The following is the full text of the Iran Update Special Report from August 6, 2026, as provided in the source material:
Iran Update Special Report, August 6, 2026
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
Analyst Notes The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran. Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. Iran is not merely responding to US strikes on Iran, however, but is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives. The revised update structure reflects some of these key objectives.
Key Takeaways
- Iranian regime media claimed that the emerging Iran-Oman deal would enable Iran to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Any agreement that grants Iran control over the strait would be detrimental to US and global commercial interests. Achieving international recognition of its control over the strait would enable Iran to use the strait as a deterrent against its adversaries in potential future conflicts.
- Iran continues to use force to consolidate its control of the strait. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 5 that a vessel’s crew heard two explosions while passing through Omani territorial waters.
- Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely attempting to deter the Syrian government from disrupting smuggling routes used to support Hezbollah.
- Iran likely believes that continued Syrian government efforts to disrupt Hezbollah smuggling routes in Syria represent Syrian cooperation with Israel and the United States against Hezbollah when, in reality, Syria is exercising its sovereign right to secure its borders.
- ISW-CTP is considering two possible courses of action for Iran in Syria:
- Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Iran uses clandestine cells in Syria to conduct spectacular attacks within Syria that force Syrian security forces to divert resources from border regions to respond to such attacks.
- Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A major Syrian counter-smuggling operation on the Lebanese border against Hezbollah triggers a coordinated Iranian-backed response involving clandestine cells, cross-border attacks, and possibly Iranian strikes to deter further Syrian government action.
- The Syrian government has deployed an increased number of forces to the Syria-Iraq border to support border security in response to Iranian and Axis of Resistance threats and activity.
- The activities of Iran and the Axis of Resistance across the region, including their reported actions in Syria, are likely causing an increasing alignment of interests between different regional states.
- The Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) military camps in Marib and Hadramawt governorates on August 6, possibly in response to ROYG ground movements near Houthi frontlines.
Toplines
Iranian regime media claimed that the emerging Iran-Oman deal would enable Iran to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Any agreement that grants Iran control over the strait would be detrimental to US and global commercial interests. An informed source told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media on August 6 that the Iran-Oman deal stipulates that ships will enter the strait through Iranian territorial waters and exit through Omani territorial waters for a “certain period”. Four industry sources similarly told Reuters on August 6 that the proposed deal would give Iran “control” over ships entering the Persian Gulf through the strait. All ships would then, after this period, pass through a central route, with Iran managing ships’ entrances and Iran and Oman jointly managing ships’ exits. The source added that the deal includes “insurance, fueling, and environmental fees,” which are effectively tolls. The arrangement described by IRGC-affiliated media would enable the Iranian regime to retain control over both inbound and outbound traffic in the strait and earn revenue through charging tolls. This Iranian media report contradicts an August 6 Saudi media report in which a “senior source” claimed that the agreement does not include transit fees or service charges.
Achieving international recognition of its control over the strait would enable Iran to use the strait as a deterrent against its adversaries in potential future conflicts. The Supreme Leader’s website newspaper, Voice of Iran, argued in an op-ed on August 5 that the regime views the strait as a central pillar of its security architecture rather than just bargaining leverage in negotiations with the United States. This argument is consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that one of the regime’s strategic objectives is to secure long-term and permanent control over the strait. Voice of Iran’s argument also comes after some “pragmatist” elements have questioned how much effort the regime should expend in enforcing its control over the strait. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, for example, argued on August 3 that Iran has a time-sensitive window of opportunity to capitalize on its control of the strait and argued that Iran should use the strait as leverage in negotiations to recover economically and avoid further US military action.
Iran continues to use force to consolidate its control of the strait. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 5 that a vessel’s crew heard two explosions while passing through Omani territorial waters. Iran has repeatedly targeted vessels in the strait using the Omani route because traffic through this route undermines Iranian efforts to assert full control over the strait.
Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely attempting to deter the Syrian government from disrupting smuggling routes used to support Hezbollah. A UK-based Saudi-owned outlet reported on August 4 that numerous Iranian cells in Syria have prepared to launch attacks on Syrian government and civilian targets if the Syrian government decides to take unspecified action against Hezbollah. Iran and its Axis partners in Iraq and Lebanon have consistently attempted to infiltrate Syria with clandestine cells and recruit former pro-Assad fighters who remained in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in 2024. The Syrian government has thwarted several Iranian-supported smuggling attempts to equip Iranian cells in Syria as well as attempts to move Iranian-backed fighters across the Syria-Lebanon border in recent weeks. Many Iraqi and Syrian fighters have already entered Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah.
Iran likely believes that continued Syrian government efforts to disrupt Hezbollah smuggling routes in Syria represent Syrian cooperation with Israel and the United States against Hezbollah when, in reality, Syria is exercising its sovereign right to secure its borders. Iran likely views Syrian efforts against Hezbollah and weapons smuggling as threats to Iranian supply lines and evidence of Syrian support for Israeli objectives. Iran and its partners and proxies have surely observed Western reports claiming that US President Donald Trump has repeatedly asked Syria to take action against Hezbollah, which would reinforce Iranian and Axis of Resistance perceptions. These Syrian government efforts instead address broader threats to Syrian sovereignty, including continued Axis of Resistance activity and smuggling in Syria after years of Iranian and Axis support for the Assad regime. Iran has historically viewed Syria as a critical component to its ability to support Axis operations and has utilized Assad-era Syria to support Hezbollah with weapons and funding via Iraq.
