Famous quotes

"Happiness can be defined, in part at least, as the fruit of the desire and ability to sacrifice what we want now for what we want eventually" - Stephen Covey

Showing posts with label Substack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Substack. Show all posts

Sunday, October 26, 2025

The Tariff Exemption behind the AI boom

 The sources provide a detailed examination of the computer parts tariff exemption, characterizing it as a critical factor enabling the massive economic and investment surge known as the AI Boom.

The Scope and Scale of the Exemption

The exemption for computers and related parts is the largest single carveout from the trade war initiated by Donald Trump, which has otherwise imposed tariffs at the highest levels since the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.

  • Size of the Exemption: The exemption for computers and parts covers an astonishing $34 billion of imports per month.
  • Costs Avoided: If the exemption were removed, importers would have paid roughly $8.9 billion so far this year (using a 10% baseline tariff) or approximately $19.2 billion (using current country-level tariff rates).
  • AI Reliance: American tech companies are now completely reliant on this exemption for their record-breaking investment push into AI. The sources explicitly state that the current AI boom would be "simply impossible" if tech companies were subject to the same tariffs faced by industries like car manufacturing or homebuilding.

The AI Boom Driven by Foreign Imports

The push to develop and run advanced AI models following the release of ChatGPT in late 2022 necessitates the construction of the largest data centers ever built, which require thousands of advanced computers. Because modern electronics have the most complex supply chains in human history, and America is only a small part of the direct manufacturing involved, the AI investment boom is heavily dependent on foreign inputs.

  • Rising Imports: Imports of large computers used in data centers have increased by 227% compared to before the launch of ChatGPT, exceeding $235 billion annualized. Imports of computer parts have risen by more than 100%, exceeding $67 billion annualized. Overall, AI-related imports (GPUs, parts, and equipment) are skyrocketing, surpassing $370 billion annualized.
  • Geographic Dependency: The majority of America's AI-related imports come from Taiwan, the headquarters of TSMC, the world-leading semiconductor manufacturing firm. US imports from Taiwan have skyrocketed from about a $25 billion/year pace in late 2023 to a $160 billion/year pace today.
  • Trade Strategy Effect: Computer imports from China are the only ones to have declined this year because the 20% tariff on all Chinese goods does not include the exemptions afforded to electronics from countries like Taiwan, Mexico, or Vietnam.

Economic and Political Implications of the Tariff Carveout

The tariff exemption acts as a form of industrial policy, heavily influencing investment decisions and economic growth.

  • Accelerating Growth: The carveout has achieved its desired effect of accelerating America’s AI boom. Large parts of the US economy are now "totally dependent" on this exception. Computer and software investment contributed approximately 0.71% to the 3.8% annualized pace of growth in Q2, which is likely an underestimate.
  • Massive Investment: Fixed investment in computers and related equipment has risen to nearly $250 billion (after inflation adjustment), a record high and nearly a $100 billion increase over the last year. Data center construction in the US exceeds a $41 billion/year pace, rising over 200% in the last three years.
  • The Paradox of Protectionism: The exemption is viewed as a victory for free-traders and a tacit admission that a full-scale trade war would "kill America’s golden geese". However, the "pick-and-choose" style of exemption means the Trump administration is punishing the rest of the economy to benefit tech companies. By making it cheaper to invest in data centers than in other structures or equipment that face tariffs, the policy is effectively incentivizing businesses into the AI ecosystem.
  • A National Gamble: The White House is making a giant gamble on artificial intelligence as the future of the world’s economy. If they are wrong, the US will have wasted tens of billions of dollars and dramatically underinvested in other valuable projects.

The Unexempted Infrastructure Challenge

A significant related issue is that while data center computers are exempt, the electricity generation infrastructure needed to power the AI boom is not.

  • Data centers require industrial-scale power, leading to commercial electricity consumption spikes (e.g., Virginia’s commercial electricity consumption has risen by roughly 45% since 2019).
  • Electrical infrastructure items such as batteries, transformers, switches, and copper wiring (which faces a 50% tariff) all face substantial tariffs.
  • This policy package—taxing electricity investment but exempting data center investment—exacerbates problems for a power grid already struggling with rising demand, leading to stagnant construction of power plants and rising US electricity prices.

