The following is the full text of the Iran Update Special Report from June 24, 2026, as provided in the source material:
Analyst Notes
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET. Note: ISW-CTP will pause publishing morning social media threads about the Iran conflict starting on June 25, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- Iran is likely using discussions called for by the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) to reach arrangements with the Gulf states that would allow for sustained Iranian influence around the strait during the post-war period. The fifth clause of the US-Iran MoU charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other littoral Persian Gulf states. The Iranian regime may also be attempting to segue discussions with the Gulf states on the status of the Strait of Hormuz into broader conversations about limiting US or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf.
- Recent remarks from Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani suggested that some Gulf countries may be amenable to cooperating with the Iranians on a “broader economic framework.” Thani told the Financial Times on June 24 that Qatar was open to discussing Iran’s plans to administer the strait alongside Oman and the future management of the strait with Oman and other Gulf countries.
- Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials discussed proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon during talks in Washington, DC, on June 23 and 24. Israeli officials told Reuters and Israeli media on June 24 that Israeli and Lebanese negotiators discussed a US-backed plan to deploy US-trained and vetted LAF personnel to backfill Israeli positions.
Toplines
Iran is likely using discussions required by the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) to reach arrangements with the Gulf states that would allow for sustained Iranian influence around the Strait of Hormuz during the post-war period. The fifth clause of the US-Iran MoU charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other littoral Persian Gulf states. Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, met with Omani officials in Muscat on June 23. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also discussed strengthening regional cooperation with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan, on June 24. Iran is likely attempting to use these talks to segue discussions over the immediate management of the Strait of Hormuz and resumption of traffic into broader discussions about a new regional architecture in the Gulf region. Ghalibaf explicitly stated on June 24 that Iran is ready for security agreements with Gulf states “that are made sustainable through economic cooperation”. Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, who is the Supreme National Defense University President and a longtime regime insider, also highlighted Iran’s objectives to strengthen its strategic relations with its neighbors in this post-war period in a speech on June 24.
Recent remarks from Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani suggested that some Gulf countries may be amenable to cooperating with the Iranians on a “broader economic framework.” Thani told the Financial Times on June 24 that Qatar was open to discussing Iran’s plans to administer the strait alongside Oman with other Gulf countries. Qatari officials met with Omani officials on June 24, likely to discuss Oman’s recent discussions about the strait with Iranian officials. A diplomat briefed on Thani’s visit to Muscat told Reuters that Qatari and Omani officials discussed initiating negotiations involving Iran, Iraq, and Gulf Arab states on the Strait of Hormuz. The diplomat stated that the Gulf states are planning to push for no “transit fees,” and added that Iran “could” push for environmental, navigation, and security fees in these discussions. The diplomat’s framing, in which Gulf states oppose transit fees explicitly but do not oppose other fees explicitly, implies that some Gulf states are willing to entertain fees in return for certain Iranian concessions or guarantees. Iran could weave these fees into any regional agreement over the strait’s management, for example. Thani denied that Qatar would approve any plan in which the Persian Gulf — which Thani called Qatar’s “gateway to the world” — was “controlled” or subject to a toll system. Thani did not explicitly rule out other arrangements that could still be favorable to Iran and give Iran a say in the future of the strait. A diplomat familiar with the matter told Agence France-Presse later on June 24 that Saudi Arabia is preparing to hold a “reconciliation summit” between Iran and Arab Gulf states separate from the US-Iran negotiations, but no date has been set at the time of this writing. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Any effort to place the Strait under the control of a state or several states would erode long-standing international norms and maritime law.
The Iranian regime may also be attempting to segue discussions with the Gulf states on the status of the Strait of Hormuz into broader conversations about limiting US or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf. This effort would be consistent with a persistent Iranian narrative in which the regime describes its intent to use the post-war period to establish a regional architecture favorable to Iran. Iranian officials have asserted during and after the war in Iranian and regional media that US partnerships with the Gulf fuels instability for Gulf States, which is designed to exploit Gulf state fears of renewed Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Gulf and surrounding the current uncertainty over US-Iran negotiations. ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iran seeks to persuade Gulf countries that accommodation with Iran — rather than reliance on US and Israeli security partnerships — offers them greater stability. This is ultimately part of a longstanding Iranian effort to reduce US presence and influence in the region. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on June 24 that as long as the US military interferes in the region, the Middle East will never achieve lasting peace. Iran may be using recent engagements with Gulf countries to attempt to strengthen its relationships with regional countries as a result. Senior Iranian officials recently met with senior Emirati security officials, following multiple Iranian requests to meet for a rapprochement.
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline section.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials discussed proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill the IDF in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon during talks in Washington, DC, on June 23 and 24. Israeli officials told Reuters and Israeli media on June 24 that Israeli and Lebanese negotiators discussed a US-backed plan to deploy US-trained and vetted LAF personnel to backfill Israeli positions. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on June 24 that the United States would help strengthen the LAF’s capacity to clear and hold territory in southern Lebanon, but did not confirm any specific plans to vet Lebanese soldiers. Unspecified US sources told Lebanese media on June 24 that the Lebanese government has proposed that the IDF transfer control of territory in the vicinity of Beaufort Castle, Nabatieh District, to the LAF as part of an initial pilot zone trial. Israel reportedly seeks to complete an assessment of Hezbollah’s capabilities before authorizing any “broader” withdrawal from Lebanese territory, however. An unnamed Lebanese official told Reuters on June 24 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations will not announce any plans involving Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon until the conclusion of talks in Washington on June 25. The IDF first transferred control of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, to the LAF and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after withdrawing from the town on June 4.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to respond to threats in southern Lebanon as the United States, Iran, Lebanon, and mediators develop plans for the “deconfliction cell” to monitor the conflict. Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani stated on June 24 that a “core element” of the deconfliction cell will be to monitor ceasefire violations. Qatar is a member of the deconfliction cell alongside the United States, Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan. The deconfliction cell appears to constrain Israeli action against Hezbollah by eliminating the post-2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring mechanism, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah ceasefire violations in certain circumstances. Both Iran and Hezbollah could materially benefit from a constrained Israeli ability to confront Hezbollah.
The IDF has continued to respond to perceived threats in southern Lebanon, however. The IDF reported that its forces killed two Hezbollah fighters who advanced toward IDF positions near Ali al Taher and posed an “immediate threat”. The IDF also reported that it later struck a second group of Hezbollah fighters in a vehicle that approached IDF positions in Ali al Taher. It is not yet clear how the newly-proposed “deconfliction cell” in Lebanon will handle incidents in which the IDF identifies a direct threat to troops in the future. An Israeli intelligence official told Haaretz that IDF soldiers have not received any official updates about the role that the deconfliction mechanism may play in Lebanon.
The Iranian regime continues to emphasize that a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is a condition for any final US-Iran deal. Iranian Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reiterated on June 24 that a complete Israeli withdrawal is a “central condition” for reaching any final agreement with the United States. ISW-CTP has assessed that the Iranian regime is using the war in Lebanon to delay any substantive negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed on June 24 that the IDF will remain deployed within the security zone in southern Lebanon while he remains in office.
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Nothing significant to report.
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