ISW-CTP is considering two possible courses of action for Iran in Syria:
- Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Iran uses clandestine cells in Syria to conduct spectacular attacks within Syria that force Syrian security forces to divert resources from border regions. This would both divert resources away from the border regions (thereby making counter-smuggling efforts less effective) and could act as a deterrent against future border security efforts. Spectacular attacks would force already strained Syrian security forces to divert resources and personnel from monitoring active smuggling routes. Iran and the Axis could take advantage of these gaps to smuggle equipment, funds, and personnel. The attacks would also create political challenges for Ahmad al Shara’s government.
- Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A major Syrian counter-smuggling operation on the Lebanese border against Hezbollah triggers a coordinated Iranian-backed response involving clandestine cells, cross-border attacks, and possibly Iranian strikes to deter further Syrian government action. A major operation—perhaps against Hezbollah warehouses or one that kills a significant number of fighters—could trigger a wider response. Iranian cells could conduct coordinated attacks against Syrian forces supported by Axis and possibly Iranian drone, rocket, and missile strikes. Such a campaign may result in broader Hezbollah objectives beyond deterring the Syrian government once it begins.
The Syrian government has deployed an increased number of forces to the Syria-Iraq border to support border security in response to Iranian and Axis of Resistance threats and activity. A UK-based Saudi-owned outlet reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and Hezbollah have reinforced positions along Syria’s borders. This deployment reportedly prompted the Syrian Defense Ministry to mobilize forces along the Iraq-Syria border. The Syrian government reportedly informed the Iraqi and Lebanese governments that Iranian and Axis activity on Syria’s borders threatens Syria’s internal stability and warned that Syrian forces would respond to any attacks. The Iraqi Border Forces commander told Iraqi media on August 4 that the situation is normal and Syria’s border security measures are being coordinated with Iraq. This statement indicates that both Iraq and Syria interpret the Syrian deployment as part of a border security operation to prevent smuggling.
The activities of Iran and the Axis of Resistance across the region are likely causing an increasing alignment of interests between different regional states. Iran has increasingly threatened Syrian security both through cells and strikes, including IRGC strikes on the former US base in al Tanf on July 17. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have repeatedly struck multiple regional countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Syria has increased its coordination with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in recent weeks. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara held two phone calls with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Nahyan on July 30 to discuss regional developments and condemn Iranian attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure. These activities have spurred increased cooperation between Arab states as they have become more frustrated with Iran.
The Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) military camps in Marib and Hadramawt governorates on August 6, possibly in response to ROYG ground movements near Houthi frontlines. The Saudi-backed Yemen Emergency Forces confirmed the attacks on several of its camps and other ROYG-affiliated units. The attacks killed at least 45 ROYG soldiers. The Houthis claimed they were responding to a recent mobilization of ROYG and “Saudi” forces. Anti-Houthi and Saudi media indicated in late July that ROYG forces were mobilizing in Marib Governorate, and security forces there arrested individuals for filming military movements on July 31. Saudi-owned media also noted on July 25 that an unspecified actor conducted airstrikes on Houthi positions in Marib and al Jawf governorates. The immediate trigger remains unclear. These attacks come after reports that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a naval and possible land offensive against the Houthis. The Houthi attacks also come after Yemen Emergency Forces raided a Houthi-linked explosives manufacturing factory and seized equipment in Hadramawt on August 3. The Houthis may have conducted their attacks to deter future ROYG actions targeting their logistics and procurement networks.
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
- Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
- Nothing significant to report.
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline section.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces thwarted a reported planned militant attack in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The Quds Operational Base announced on August 6 that its forces dismantled an unspecified militant cell before it could conduct an attack in the southern part of the province. IRGC forces reportedly ambushed the cell and killed two of its leaders. Sistan and Baluchistan is a hotspot for anti-regime activity, including by Baloch separatist groups that frequently attack security forces.
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly threatened to respond to the recent US-Saudi strikes on militia sites in Iraq if Saudi Arabia fails to meet the militias’ demands, which include an official apology. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq previously said it would respond after August 6. Demands also include compensation for victims’ families and damage to property, and limiting anti-militia discourse in Saudi media. The United States and Saudi Arabia conducted joint strikes on militia positions on July 28 in response to attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and US interests. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) said the strikes killed at least 20 members and injured 30.
The militias’ decision to make their response contingent on Saudi Arabia meeting demands may be in response to Iraqi federal government pressure to de-escalate. Sources told independent Iraqi Kurdish media on August 5 that militias are “serious” about a military response, but high-level political pressure is preventing them from acting. Historically, previous governments attempted to halt militia activity to no avail, and militias only stopped attacks on US forces in early 2024 after receiving direct orders from IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.
Iraqi militias continue to take security precautions due to concerns over further US strikes. Security sources told media on August 6 that militias evacuated bases and established new positions following last week’s strikes, transferring weapons, equipment, and commanders. The PMF Ninewa Operations Command reportedly ordered the complete evacuation of its headquarters on August 2 in anticipation of future strikes.
Arabian Peninsula
The Saudi Defense Ministry appointed a commander for the Saudi-led multinational “maritime defense coalition” on August 6 to coordinate activities to protect international shipping from Houthi threats in the Bab al Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Fourteen countries, including the ROYG, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, and Sudan, joined the alliance on July 30. Saudi Arabia formed the coalition in response to the Houthi blockade that began on July 20.
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