Future Possibilities for the Exemption

The exemption has been billed as temporary, though the administration has repeatedly missed deadlines for closing it, proving thus far unwilling to do so. The sources note that the administration appears scared to end the exemption lest a poorly designed tariff hurt tech companies’ stock valuations and halt the domestic data center buildout.

Potential methods for ending the electronics exemption include:

  1. Exemption for US Investment: Imposing high tariffs but providing a "massive exemption" for companies that invest domestically. This version might require a 1:1 ratio of imports to promised future semiconductor production. This approach would likely lead the administration to functionally exempt everything important by recognizing existing large-scale investments by multinational electronics manufacturers like TSMC.
  2. Tariffs based on Semiconductor Value: Placing tariffs based on the value of the semiconductors within the imported item. While administratively complex, this approach would avoid punishing companies for non-semiconductor parts and would set a concrete incentive for domestic chip production, rather than just settling for promises.

Thursday, April 04, 2024

A New Atlantis - A crazy solution to Building crisis

By Duncan Mcclements and Jason Hasusesnloy

Housing in Britain is unaffordable. The average British home costs 9.1 times median earnings to purchase - the highest since the unification of Germany - and rents are 27% of pre-tax monthly income in England as a whole, and 35% in London. For all this, Britons get homes that are smaller than in New York and demolished so infrequently that equilibrium entails an average house age over 1350 years old.

As many note, this is overwhelmingly due to Britain’s bloated planning restrictions. For example, in London, these restrictions essentially ban building in an area three times larger than the city itself, while very heavily restricting construction within its borders. We have previously estimated, conservatively, such restrictions cost 6% of GDP a year. Yet, they have endured largely because existing residents don’t want the inconvenience of housing construction and increased population density more broadly.

Well, if the difficulty is existing residents, we have a Wales-sized solution. Dogger Bank. Dogger Bank has a perimeter of 720 km and area of 17,600 km2, compared to Wales’ 20,600km2. It’s almost entirely within Britain’s territorial waters (sorry Germany). And it's only 15-40 m below sea level to boot - so at depths humanity has constructed large engineering projects before.

Headline results: we estimate raising Dogger Bank would cost £97.5bn, but would bring present value benefits of £622bn. Under the government’s standard method of cost-benefit analysis, this project would get a go-ahead, with a cost-benefit ratio of 6.2.

Methodology What exactly is involved in reclaiming land?
Well, a layman’s guide to land reclamation:
Build a wall around the area you want to reclaim.
Pump out the water.1
Fill it up with your desired material. 2
Develop.
To estimate the costs for Dogger Bank, we’ll simply add up the costs for each section.

Build A Wall

There are only two comparable projects of this scale, the Dutch “Oosterscheldekering” and South Korean “Saemangeum.” The Oosterscheldekering is a series of 65 concrete walls each 40m tall that form 9km of the Dutch Coastline. The project was completed in 10 years, from 1976-1986 at a cost of £6bn. The Saemangeum was much cheaper, a 33km seawall built in 2010, at an average height of 36m, at the cost of £1.94bn.

Using the South Korean numbers, which are both more modern and closer to the size of our project, we calculate that building a 720km seawall will cost £76.1bn. This, conservatively, considers that all costs, such as transportation and labour, scale at a similar rate to UK wages compared to 1998 Korean ones, which are ~86% higher than UK wages. We also adjust downwards to account for economies of scale, additional efficiencies gained from this large project size, adapting our figures from the equivalent measures in homebuilding, where a 100-fold increase in project size reduces price per unit by 20.5%.

To check our work, we compared this seawall cost to the proposed 700km North European Enclosure Dam (NEED), which the literature estimates will be in the range of £250bn-500bn.3 This corresponds with our results, because for comparable lengths, NEED requires construction at much greater depths, up to 300m in the deepest parts, compared to a maximum depth of 40m for DoggerBank.

Pump Out The Water

Delightfully, the Pump Express company publishes the costs to pump water using centrifugal pumps. For us, we calculate that we’re going need around 7.16mn CP230, their most cost-efficient model that can pump water high enough, which will cost £1150 per machine.

Unfortunately, the ground is leaky. This makes for a fun optimisation problem. If we assume that water seeps back into the area of ~1% a day, it turns out the cost-minimising solution involves keeping those 7.16mn of those machines on for 107 days, assuming an electricity cost of 9p/kwh, at 50% efficiency. This yields a total cost for this step of £12.1bn.

