# Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2026
**Assessment as of:** 8:00 PM ET
**Data Cutoff:** 11:15 AM ET
**Prepared by:** Jennie Olmsted, Samuel Frykholm, Tetiana Trach, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Shymkiv, Arielle Sher, Nikolai Sundstrom, and Frederick W. Kagan
**Institute for the Study of War (ISW) & Critical Threats Project (CTP)**
## Toplines / Analyst Notes
Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia’s poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage that over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have done to the Russian economy. Putin stated that Russia’s GDP growth is currently around one percent, characterizing the growth as “modest” but positive. Putin acknowledged that “external pressure” and “terrorist attacks” — the Kremlin’s code for Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign — are affecting Russia’s economic growth.
Putin tacitly acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities in late July and August 2026, which are imposing growing operational and financial costs on Russia, mean that some logistics and warehouses require “restoration” but claimed that all trade infrastructure is operating effectively. Putin sought to reassure the Russian public that he is taking appropriate measures to address Russia’s economic challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections. He tried to present the Russian government as prioritizing quality of life issues for Russian citizens even as the Kremlin also tries to prepare Russian society to make more sacrifices for his failing war.
The Russian people have been increasingly feeling the effects of war in the form of rising inflation and the price of goods, gasoline shortages, and labor shortages. Putin is likely acknowledging the damage Ukrainian strikes are doing to the Russian economy to portray himself and his United Russia party as aware of the economic and social struggles of the Russian people and to avoid appearing isolated from economic realities ahead of the elections.
Putin has been able to present a fictional picture of the Russian military’s performance on the battlefield to the Russian public more readily than he can dissemble about the economic situation. The Kremlin has conducted a broad censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the progress of the full-scale invasion since 2022, making it easier for Putin to present a much more positive vision of the war’s progress than the military situation actually supports. Ukrainian long-range strikes, however, have forced Putin to publicly acknowledge the economic effects that over four years of war have had on Russia as the Russian population and business community see those strikes and their effects themselves in ways that censorship cannot control.
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## Gasoline Shortages and Economic Strain
Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in areas Putin has sought to shield from negative consequences of the war. Russian state newspaper *Izvestia* reported on August 18, citing data from Russian crowd-sourced mobile application *GdeBENZ* (which provides Russians real-time fuel availability and prices), that gasoline was available at only 28 percent of all Russian gas stations, down from 41 percent the previous week. Fuel availability has reportedly declined across several Russian oblasts that are frequent targets of Ukrainian long-range strikes, including Moscow Oblast.
Russian state-owned oil company Gazprom Neft’s hotline acknowledged to Russian business outlet *RBK* that it has instituted gasoline quotas at some gas stations in Moscow City but claimed that it was making efforts to increase supply. *Izvestia* correspondents confirmed on August 17 that 21 gas stations in Moscow City and Moscow Oblast were experiencing varying levels of gasoline shortages, particularly of high-quality gasoline. The correspondents reported that only seven of the 21 gas stations were selling AI-92 gasoline, six were selling AI-95, and only five were selling AI-98 gasoline. The Kremlin has long sought to shield residents of urban areas in western Russia, particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg, from the impacts of its war in Ukraine. Renewed gasoline shortages across Russia, including in Moscow, resulting from Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, indicate that the Kremlin’s ability to shield Moscow residents is becoming tenuous.
### Compounding Effects on Other Sectors
The Russian government’s attempts to alleviate gasoline shortages are having compounding effects, including in other key economic sectors. Russian business newspaper *Kommersant* reported on August 19 that Russia is also experiencing shortages in motor oil due to the reduced availability of raw inputs and difficulties importing motor oil. *Kommersant* reported on August 18 that the Russian Government Commission on Economic Development and Integration met in mid-August 2026 to discuss a possible ban on the export of aromatic hydrocarbons.
