The Architecture of European State Building

 In the context of state-building, the European Union (EU) is characterized by imbalanced institutional development, appearing as a "legal colossus" that lacks the centralized fiscal, administrative, and coercive capacities typical of modern states,. While the EU wields extensive regulatory power and possesses a powerful judicial system, it remains weak or "impotent" in its ability to tax, spend, or use coercive force,,.

The Dual Logics of State-Building

According to the sources, historical state-building has generally been driven by two macro-historical logics that, when combined, lead to consolidated political development:

1. The "Bellicist" Logic (War): Security threats and the demands of war-fighting historically incentivized elites to centralize power swiftly to extract revenue (taxes) and build coercive apparatuses (armies),.
2. The Market Logic: The drive for economic gain leads a rising merchant class to push for centralized authority to regulate commerce and stabilize markets, often resulting in the creation of a "law-state" supported by judicial institutions,,.

The sources argue that the EU’s imbalanced development stems from the dominance of market logics over security pressures,. Unlike historical European states formed in the "crucible of war," the EU developed under a security umbrella provided by the United States and NATO, which relieved the pressure to develop centralized coercive and fiscal capacities,.

Consequences of Imbalance: The Euro and Schengen

This uneven development has produced incomplete, crisis-prone institutions in two key areas:

• The Euro (Money without War): The single currency was created to facilitate market integration but lacks the common fiscal policy, collective debt, or redistribution mechanisms found in national currencies,,. Historically, such fiscal powers were only centralized when forced by the exigencies of military conflict; without an existential threat, the EU has relied on incremental, technocratic legal rules that proved insufficient during the Eurozone crisis,,.
• Schengen (Mobility without Security): Driven by the market need for the free movement of goods and labor, the EU removed internal borders,. However, because the project was viewed as technocratic rather than a security endeavor, the EU was not granted the authority to police external borders or centralize migration policy,,. This led to a "half-baked" regime that struggled significantly during the 2015 refugee crisis,.

The EU as a Contemporary "Law-State"

The sources emphasize that while the EU is not a traditional Weberian state, it follows a pattern similar to the nascent "law-states" of medieval England and France, which initially focused on judicial institutions before being "jolted" into developing coercive apparatuses by cycles of war,,. The EU's development is described as a slow-moving, conflict-ridden, and contingent process rather than the implementation of a neat master plan,.

Despite recent crises like COVID-19—which spurred some movement toward fiscal solidarity—the EU still lacks the political force generated by territorial security threats to achieve the full centralization of power seen in historical state-building.

The state-building theoretical lens provides a comparative historical framework to explain the European Union's development, moving beyond traditional scholarship that often views the EU as a sui generis (unique) case of supranational integration. By treating the EU as an emergent polity struggling with the centralization of power, this lens identifies the specific macro-historical logics that shape its institutional architecture.

Core Components of the State-Building Lens

The sources identify several key features of this theoretical approach when applied to the EU:

• Focus on Process, Not Destination: The lens is described as an "epistemological tool" to understand the path of political development. It does not assume a "teleological determinism"—meaning it does not argue that the EU is destined to become a traditional Weberian state. Instead, it focuses on the difficulties and contingencies of moving power to the center.
• Interaction of Macro-Historical Logics: The lens centers on two primary drivers of state formation:
  1. The "Bellicist" Logic: Historically, the functional demands of war-fighting (revenue extraction, logistics, and security) incentivized elites to swiftly centralize fiscal and coercive powers.
  2. The Market Logic: The drive for economic gain and market integration leads to the creation of judicial institutions and "law-states" to regulate commerce and protect property rights.
• Emphasis on Historical Continuities: This approach highlights that the EU’s development mirrors historical "law-states," such as medieval England and France, which initially built robust judicial systems before later developing coercive apparatuses in response to cycles of war.

The EU as a Departure from Standard Scholarship

The sources argue that the state-building lens is a departure from established theories of European integration, such as International Relations (IR), Neofunctionalism, or Liberal Intergovernmentalism. While these theories focus on state bargaining or supranational governance, they often avoid "state-building" because the EU lacks essential elements of statehood, such as a monopoly on violence.