Fill It In

We’ll need to fill 634 cubic kilometers, meaning that we’ll need 2 gigatons of rock – this accounts for the 10-30% increase in volume required because the rock must be compacted. Using open quarries at a typical rate of $5/tonne, this will cost £7.9bn (or perhaps a great volume of dynamite and some less picturesque Welsh mountains). To transport these 2 gigatons, we’ll use commercial shipping and trucking rates of £1.22/tonne/1000km and £4.77/tonne/1000km respectively. This gives us a total to fill in Dogger Bank of £9.3bn.

Dogger Bank Reclaimed
Concluding, this gives a total construction cost of £97.5bn across the three steps, or 4.3% of UK GDP.4 That’s about as much as the full HS2.
Development

At the moment, DoggerBank is a barren piece of land in the North Sea, even wetter and windier than the mainland. We’re going to need some infrastructure.

We can split this calculation into two parts:

Infrastructure paid for by the end user, such as ports, reservoirs, power generation and telecommunications – which we don’t calculate because will be covered privately

And infrastructure provided by the government, think schools, hospitals and roads.

Based on our prior estimates, schools and hospitals cost £2277 and £2588 per capita, respectively. Underground lines in London cost £9100 per capita, but using Madrid's cut-and-cover method before house construction, costs can be reduced to less than a tenth per kilometer. Fares at London levels should drive net costs to zero.

Per capita costs will be factored into house prices. Roads cost £1194/capita (based on a £4bn maintenance budget, 5% discount rate). Courthouses and prisons have capital expenditure totaling £567/capita (assuming all capital spending is for building maintenance). Police and fire stations, managed locally, cost £19/capita and £51/capita respectively (based on Essex Police and North Yorkshire figures, including all capital expenditure).

The total budget is £6129 per capita, which translates to an implied cost of £14,464 per household (average size: 2.36 people).

Benefits

We’ll use our adaptation of Hsieh and Moretti 2019 to estimate the implied benefits. See our housing paper for all parameter estimates not undertaken here, and for a more detailed exposition of the model used.

We'll make several improvements to our previous calibration. We remove the variation in construction project size, as this will be a new city that can be constructed in larger chunks, assuming each is £100mn in size (the limit of the data). We now allow increases in buildable envelope, considering that in London today, 2.27x as much space is used on residential gardens as on residential buildings, and more space is used on private gardens than residential buildings in all but 5 of the 33 boroughs. These gardens add relatively little value to properties, so they would be removed by a free market.

Price index convergence is no longer relevant as all possible houses are built in the same region – we instead assume that all homes will be built at the combined London index.

As construction will occur upon a completely flat area the size of Wales over a 40-year period (the length under which the mobility assumptions are computed), there is little reason to expect prices to vary with quantity. Therefore, the Price Elasticity of Supply (PES) will be assumed to be infinite in all cases.

Levies are lower for reasons explained later, albeit calculated more comprehensively.

We retain the 8-storey assumption as this minimizes prices under our estimated price levels.

Project construction time will also vary, as this affects the present discounted value of undertaking it. The envisioned construction techniques should scale roughly linearly to time spent, making a 5-year construction schedule plausible. However, 20 and 40 years will be assumed for the central and conservative cases, respectively.

The most important change compared to the previous model is the inclusion of land prices, which is necessary to model cases other than merely increasing density. In the conservative case, we copy existing land prices wholesale, albeit under the retained assumption from the previous model of average building heights of 8 storeys, up from a presumed average height of 3 storeys in London and 2 storeys in the rest of the country.

For the central and stretch cases, we consider two additional effects from a possible increase in buildable envelope:

A direct effect of spreading land price over a greater number of homes, reducing unit costs. An indirect effect of reducing prices through demand-curve effects. Findlay and Gibb (1994) report that estimates of housing's price demand elasticity vary in the literature from -0.5 to -0.8. Assuming this maps onto land, we'll use the implied estimates of changes in land price.

Table 2: Estimated rents for the new city by assumptions - “recreating Birmingham” in this model means both having West Midlands housing construction prices estimated here and current wages. The North East shows no variation due to actual house prices being below predicted construction prices, with this being a result of falling populations causing a temporary disequilibrium. An area the size of Wales could generate economic activity beyond the cities located nearby. While potential mining or energy industries will be ignored, changes in territorial waters related to North Sea oil and gas could lead to substantial effects in the energy sector.