Aromatic hydrocarbons are used in lower-quality gasoline but are necessary for a number of defense-related products, including synthetics, rubbers, and polymers. *Kommersant* noted that refineries produce aromatic hydrocarbons and decide how much to release to the domestic market rather than using them to produce gasoline. Russian refineries are now using more aromatic hydrocarbons to produce lower-octane gasoline in order to alleviate the ongoing Russian fuel shortages following a July 2 decree allowing them to do so.
Reallocation of aromatic hydrocarbons to the production of lower-quality gasoline is exacerbating shortages in other sectors, including in the availability of motor oil, as fueling with lower-octane gasoline requires more motor oil to maintain vehicles. The Russian government’s attempts to increase the domestic flow of gasoline supplies are increasing stressors on other parts of the Russian petrochemical industry and on industrial production dependent on petroleum products other than gasoline or diesel. Even these measures, however, have not resolved ongoing fuel shortages in Russia.
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## Security and Civil Suppression Tactics
### Deployment of Paramilitary Forces
Kremlin concern about social disorder resulting from fuel shortages has reportedly led to the deployment of paramilitary forces in some areas. A Russian insider source claimed on August 18 that Putin deployed Rosgvardia (Russia’s heavily militarized internal security force) units to gas stations in Moscow Oblast. Rosgvardia personnel have reportedly deployed to at least 13 gas stations in Russia and occupied Crimea amidst ongoing fuel shortages in Summer 2026.
Putin is deploying additional Rosgvardia manpower to patrol gas stations likely in order to manage civil unrest and violence occurring at gas stations due to severe fuel shortages and sales restrictions. Putin’s deployment of Rosgvardia personnel also likely suggests that the Kremlin expects the Russian fuel crisis and fuel-related violence to protract. The deployment of Rosgvardia troops indicates that the Kremlin does not have confidence in the ability of Russian regular police forces to manage the scale of fuel-related violence.
### Expansion of Legal Authorities for Emergency Forces
The Kremlin is also expanding the legal authorities of Russia’s emergency forces, likely in part in anticipation of more widespread public unrest. Russia’s legislative commission approved a draft bill on August 18 allowing Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations’ rescue forces to use physical force and firearms if the forces cannot fulfil their duties through nonviolent means, according to a source within the Kremlin and another source within the legislative commission.
The bill allows rescue forces to use firearms to prevent attempts to seize military equipment and to protect Ministry of Emergency Situations’ personnel. The deputy chairman of Russia’s Security and Anti-Corruption Committee reported that the bill will also provide a legal tool for Russian rescue forces to counter Ukrainian drone strikes during evacuations in occupied Ukraine and in emergency situations. Russian officials are framing the bill solely as a counter-drone measure.
However, the draft bill provides the Kremlin with additional means to suppress domestic unrest, including through violent means if necessary. The Kremlin is amending Russia’s civil defense law likely in anticipation of public discontent amidst continuing domestic gasoline shortages and possibly in anticipation of involuntary mobilization that Putin is reportedly considering for after the September State Duma elections.
### Restrictions on Mass Gatherings in Moscow
Russian authorities are restricting mass gatherings in Moscow’s Red Square, likely out of fear of protests and domestic unrest. The organizers of the Spasskaya Bashnya (Savior Tower) military music festival announced on August 17 the cancellation of the music festival, originally scheduled for August 21 to 30, “for reasons beyond the organizers’ control.” Russia has held the Spasskaya Bashnya music festival annually in Red Square since 2007 (except 2020), and it includes military bands of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Rosgvardia, Federal Security Service (FSB), and other federal security agencies.
Russian authorities also cancelled an annual concert in Red Square for Russia Day planned for June 12. Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation noted that the cancellations of mass events in Red Square follow protests against the Russian Supreme Court’s decision to ban the opposition Yabloko Party from the September 18 to 20 State Duma elections. Large public events in Red Square would likely draw a large security presence to manage even without fear of protests or civil unrest, and the cancellations of these events indicate that Russian authorities have chosen to preserve the bandwidth of their security forces amid the new competing requirements imposed by the effects of the war in general and of Ukraine’s strike campaign in particular.