By contrast, the state-building lens suggests that the EU’s lack of fiscal and coercive capacity is not merely a "bad design choice" but a predictable outcome of market logics dominating security pressures. Because the EU developed under a security umbrella (NATO and the US), it lacked the "bellicist" pressure that historically forced states to centralize coercive power.

Insights into Crisis and Consolidation

From a state-building perspective, the crises currently facing the EU—such as the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis—are seen as part of a "contingent, messy, and often violent unfolding of politics" typical of emerging polities. The lens offers several insights into these challenges:

• Imbalanced Development: The lens explains why the EU is a "legal colossus" but a "fiscal and coercive dwarf". It characterizes the EU as having shifted "core state powers" to the center through law and technocracy rather than overt coercion, leading to "half-baked" institutions like the euro and Schengen.
• The Role of Crises: Rather than portents of demise, crises are viewed as potential (though not guaranteed) catalysts for further centralization. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic spurred movement toward fiscal solidarity (Eurobonds), yet the lens notes that even such a pandemic lacks the intense political force generated by territorial security threats.
• Slow-Bore Politics: Drawing on Max Weber, the sources describe state-building as the "strong and slow boring of hard boards". It is an inherently conflictual process where political authority is contested and institutional outcomes are often suboptimal.

The sources describe the euro as a prime empirical example of the European Union’s imbalanced institutional development, characterizing it as "money without war". Within the state-building theoretical lens, the euro represents a significant transfer of power that remains "half-baked" because it was driven by the logic of market integration rather than the existential pressures of military conflict.

The Historical Contrast: War as a Catalyst for Currency

According to the sources, historical state-building demonstrates a strong link between war-fighting and the creation of national fiscal capacity. In the 19th century, the creation of national currencies—such as the German mark, the Italian lira, and the U.S. greenback—was often forced by the exigencies of military conflict.

• Fiscal Power: War creates a functional demand for revenue extraction, borrowing, and logistics.
• Overcoming Resistance: Security threats provide the political legitimacy needed to override local objections to centralizing the power to tax and spend.
• The Euro's Absence of Threat: Because the euro was created in the shadow of a security umbrella provided by NATO and the U.S., it lacked the immediate, existential threat that historically forced emerging polities to couple a common currency with a common treasury.

Market Logic and Technocratic Design

The sources argue that the euro was motivated primarily by the logic of market integration. It was framed as the "substantive backbone" of the Single Market, with the rationale that "one market" necessitated "one money".

Because the project was voluntarily agreed upon by states of equal status rather than forced by coercion or security necessity, it resulted in a stunted governance architecture. This design includes a central bank (the ECB) to manage liquidity but lacks the other two hallmarks of a modern state currency:

1. A banking authority to regulate financial risk across the union.
2. Fiscal redistribution mechanisms, such as collective borrowing (Eurobonds) and taxing powers, to adjust for economic shocks.

Consequences: The "Failing Forward" of the Eurozone

The sources suggest that the euro’s lack of a centralized fiscal union led directly to the economic devastation of the Eurozone crisis. Without a centralized treasury, the EU relied on its "familiar toolkit" of legal rules and technocratic regulations, such as the "Six-Pack" of governance regulations and the 2012 Fiscal Compact Treaty.

While the COVID-19 pandemic eventually spurred a "landmark step" toward fiscal solidarity—the creation of a collective debt fund—the sources note that even a global pandemic has not generated the same political force as a territorial security threat. Consequently, the euro remains an "incomplete" institution, relying on the independent actions of the European Central Bank (e.g., Mario Draghi’s "whatever it takes" pledge) to maintain solvency where a state would normally use fiscal power.

The Schengen Area serves as a primary empirical example of the European Union’s imbalanced institutional development, characterized by the sources as "mobility without security". In the context of state-building, Schengen demonstrates how the dominance of market logics over security imperatives creates "half-baked" institutions that possess extensive legal rules but lack centralized coercive capacity.

Market Logic: The Driver of Open Borders

According to the sources, the Schengen project was born primarily from the logic of market integration rather than security concerns.