Agriculture, however, could produce more significant effects. Arable land is valued at £9,272/acre, or £2.3 million/km2. The proposed city would have population densities 2.7 to 5.3 times higher than present-day London, so even with the size of London it would only operate 3.3% of the island. The remaining agricultural land would then generate £38.97 billion worth of agricultural land as a one-time benefit, equal to 1.7% of GDP.

To calculate the value of these changes, we will adopt the British government's approach of using a 1% real long-run discount rate. For the sake of brevity, only imperfect mobility results will be reported, as perfect mobility results would be higher. It will be assumed that housing benefits from migration accumulate linearly over the 40-year period corresponding to the imperfect mobility coefficient.

Table 3: GDP gains under imperfect mobility, new city has productivity of London Table 4: GDP gains under imperfect mobility, new city has productivity of Bracknell We present the results for London and Reading and Bracknell, the two most productive Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs) in the UK. The results for all cities more productive than Birmingham are roughly similar, within a range of approximately ±25%, to those of Reading and Bracknell. However, for cities less productive than Birmingham, the model yields much lower values that typically do not pass a cost-benefit ratio.5

The results in this analysis vary much less across specifications compared to our earlier work. This is because the rent variation across different scenarios is much smaller, and the price elasticity of supply is no longer relevant for topographical reasons, leading to smaller changes in migration as well. However, the estimated GDP gains under imperfect mobility are much larger; this occurs because the model assumes decreasing returns to scale due to land constraints, so creating a new London with relaxed restrictions is considerably more valuable than relaxing restrictions in present London. It is important to note that the results are applicable for a wide range of plausible productivities that are high enough to justify the scheme.

Discussion

We present the costs of complete reclamation for Doggerbank for illustrative purposes only. An area much smaller than the size of Wales would be initially needed for any likely city construction program. London's current size is 8.9% of the proposed reclaimed area, and Singapore's is 4.2%. As costs for the wall decline with the square root of size, the cost-benefit ratio could be substantially improved compared to the value presented here, with agricultural benefits constituting only a small fraction of the total.

However, the project's success is based on the ability to continually grow a city to a size comparable to current cities. If the same British residents who currently oppose housing construction in existing cities move in, they may force the city to stagnate at a much lower size.

The project would be at little risk from sea level rises, as above-ground sea walls are generally inexpensive, costing only £700-£5400/m2 with low maintenance costs. Building a sea wall around the entire project would thus add at most 4% to the capital cost.

There is a possibility that this project could damage marine ecosystems, but it is likely less than any land-based construction. Oceans contain around 200 times less biomass than land per unit area on average, although this figure is likely higher for the North Sea compared to most oceans due to closer proximity to coastlines. Additionally, the project avoids the usual costs associated with land reclamation proposals, as it does not require large quantities of sand. It will only disrupt extant marine ecosystems in the quantity of seawater now occupied by the newest constituent nation of the UK, not elsewhere.

Conclusion

As with Mankiw and Weinzierl 2009’s famous study of optimal height taxation, there are two possible ways to interpret this post. The first is a simple reductio ad absurdum argument against current land use regulations - the planning system means that the British government would receive a greater than 6-fold return from reclaiming an area the size of Wales from the North Sea. The second is that it is a perfectly sensible suggestion similar to existing policies to circumvent NIMBYs in other areas - just as we escape the planning system’s strictures on wind farms by building them offshore, we can do the same for cities. We leave the correct choice as an exercise for the reader.

From Model Thikning Substack

Wednesday, June 28, 2023

How big is your Government

How big is your government?The Index of Economic Freedom is directionally correct at best
By Pradyumna Prasad
Jun 27, 2023

The Index of Economic Freedom ignores an important measure of government size: government ownership of the economy. This distorts its measurements of two entrepots: Singapore and Hong Kong

More importantly, it also ignores land ownership and regulations which shape the economy quite strongly in these two places. Hong Kong’s high rents can in part be blamed on its poor land management policy which incentivizes the government to limit the supply of land increasing rents.

It also ignores corporate economic power which hurts economic freedom strongly in economies with high levels of concentration in a few companies. The government isn’t the only entity hurting economic freedom.

