The Elusive Quest to End Congo’s War

 Not all Donald Trump’s peacemaking boasts are empty But to end Congo’s terrible war, America must remain neutral

When Donald Trump boasts about all the wars he has supposedly ended, he often mentions one in central Africa. In December he brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose on-again, off-again conflict has been one of the continent’s bloodiest, and persuaded them to sign a peace deal called the Washington Accords. “They’ve spent a lot of time killing each other and they’re going to spend a lot of time hugging,” he said.

But there is still a lot more killing than hugging. Most of the 8m or so Congolese who have fled from their homes are too scared to return. Over the past year the battlefield has expanded in the eastern Congolese provinces of South and North Kivu, leading to hundreds more civilian deaths. As we report, m23, a Rwandan-backed rebel group that controls most of the region, is building a statelet there and is eager to cut its own deals with America.

To its credit, the Trump administration has tried to enforce the Washington Accords. In March it put sanctions on Rwanda’s armed forces to try to persuade Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s president, to reduce support for m23. Yet it seems unwilling to exert similar pressure on his Congolese counterpart, Félix Tshisekedi. Many locals fear that Mr Trump cares more about getting his hands on Congo’s abundant minerals than he does about peace.

Eastern Congo is as bewildering as it is blighted. The state’s authority barely exists. More than a hundred armed groups thrive in its absence. m23 is the strongest of them. It is led by Congolese Tutsis who say they want to topple the government in Kinshasa, Congo’s capital 1,500km away. It is also a tool used by Rwanda to create a buffer zone in Congo. Rwanda denies this, but also claims that any “defensive measures” it undertakes are justified because it is threatened by Congo—and by a militia known as fdlr whose origins go back to the ethnic Hutus who carried out the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The region’s minerals give everyone a lucrative extra reason to fight.

So it is too soon to celebrate the Washington Accords. But they are a good foundation to build on. They reaffirm previous commitments by Rwanda to stop supporting m23 and to respect Congo’s territory, and by Congo to end any support for fdlr and other armed groups that threaten Rwanda. Both sides have said they will make it easier for aid agencies to deliver humanitarian supplies in eastern Congo, which are desperately needed.

American sanctions on the Rwanda Defence Force (rdf) will influence Mr Kagame, who was once seen by Western governments as an enlightened autocrat with whom it was easy to do business. Having the rdf subject to similar restrictions as the armed forces of Iran and North Korea is not good for “Brand Rwanda”. And since Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence has huge interests in construction, agriculture and other sectors, the sanctions will also force foreign investors to rethink whether it is legally safe to do business in the country.

Pressing Rwanda is necessary to stop the war. But it is not sufficient, since m23 has a degree of autonomy. Talks between Congo and m23, brokered by Qatar with American support, have stalled. All parties to the discussions, including African governments, need to do more to persuade the sides to return to the table and agree on a ceasefire.

There is a risk that America is emboldening Mr Tshisekedi. When Mr Trump brokered the Washington Accords he also struck a “strategic partnership” with Congo. The upshot was that America would bolster Congo’s president in exchange for preferential access to minerals. America has intervened in Congolese politics in ways that benefit Mr Tshisekedi; last month it put sanctions on Joseph Kabila, a rival and former president, ostensibly for backing m23.

To some in the Trump administration, backing Mr Tshisekedi is sensible realpolitik. But, like miners digging without a plan, they risk the edifice crashing down on them eventually. America’s new deals with Congo are shockingly non-transparent—a criticism America once made of Congo’s dealings with China. Mr Tshisekedi became president with America’s endorsement in 2019 after a fraudulent election. So long as he cuts mining deals with Americans, he may think he can shirk his obligations under the accords.

America should disabuse him of that idea. The Trump administration has done more than any other foreign government to try to bring a measure of peace to this war-scorched part of Africa. It is right to be tough on Rwanda, whose support for m23 is the proximate cause of the conflict. But America now needs to ensure that it acts as an impartial mediator, rather than as a cheerleader for one side.