• The "Four Freedoms": The removal of internal borders was seen as essential to the EU’s single market project, ensuring the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labor.
• Economic Impetus: The specific raison d’être for the 1985 agreement was a reaction to economic disruptions, such as roadblocks set up by truckers frustrated by long waits at internal European borders.
• Legalistic Approach: Because it was a market-driven project, leaders approached it through a technocratic and legalistic lens, establishing the Schengen Border Code and common asylum rules without granting the EU the executive authority to enforce them.

The Absence of Security Logic

The sources contrast the EU’s path with historical state-building, where collective security imperatives were the indispensable drivers for centralizing border control.

• Historical Monopoly of Movement: Historically, the first modern states focused on controlling external frontiers as a matter of survival. In the United States, "immigration federalism" saw the federal government assert exclusive power over borders explicitly on national security grounds, particularly during threats to sovereignty or after major events like 9/11.
• The EU Security Umbrella: Unlike these historical cases, the EU developed under the protection of NATO and the United States, which relieved the pressure to develop the coercive capacities required for external border defense and internal policing.

Consequences of Imbalance: The Refugee Crisis

This uneven development—abolishing internal borders without hardening external ones—produced significant dysfunction during the 2015–2016 Mediterranean migration crisis.

• Institutional Failure: The EU possessed a voluminous body of law (the acquis) and the Dublin Convention for asylum, but it had no "teeth" to ensure member states met their obligations.
• Fragmentation: When faced with over 1.2 million asylum requests, the system struggled; some states flouted EU law, while others temporarily reintroduced internal border checks, leading to a partial unraveling of the regime.
• Incremental Centralization: Only after these security concerns became salient did the EU begin to increase its "infrastructural capacity" by upgrading Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard. However, the sources note that these upgrades remain limited, as EU border officers still operate under the command and control of individual member states.

The sources conclude that applying a state-building theoretical lens to the European Union (EU) provides a powerful tool for understanding its uneven and imbalanced institutional development. By situating the EU within the comparative history of political consolidation, the authors argue that the union's current form—a "legal colossus" that remains a "fiscal, administrative, and coercive dwarf"—is not a unique anomaly but a predictable outcome of specific macro-historical logics.

The primary conclusions drawn from this perspective include:

1. The Dominance of Market Logic over Security

The most significant conclusion is that the EU’s imbalanced architecture is a product of market integration moving forward without the "bellicist" pressure of an immediate military threat. Historically, the most complete political projects occurred when security pressures forced a swift centralization of fiscal and coercive powers, while the EU has instead developed through voluntaristic, incremental, and legally based processes. This has resulted in a "law-state" that mirrors the early development of medieval England and France, which built robust judicial institutions long before they possessed permanent coercive apparatuses.

2. State-Building as a "Slow and Messy" Process

The sources emphasize that the EU should be viewed as a work-in-progress rather than a completed project or a failed state. Key insights regarding this process include:

• Contingency and Conflict: State-building rarely follows a neat master plan; it is characterized by the "contingent, messy, and often violent unfolding of politics".
• Politicization as a Norm: The intense political contestation (politicization) currently facing the EU is to be expected because the union is attempting to centralize "core state powers" that were historically the most fiercely defended.
• The "Slow Bore" of Politics: Drawing on Max Weber, the sources describe political development as the "strong and slow boring of hard boards," requiring both patience and perspective to endure the frequent setbacks and suboptimal outcomes typical of emerging polities.

3. The Role of Crises

A vital conclusion for contemporary observers is that profound crises should be seen as part and parcel of political development rather than certain portents of the EU's demise. While the Eurozone and migration crises exposed the "half-baked" nature of EU institutions, the state-building lens suggests these moments of stress are precisely what drive (or fail to drive) the next stage of centralization. For example, while the COVID-19 pandemic spurred a landmark step toward fiscal solidarity via jointly issued "Eurobonds," the sources conclude that even a global pandemic has not yet generated the same transformative political force as a direct territorial security threat.

4. Future Directions: The EU at a Crossroads

The authors conclude that the EU has reached a critical juncture where its current foundations as a "law-state" may no longer be sufficient to sustain it without a more complete set of state powers. While there is no guarantee that the project will survive, the state-building lens helps identify the limits of relying purely on law and technocracy when the functional demands of the twenty-first century increasingly require centralized administrative and coercive capacities.