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## Political and Diplomatic Developments
### Ukrainian Government Appointments
The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) confirmed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appointment of Yevheniy Khmara as the Ukrainian Defense Minister on August 19. Zelensky appointed Khmara as interim defense minister on July 16 and submitted Khmara’s candidacy for acting defense minister to the Verkhovna Rada on August 18. The Verkhovna Rada also confirmed Zelensky’s reappointment of Andriy Sybiha, who has served as the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister since September 2024.
### Prisoner of War (POW) Exchange
Russia and Ukraine recently conducted an exchange of prisoners of war. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Russia returned 103 Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine, most of them wounded and/or seriously ill. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on August 19 that Ukraine returned 103 Russian servicemembers who were immediately sent to Belarus to receive psychological and medical assistance.
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## Key Takeaways (Summary)
1. **Putin's Narrative Framing:** President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia's poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have caused.
2. **Fuel Shortages:** Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in western urban areas (like Moscow) that the Kremlin has long sought to shield from the war's negative consequences.
3. **Compounding Economic Stress:** Measures to alleviate the gasoline shortages are exacerbating constraints in other economic sectors, including shortages in motor oil due to the diversion of aromatic hydrocarbons.
4. **Paramilitary Security Measures:** Concerns over fuel-related social disorder have led to the deployment of Rosgvardia internal security forces to gas stations in Moscow Oblast and occupied Crimea.
5. **Moscow Gatherings Restricted:** Major public events in Moscow's Red Square (like the Spasskaya Bashnya music festival) are being cancelled, reflecting fears of protests and a desire to conserve security force bandwidth.
6. **Ukrainian Leadership Changes:** The Ukrainian Parliament confirmed Yevheniy Khmara as Defense Minister and reappointed Andriy Sybiha as Foreign Minister.
7. **POW Exchange:** Russia and Ukraine exchanged 103 prisoners of war each.
8. **Kharkiv & Kupyansk Progress:** Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, while Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
9. **Deep Ukrainian Refinery Strike:** Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refining Hub in the Republic of Bashkortostan, approximately 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
10. **Russian Air Assaults:** Russian forces launched 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 drones against Ukraine overnight.
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## Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refining Hub, which includes three separate refineries, in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border) overnight on August 18 to 19. Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows smoke rising from the Ufa Oil Refining Hub. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko and Bashkortostan Republic Head Radiy Khabirov confirmed the Ukrainian strike. Ukrainian defense outlet *Militarnyi* assessed that the Ukrainian strike destroyed the AVT-6 primary refining unit at the Bashneft Oil Refinery in Ufa.
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 19 that Ukraine’s August 14 to 15 strike against the Progress Space Launch Center in Samara Oblast hit the Soyuz launch vehicle engine assembly workshop. The Progress Center is Russia’s main production center for Soyuz launch vehicles, which Russia needs to launch satellites for its Rassvet (the Russian Starlink analogue) constellation. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the August 14 to 15 strike also caused a fire at an aircraft maintenance workshop at the Aviakor Aviation Plant in Samara City.
Likely Ukrainian forces reportedly struck grain vessels at or near Russian ports in the Black Sea in recent days. *Bloomberg* reported on August 18, citing sources familiar with the matter, that unspecified actors struck at least five grain vessels near the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai on August 17 and 18 — the first confirmation of strikes against grain vessels at Russian ports. The sources stated that Russian authorities are downplaying the strikes. Ukraine recently offered a moratorium on strikes against maritime targets in the Black Sea, but the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected this proposal on August 14.
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## Frontline Assessments and Land Operations
### Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
* **Russian Objective:** Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border.
* **Ground Activity:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Russian forces advanced east of Volkhivka (northwest of Sumy City and roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).
