the prospect of earning more money, not when corporate taxes go down. Investment, for a whole host of reasons, has been down in the dumps for close to a decade now,. I shall not go into these reasons in detail here, having dealt with this issue on multiple occasions in the past.

This has created a communication problem around high petrol and diesel prices for a government obsessed with managing the narrative.

In their book Nudge—The Final Edition, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein talk about the publicity principle, originally elucidated by the philosopher John Rawls. As Thaler and Sunstein write: “If a firm or government adopts a policy that it could not easily defend publicly, it stands to face considerable embarrassment, and perhaps much worse, if the policy and its grounds are disclosed [emphasis added].”

This is precisely the problem with the entire messaging around the issue of high petrol and diesel prices. The only reason for this is the high excise duty on petrol and diesel, in order to compensate for lower corporate tax collections.

The excise duty on petrol has gone up from Rs 9.48 per litre in October 2014 to Rs 32.90 per litre currently, a jump of close to 250%. A bulk of this increase of around Rs 10 per litre has happened in the last one year. A similar story has played out with diesel, with excise duty going up from Rs 3.56 per litre in October 2014 to Rs 31.80 per litre currently, a jump of close to 800%. (I would like to thank Chintan Patel for providing this information by using the central government notifications on excise duty on petrol and diesel).

Of course, this is not something that a narrative obsessed government can admit to. This would mean telling the world at large that the common man is being made to pay for lower corporate taxes. This has led to the entire narrative around oil bonds and they having to be repaid and interest having to be paid on them, and that leading to a higher excise duty on petrol and diesel, and hence, higher pump prices of fuel.

This is a narrative that can be easily sold on WhatsApp, given that most people don’t have the time to check the facts of any argument and buy anything that is sent to them over the world’s newest and the most happening university.

As Thomas Sowell writes in Knowledge and Decisions:

“To exhort the individual citizen to make investments in knowledge comparable to those of lobbyists and political crusaders (both of whom have much lower costs per unit of personal benefit) is to urge him to behaviour that is irrational, if not physically impossible in a twenty-four hour day.”

This is something that the current government is making use of and projecting a narrative that wrongly blames the past government for high fuel prices.

As Thaler and Sunstein write: “Organizations of all forms should respect people, and if they adopt policies that they could not and would not defend in public, they fail to show that respect. Instead, they treat citizens as tools for their own use or manipulation [emphasis added].”

This is precisely what is happening.

The interesting thing is that the government has given the more or less the right reason behind high fuel prices in an answer to a question raised in the Lok Sabha. As it said: “The excise duty rates on petroleum products are calibrated from time to time with the objective of generating resources for infrastructure and other developmental items of expenditure, taking into account all relevant factors and keeping in view the prevailing fiscal situation.”

Every government has the right to tax the citizens in different ways. This answer tells us precisely that. Of course, explaining the rationale behind the tax is not always that straightforward.

