The Rift Between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.

 

The Growing Rift Between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.

What this shocking split might mean for the future of the Middle East.

By Isaac Chotiner February 17, 2026

In the years following his appointment as deputy crown prince in 2015, Mohammed bin Salman (M.B.S.) has gathered significant power within Saudi Arabia. Under his de-facto leadership, the kingdom launched a military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, blockaded Qatar, and even temporarily kidnapped Lebanon’s Prime Minister. These aggressive foreign policy moves were largely aimed at isolating Iran. Throughout this period, M.B.S. maintained a close alliance with Mohamed bin Zayed (M.B.Z.), the President of the United Arab Emirates, who reportedly viewed the younger M.B.S. as a reflection of himself: energetic and eager to confront regional enemies.

However, this alliance has recently collapsed into acrimony. Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. now find themselves on opposing sides of violent conflicts in both Sudan and Yemen. Furthermore, the two nations are increasingly competing for regional economic opportunities. While the U.A.E. appears resentful of Saudi power, Saudi Arabia views the U.A.E. as being too willing to align itself with Israel.

Kristian Ulrichsen, a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and author of “The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policy-Making,” discussed the roots of this rift and its implications in a recent phone conversation.

Why has a falling out occurred over the past several months?

The primary trigger occurred in early December when forces backed by the U.A.E., specifically the separatist Southern Transitional Council (S.T.C.), moved into two eastern Yemeni provinces. This action upended the fragile balance of power in Yemen and was viewed by Riyadh as a major provocation. The Saudis saw this move as antithetical to their interests, unhelpful to the anti-Houthi coalition, and a potential threat to Saudi security due to the proximity of the Yemeni-Saudi border. Notably, the U.A.E.-green-lit advance began on the same day that Gulf leaders were meeting in Bahrain.

Initially, both countries were aligned in Yemen, entering the conflict together in March 2015 to counter the Houthis, whom they viewed as an Iranian proxy. While there was early coordination between M.B.S. and M.B.Z., their paths began to diverge as Saudi forces became stuck fighting the Houthis, while the U.A.E. successfully pushed them back and reclaimed territory from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Feeling its mission was accomplished and facing international pressure over its tactics, the U.A.E. announced a redeployment of its forces in July 2019. It shifted its strategy to supporting local militias in southern Yemen to ensure its own access to Red Sea ports and maritime networks.

Following a 2022 truce that had largely frozen the conflict for years, the S.T.C.’s sudden November advance caught many by surprise. There are reports that the U.A.E. may have been reacting to M.B.S. raising the issue of the Sudanese civil war with President Trump during a mid-November visit to the White House. In Sudan, the U.A.E. has been backing the Rapid Support Forces (R.S.F.), a non-state militia group.

In Yemen and across the region, Saudi Arabia has acted incredibly aggressively over the past decade. Now something seems to have switched, and the U.A.E. seems more aggressive. What changed?

From 2015 to 2019, M.B.S. and M.B.Z. were closely aligned in their assertive and interventionist regional policies, seeking to limit the radical changes brought about by the Arab Spring. They worked together on the Yemen intervention and the blockade of Qatar, and Saudi Arabia intervened in Lebanese politics by holding their Prime Minister hostage in 2017.

The turning point for Saudi Arabia was the September 2019 missile and drone attacks on its oil infrastructure, which were widely attributed to Iran. The lack of a response from President Trump, who stated the attack was on Saudi Arabia and not the U.S., sent shockwaves through Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Realizing they might be on their own, the Saudis began to pull back, de-escalating tensions with Iran and improving ties with Turkey to focus on internal economic growth.

Conversely, the U.A.E. remained more willing to take risks, continuing to back sub-state networks in countries with weak state institutions to support its own security and governance goals. This fundamental divergence in risk calculation and regional strategy grew throughout the 2020s.

I get that the two countries have different visions for the region, but does it seem like, given the speed with which this has spiralled out of control, there’s a deeper anger here?

The current animosity involves each side attempting to ensure its own narrative prevails, particularly with the Trump Administration. There is fierce debate regarding what M.B.S. actually said to Trump in November concerning the U.A.E. and the R.S.F., with perceptions on both sides driving their respective responses. These long-simmering splits, particularly in Yemen, have become too significant to ignore.

Economically, the two countries are also increasingly in competition. Saudi Arabia is struggling to attract foreign investment and is attempting to move into sectors like tourism, travel, and entertainment—areas where the U.A.E. has a decades-long head start. While this hasn't yet reached the level of a full political rupture like the 2017 Qatar blockade, the economic and security-focused rivalry is intensifying.

How do you think competing for the favor of the Trump Administration changes the rivalry?

Trump’s transactional approach to policy has created opportunities that both countries have sought to exploit. Since his 2025 inauguration, both nations have separately reached out with promises of investments in the U.S. economy and Trump-aligned companies. They are essentially competing for the ear of the White House. This competitive edge extends to technology as well; for instance, the U.A.E. has taken a lead in A.I. over the last several years, leaving the Saudis to play catch-up.

Have you been surprised by the U.A.E.’s enduring support for the R.S.F. in Sudan, despite the bloodshed?

It is surprising that international condemnation of the R.S.F. and its documented links to the U.A.E.—including weapon transfers disguised as humanitarian aid—has not forced Abu Dhabi to compromise its support. Instead, the U.A.E. has doubled down, possibly because it feels defensive or isolated in the region.

Is the U.A.E.’s increasingly aggressive actions driven by ideology or practical ends like projecting power?

It is a combination of both. For example, the U.A.E.'s heavy intervention in Libya was partly aimed at pushing back against Islamist groups supported by Qatar. They have built networks across Libya, Chad, and Sudan to support authoritarian strongmen who will limit Islamist influence. In the U.A.E., security and investment are explicitly linked, as seen in the roles held by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan, who serves as both national-security adviser and head of major investment groups.

Saudi Arabia has historically been more pragmatic. In Yemen, for instance, the Saudis were willing to work with an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas the U.A.E. maintains a zero-tolerance policy toward any Islamist movements, viewing them as the most likely source of political dissent.

What do you make of the Saudis accusing the U.A.E. of becoming too close to Israel?

Saudi propaganda is currently emphasizing the depth of ties between Israel and the U.A.E., labeling them as regional disruptors. This is ironic because M.B.S. himself was close to a normalization deal with Israel just before October 7, 2023. While the Saudis likely still want to normalize relations eventually, the domestic "price" for such a deal has risen due to the situation in Gaza.

Saudi Arabia faces more domestic political pressure than the U.A.E. because it is a much larger country and serves as the guarantor of Islam's two holiest sites. Consequently, Saudi policymaking is generally more cautious and sensitive to public opinion, which remains unenthusiastic about diplomatic ties with Israel.

Do you think the worldwide condemnation of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder in 2018 influenced M.B.S.'s shift toward being less aggressive?

Yes, the 2018 murder brought M.B.S.'s "Vision 2030" plans to a temporary halt and made him persona non grata in the West. He was only rehabilitated in 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as Western leaders realized they needed to deal with him to manage rising oil prices. President Biden's subsequent visit and fist-bump with M.B.S. signaled this shift.

I’m curious if you think their falling out has anything to do with their personal dynamic.

While M.B.Z. is twenty-four years older and initially played a crucial role in establishing M.B.S.'s credibility in Western capitals, the relationship was always likely to face a clash of characters. Both are headstrong leaders; M.B.Z. saw a younger version of himself in M.B.S., but M.B.S. is now the crown prince of a regional leader. Currently, neither leader seems willing to back down in their struggle for the upper hand in the relationship.