* **Ukrainian Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 17 and 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a bridge using a GBU-39 guided bomb in Zvannoye, Kursk Oblast (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline) and a mine-laying vehicle in Sudzha (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).
### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1: Kharkiv Oblast
* **Russian Objective:** Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
* **Ukrainian Advances:** Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Bilyi Kolodyaz (north of Kharkiv City).
* **Russian Operations:** Russian milbloggers claimed on August 19 that Russian forces advanced east of and in northwestern Kozacha Lopan and east of Vysoka Yaruha. Russian forces continue to conduct frontline glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian military assets in the near-rear. Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian artillery system using four FAB-500 glide bombs in northern Slatyne. Russian forces are increasingly reliant on glide bombs to strike military assets in the Ukrainian rear and facilitate Russian infantry advances along the frontline as they are less vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes than artillery systems.
* **Flag-Raising Thwarted:** Ukrainian forces recently thwarted a Russian flag-raising mission in the Vovchansk direction. The Ukrainian State Border Service reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel attempting a flag-raising mission in the Vovchansk direction. Russian flag-raising missions are part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to project a false impression of Russian gains.
* **Velykyi Burluk:** Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance.
### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2: Oskil River
* **Russian Objective:** Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast.
* **Russian Advances:** Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 19 that Russian assault units seized the eastern part of Kivshrivka (southeast of Kupyansk), supporting Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets’ report on August 13 that Russian forces had consolidated on the northeastern outskirts of Kivshrivka. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces advanced east of Mala Shapkivka (north of Kupyansk), north and south of Radkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and in northwestern Kupyansk.
* **Borova Direction:** A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces attacked in the Borova direction on August 19 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.
* **Luhansk Oblast Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot near occupied Lobacheve (roughly either 86 or 118 kilometers from the frontline), a material and technical support warehouse near occupied Kadiivka (roughly 62 kilometers from the frontline), and Russian equipment and manpower near occupied Lysychansk (roughly 36 kilometers from the frontline).
### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3: Donetsk Oblast
* **Russian Objective:** Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
* **Slovyansk Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Lyman.
* **Order of Battle:** Elements of the Russian Phobos Unmanned Systems Battalion (reportedly of the Smersh Unmanned Systems Forces [USF] Brigade) are operating in the Slovyansk direction. This is the first instance ISW has observed of the Smersh USF Brigade or its Phobos Battalion operating in Ukraine. ISW observed reports of the Russian Phobos Drone Group (reportedly of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Kherson direction in November 2025. It is unclear whether the Phobos USF Battalion and Phobos Drone Group are the same unit.
* **Infiltration Tactics near Kostyantynivka:** Russian forces continue small-group infiltration missions within and near Kostyantynivka in order to bypass Ukrainian frontline positions and interdict Ukrainian logistics. Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions in southwestern Kostyantynivka and northeast of Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.
* **Aggrandized Claims:** Russian sources continue to aggrandize Russian claims of advance in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian sources published footage on August 19 purportedly showing Russian soldiers waving flags in Novomykolaivka in order to claim that Russian forces have seized the village. ISW has reason to assess that the footage was likely doctored or AI-altered. The Kremlin has been conducting a cognitive warfare campaign using aggrandized claims of advance and AI-altered footage to create the false perception that Russian forces are making significant gains across the entire theater.
* **Dobropillya Direction:** Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on August 19 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Vodyanske (east of Dobropillya).
* **Manpower Concentration:** Russian forces are reportedly concentrating manpower for a future offensive toward Dobropillya. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 19 that Russian forces are attempting to reach the Rodynske-Kryvorizhzhia highway (southeast and southwest of Dobropillya respectively) to advance toward Dobropillya. The commander noted that Russian forces are accumulating infantry to prepare for further offensive operations — an approach that Russian forces have not used for at least two to three months. The commander added that Russian forces have to travel approximately 10 to 15 kilometers from Pokrovsk over three to four days to reach the frontline.