Wonderful Brahma Chellaney Post on the failure of Indian Diplomacy

The following article by Mr Brahma Chellaney was published in Japan Times. Such an insightful article about Indian Diplomacy by a reputed India found a place in a Japanese News agency but not in any Indian media outlet.Careful dissection of Indian diplomacy like this article does is sometimes too smart for our Dumb Indian Media. India Losing out on US Diplomacy : Losing more than what we have gained
WASHINGTON — Was the U.S.-India strategic partnership oversold to the extent that it has failed to yield tangible benefits for the United States? Even as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has just held detailed discussions in New Delhi, an increasing number of analysts in Washington have already concluded that the overhyped relationship is losing momentum. The skeptics cite two high-visibility issues in particular: India’s rejection of separate bids by Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co. to sell 126 fighter-jets, and New Delhi’s reluctance to snap energy ties with Iran. The discussion over these issues, however, obscures key facts. Take the aircraft deal. Despite that setback, U.S. firms have clinched several other multibillion-dollar arms deals in recent years. These contracts have been secured on a government-to-government basis, without any competitive bidding. But in the one case where India invited bids, American firms failed to make it beyond the competition’s first round because they did not match the price and other terms offered by the French manufacturer of the Rafale aircraft and the European consortium that makes the Eurofighter Typhoon. The most-startling yet little-publicized fact is America’s quiet emergence as the largest arms seller to India. In the decade since President George W. Bush launched the vaunted U.S.-Indian strategic partnership, India has fundamentally reoriented its defense procurement, moving away from its traditional reliance on Russia. Indeed, nearly half of all Indian defense deals by value in recent years have been bagged by the U.S. alone, with Israel a distant second and Russia relegated to the third slot. Given that India has become the world’s largest arms importer and the United States remains the biggest exporter, U.S. firms are set to secure more contracts in India, which plans to spend more than $100 billion over the next four years to upgrade its military capabilities, including by buying submarines, heavy lift and attack helicopters, howitzers, and tanks. Now consider the Iran issue. Just as the Indian rejection of the Boeing’s F/A 18 and Lockheed-Martin’s F-16 bids has made big news but the U.S. landing of multiple arms contracts has received little notice, India’s reluctance to publicly support U.S. energy sanctions on Iran has been in the spotlight but not the quiet Indian strategy since the late 1990s to let the share of Iranian oil in India’s energy imports gradually decline — a trend that has seen the importance of Iranian oil supplies for India considerably weaken. Few in India consider Iran a friend. But given India’s troubled neighborhood, with the country wedged in an arc of problematic states, New Delhi is reluctant to rupture its ties with Iran, its gateway to Afghanistan — the top recipient of Indian aid. India already has paid a heavy price for taking America’s side on some critical issues in its long-running battle against Iran, even though Washington doesn’t take India’s side in its disputes with China or Pakistan. The Bush administration persuaded India not to conclude any new long-term energy contracts with Iran, and — in return for a civil nuclear deal with the U.S. — abandon its plan to build a gas pipeline from Iran. New Delhi, by voting against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board in 2005 and 2006, invited Iranian reprisal in the form of cancellation of a 25-year, $22-billion liquefied natural gas deal which had terms highly favorable to India. That deal’s scrapping alone left India poorer by several billion dollars. Now the U.S. energy embargo against Iran has pushed international oil prices higher, significantly increasing India’s oil bill. The embargo also threatens to undercut India’s import-diversification strategy by making it place most of its eggs in the basket of the Islamist-bankrolling, Saudi Arabia-led oil monarchies that continue to play a role in South Asia detrimental to Indian interests. In fact, thanks to the U.S. embargo against Iran, the swelling coffers of the iron-fisted oil sheikhdoms are set to overflow, increasing their leverage in the region and beyond. Lost in the U.S. public discussion is an important fact — the declining share of Iranian crude in India’s total oil imports as part of a conscious Indian effort to reduce supply-disruption risks linked with the lurking potential for Iran-related conflict. Since 2008 alone, Iranian oil imports have swiftly fallen from 16.4 percent to 10.3 percent. Given India’s soaring oil imports and search for new sources of supply, the Iranian share is set to decline further, even without India’s participation in the U.S. embargo. Make no mistake: India shares U.S. objectives on Iran but the exigencies of its regional situation compel it to toe a more cautious line. The repositioning of the U.S.-India relationship was never intended to be transactional. Rather it was designed as an important geostrategic move to underpin Asian security and serve the long-term U.S. and Indian interests. But even if the relationship were viewed in transactional terms, the U.S. has reaped handsome dividends. On Iran, the right course for U.S. policy would be to encourage India to continue reducing Iranian oil imports by granting it a waiver from American sanctions law — as Washington has to Japan and nine other countries — and by helping to finance the retrofitting of Indian refineries that presently have a technical capacity to process only Iranian oil. More fundamentally, just as the Bush administration exaggerated the importance of a single deal with India, contending that the nuclear deal would be fundamentally transformative, it is an overstatement that the U.S.-India relationship today is losing momentum. The geostrategic direction of the relationship is irreversibly set — toward closer collaboration. Even trade between the countries has continued to grow impressively, from $9 billion in 1995 to $100 billion in 2011. While it is too much to expect a congruence of U.S. and Indian national-security objectives in all spheres, the two countries are likely to deepen their cooperation in areas where their interests converge, such as ensuring Asian power equilibrium. Barack Obama had stroked India’s collective ego by inviting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for his presidency’s first state dinner, leading to the joke that while China gets a deferential America and Pakistan secures billions of dollars in U.S. aid periodically, India is easily won over with a sumptuous dinner and nice compliments. The mutual optimism and excitement that characterized the blooming U.S.-Indian ties during the Bush years, admittedly, has given way to more realistic assessments as the relationship has matured. Geostrategic and economic forces, however, continue to drive the two countries closer. Indeed, Obama’s recent pivot to Asia has made closer U.S. strategic collaboration with India critical.

Why the IITs are NO GOOD for India

IT long considered to be the beacon of education in India is nothing more than a mirage of brilliance!!!!
How else would you characterize the leading technology university in a country which till date has not yet produced any one groundbreaking technology nor the talent to atleast reverse engineer the products of the west.As school and college dropouts in the United States come out with more innovations here in India most of the so called "intellectuals" doesnt even have the talent to produce a pen.No Indian company has succeeded yet to replicate the German technology in Reynolds pen.Most of these IITians just look for some desk jobs in MNCs overseas with a plush salary. There is hardly any innovation involved in such jobs but they are more keen to have a salary to settle their family and does not seem to have any interest in actually producing something. India needs more technology than any other country in this world. We have 400 Million people living in dire poverty,who needs cost effective technology to reach them. The technology produced by the West is just too costly for most Indians.If India had the capacity to produce airplanes that would result in a huge cost savings in the purchase of military jets and the purchase of airliners by the private airline companies. Just like the Space market where the Indian rocket is ten times cheaper than the same payload rocket of any other country.We would always be produce more cost effective technology than the western world but there is simply no initiative or positive attitude towards any kind of technological innovation in India.We are happy with whatever the west gives us and ready to pay a premium price for it.The PRICE OF OUR INCOMPETENCE.