And finally, it doesn’t consider infrastructure and other positive freedoms that make an economy worthwhile to invest, work and live in.

Every year the Heritage Foundation releases its Index of Economic Freedom, and every year the results are nearly the same. Singapore, Hong Kong and Ireland are usually at the top. They are then followed by Taiwan, New Zealand, a number of Nordic countries and so on.

But the Index is a flawed indicator in many ways. One of them is that the size of government component ignores an extremely important part of any economy: the ownership of the means of production. This gives a poor impression of the size of government and its effects in the two high-scoring entrepots in the index: Hong Kong and Singapore.

Singapore from the statistics looks as if it is one of the least interventionist states in the world. Tax rates are low, and it is extremely easy to set up a business in the city-state. Government spending is low at 16% of GDP in FY2022 which is lower than any OECD country. Taxes also are low at 13.8% of GDP in FY2022 which is also lower than any OECD country. It takes just two days to start a business in Singapore which is the second-lowest in the world.

And you wouldn’t be wrong entirely. Lots of companies set up their regional headquarters in Singapore because of the regulatory environment and lots of financial firms are present here for the low tax rates and ease of incorporation. But this focus on taxes and government spending as the measure of the size of government obscures an important fact in understanding Singapore’s government: it owns several companies that are essential to the functioning of Singapore.

The government (through holding company Temasek) has a minority stake in DBS Bank which is the largest company on the Singapore Exchange. The government has a majority stake in the two largest telecom companies: Singtel and Starhub, it has a majority stake in the flag carrier Singapore Airlines and it is the owner of CapitaLand (the largest real estate company in Singapore).

Out of the 25 largest companies listed on the Singapore Exchange (as of 26th June 2023, excluding real estate investment trusts) 9 companies were started by the government. It still maintains at least a minority stake in all of them and a majority stake in Singapore Airlines and ST Engineering. For most of them, it is still the largest shareholder.

Singapore’s Government Linked Companies do not appear to get any special advantages according to this 2003 study, and some of them - like SIA, Singtel, DBS and Keppel - have achieved success out of the home market.

Along with this, the government of Singapore owns the vast majority of land in Singapore. I’m not sure of the exact number (this 2021 article says over 80% while this OECD site says 90% without citing it), but it is likely to be above 80 or 90%. Nearly 80% of Singaporeans live in government built housing.

Now both of these facts about land ownership and government linked companies in the economy paint a very different picture of Singapore than the Index of Economic Freedom would give. For academics studying Singapore relying on the Index of Economic Freedom would mean that their data would misrepresent the size of Singapore’s government, and for foreign investors trying to enter Singapore this would mean they fundamentally misunderstand the business climate they are investing in.

Yes, Singapore is a country with low tax rates and a high ease of doing business. But it is also a country where government owned and linked companies are a non-negligible part of the economy and most of the country works, travels and sleeps on government owned land. And not mentioning this devalues the information in the Index of Economic Freedom!

Another country where the Index of Economic Freedom does not show the size of government well is Hong Kong. The Government of Hong Kong owns all land in the SAR, and gains substantial amounts of revenue leasing it. 20.6% of the Hong Kong SAR’s revenue came from land premiums. And this creates perverse incentives for the Hong Kong government, where the government is incentivized to increase land prices to increase its revenue and keep taxes low. As this WSJ article explains:

How does Hong Kong pull it off? Like much else in the city, the answer is down to real estate. The government owns functionally all land in Hong Kong, with leases auctioned off over time to raise revenue. Revenues accruing to the Capital Works Reserve Fund from land sales and premiums made up more than 20% of the government’s total revenues in the past five full fiscal years, almost twice as much as taxes on salaries.

No wonder then, that the top rates of tax for salaries and corporate profit that the Heritage index prioritizes seem unusually low, and yet the government runs up little debt. The city’s residents are effectively paying additional shadow taxes to their landlords and to the city’s leviathan real-estate developers in the form of extremely high house prices and rents, propping up the government’s source of revenue. The system is no free lunch for Hong Kong.

As author Alice Poon noted a decade ago, the land price policy of successive Hong Kong governments is at the root of “ever-deepening economic concentration,” where real-estate developers continually make bumper profits. “Hopes for diversification into a knowledge-based economy have been constantly dashed due to the entrenched land and tax systems.”