* **Pokrovsk Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance.
* **Novopavlivka Direction:** Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on August 19.
* **Oleksandrivka Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 18 and 19 but did not advance.
* **Donetsk Oblast Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and rear-area logistics in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone depots near occupied Novopetrykivka and Novotroitske (roughly 39 and 70 kilometers from the frontline, respectively). Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows a Ukrainian drone strike against a Russian vehicle along the T-0515 Kramatorsk-Donetsk City highway near the entrance to the Donetsk Airport near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline).
### Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
* **Russian Objective:** Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City.
* **Hulyaipole Direction:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 18 to 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. The kill zone in the Hulyaipole direction may increase as seasonal dynamics can affect its growth. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment reported on August 19 that the kill zone in the Hulyaipole direction is not currently increasing as it did in the winter of 2025-2026, but that the growth of the kill zone is often seasonal. Filatov noted that the kill zone may expand significantly in the fall and winter as it did in 2025.
* **Zaporizhia Oblast:** Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 19 that Russian forces seized Mala Tokmachka (east of Orikhiv).
* **Zaporizhia Strikes:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian KamAZ truck along the H-30 Berdyansk-Tokmak highway east of Sofiivka (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline). Footage published on August 19 shows a series of burning Russian trucks and fuel tankers along the M-14 Berdyansk-Mariupol highway, likely following Ukrainian strikes. The Ukrainian Navy reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian BM-27 Uragan 220 mm rocket MLRS in occupied Nikopolskyi Raion.
* **Kherson Direction:** Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 19.
* **"Human Safari" in Kherson City:** Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Ukrainian officials reported on August 19 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone intentionally targeted a minibus in Kherson City, killing four civilians and injuring five others. Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows the aftermath of the strike. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear, especially in Kherson City, is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.
* **Crimea Strikes & Economic Toll:** Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on August 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a ground repeater used for controlling Russian Geran strike drones near occupied Olenivka (likely one of three settlements approximately 130 to 230 kilometers from the frontline). Crimea-based Telegram channel *Crimean Wind* claimed on August 19 that Ukrainian strikes disabled the Darsan substation in occupied Yalta (roughly 260 kilometers from the frontline) and that explosions occurred near occupied Hurzuf, the Saki Thermal Power in occupied Saki, a mobile gas turbine power plant in occupied Sevastopol, the Malorichenske substation in occupied Malorichenske, and the Alushta substation in occupied Alushta (between roughly 175 and 260 kilometers from the frontline).
NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at a reported Russian Black Fleet Fleet [sic] storage depot near occupied Sevastopol (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline) and a reported Russian communications center near Annivka (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline). *Crimean Wind* also reported that fuel shortages, power disruptions, logistical problems, and Ukrainian strikes caused hotel occupancy in occupied Crimea to fall by roughly 35 percent in July 2026 and 30 percent in August 2026.
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## Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
* **Russian Objective:** Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline.
* **Reporting Interruption:** The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.
* **Nightly Air Strikes:** Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; occupied Donetsk city; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones and two Banderol loitering munitions, that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 10 locations, and that drone debris fell on three locations.
* **Targeted Infrastructure:** Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, transportation, residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukrainian state energy operator *Ukrenergo* reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.
* **Economic Impact on Ukraine:** Russian strikes against Ukraine are causing significant disruption to the Ukrainian economy. *The Economist* reported on August 19 that Russian strikes are inflicting significant damage on the Ukrainian economy, causing an estimated $500 million in damages to Ukrainian businesses and Ukrainian industrial and agricultural infrastructure. *The Economist* noted that Russian strikes against port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast could disrupt Ukraine’s ability to export 50 million tons of already harvested agricultural products.
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## Significant Activity in Belarus
* **Russian Objective:** Increase military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks.
* **Activity:** Nothing significant to report.
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*Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports.*
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