And again, if an investor understood this about Hong Kong, she would have a more complete picture of the HK economy and the conditions for investing there. There are other things about Hong Kong that make it a less economically free place: for a long time Hong Kong had little antitrust enforcement, which allowed for monopolies and cartels back in the day. (I’m not sure of the current situation). To quote from my previous post about Asian Godfathers:

Li’s PARKnSHOP and Jardine’s Wellcome control about 70% of the groceries market in Hong Kong. When Jimmy Lai’s ecommerce AdMart tried to set up shop in Hong Kong, their trucks couldn’t enter any building residential or commercial owned by Li. Let me put that into perspective - if you ran a store in any building owned by Li’s real estate business Cheung Kong, you couldn’t get any shipments from AdMart. If you lived in a service apartment owned by Cheung Kong, you couldn’t get a delivery from AdMart

Despite having labour costs far lower than other countries with similar per capita GDP, terminal handling fees in Hong Kong are fairly high - one report estimates them to be double of that in Germany. Why does this happen? Concentration among port berth owners is the reason. Li’s Hutchison owns 14 out of 24 ports and this has remained his “core” business that funds his real estate business

Sure, Hong Kong is economically free in the sense that it doesn’t have onerous amounts of government regulation and taxes. But it isn’t free from corporate power and government land policy, both of which make it a difficult place to live and do business in.
What does the Index actually tell us?

The Index is relatively good at giving a general idea of how friendly a country is to business and investment. That is mostly because in general the indicators that it picks are directionally accurate about the outcomes they intend to measure. If the UK is ranked 28th and Honduras is ranked 94th, you can be sure that the UK has a better business environment than Honduras has.

But beyond that, it isn’t very useful as a measure for businesses or academics in studying economic freedom or understanding the ease of investment in businesses in that country. The first reason is that many of these are subjective judgements made by other people. For example in the property rights sub-component, they use the US Chamber of Commerce’s Country Risk and Insights and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. These indicators are in the end subjective, and their impressions would differ among people.

For example, India has an economic freedom score of just 52.9 which is below Russia’s 53.8. And yet if you saw what the market said about India’s economic freedom in terms of venture capital investments, the number of new and innovative companies coming out of the country and general investor sentiment about their respective economies, it would be far more positive about India than it is about Russia (even before the invasion). Obviously, much of this can be attributed to demographics where India is expected to have a booming population, and Russia a declining one.

But even then India has undergone massive improvements in its digital infrastructure (in large part because of the government and the entry of a new player in the market for online data), and this would be highly relevant to someone considering economic opportunity in India even though it isn’t directly about economic “freedom”. This is another problem I want to highlight about the Index of Economic Freedom: it doesn’t consider positive freedoms at all.

Negative liberties are the absence of obstacles. For example not having exorbitant taxes or laws that restrict economic activity would be an example of negative freedoms. Positive liberties on the other hand is about the possibility of acting out one’s actions. For example building an airport would increase the positive freedom of entrepreneurs in an economy because it gives them the capability to travel and sell to places they previously wouldn’t have had the ability to do so.

And this is an enormously important part of evaluating an economy. The lack of government interference is one important part. But positive actions by a government to improve infrastructure (like UPI in India, or the Singapore government’s construction of the large Changi Airport) do increase the capabilities of actors in the economy. Those are important aspects too!

What would I change?

There are some things I would add to the Index of Economic Freedom to improve its usefulness as a measure of economic freedom.

I would include restrictions on land use as part of the regulatory environment. Many countries (for example the United Kingdom) are nominally “somewhat free” but their economic potential is capped because of their restrictive land use laws. Hong Kong and Singapore too have land use laws that should make a difference in their index.

I would add a measure of government ownership of the factors of production as a measure of restricting economic freedom. In many countries governments own companies that they use for political purposes (see my article about Pakistan) which limits the economic potential of the rest of the economy by misallocating resources. This is especially true for Hong Kong as explained above, but much less true for Singapore.

They should account for corporate power which reduces economic dynamism via charging higher prices and restricting entry into new sectors. This is true for Hong Kong, but also South Korea’s chaebol run economy. The government isn’t the only thing restricting people’s economic freedom!

And while perhaps this might be out of the scope of the Index of Economic Freedom, having a “positive freedoms” index which measures what is possible given the infrastructural and financial constraints of the economy is valuable.