By TCA Srinivasa Raghavan in Hindu BusinessLine
P
olitical attitudes, preferences and
voting behaviour have been a
topic of intense scrutiny for half a
century. At the end of all the study, no
one really knows how voters will vote on
voting day. That’s why pollsters go
wrong.
Recent Indian experience with
welfare programmes should have led to
Indian research on whether economic
factors matter more than non-economic
ones. But our academics are obsessed
with varna and jati, caste and sub-caste.
Irecall reading a British paper from
Oxford on the subject of voters and
economics about 10 years ago. The
question was whether voters look at the
economy as a whole or only their own
pockets, and whether past misery is less
important than a promise of achche din.
GUARANTEES AND VOTING
An important question in this regard is
whether they change their minds about
how to vote after political parties bribe
them with income guarantees. Or
perhaps other benefits that come free?
An interesting experiment in the US
has been described in a working paper
posted recently on the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) website.
It’s by David E. Broockman, Elizabeth
Rhodes, Alexander W. Bartik, Karina
Dotson, Sarah Miller, Patrick K. Krause
and Eva Vivalt. (Working Paper 33214).
They have studied what aects
political attitudes and behaviour. They
say that “a large positive income shock
delivered through a private guaranteed
income program had limited eects on
most political outcomes, with a few
notable exceptions.”
What happens apparently is that
political predispositions don’t get
aected by such increases in income.
People go on believing what they have
always believed.
Thus they say “Despite receiving a
substantial income increase ($12,000
annually) over three years, participants
showed minimal changes in a wide range
of political views and behaviors,
including political participation, party
identification, policy preferences, trust
in institutions, and support for
democracy.”
They then say that previous research
has also shown that
“government-sponsored cash transfers
often increase support for incumbents
and voter turnout.” They go on to say
that much depends on whether it is the
government or someone else who makes
the transfers.
Most importantly, it appears people
view work as being preferable to
handouts. They say more research is
needed “into how experiencing
guaranteed income programs shapes
attitudes about work and
deservingness.”
“The relative stability of most
political attitudes in the face of a
substantial income shock suggests that
economic circumstances may primarily
aect political behavior through
mechanisms other than direct eects of
income…”
Overall, all the analysis hasn’t led to
anything definitive about voter
behaviour. It’s as unpredictable as the
behaviour of a bird sitting on a branch.
(After Mao Zedong banned gambling,
the Chinese who love it, used to bet on
when the crow would fly o.)
CETERIS PARIBUS METHOD
Ithink the researchers might have
framed the question wrongly. Perhaps
they should be using the ceteris paribus
method, namely, all other things being
constant, how would a positive change
in “economic incentives” alter voter
preferences.
This would certainly be a more
fruitful approach in India where
sociological attitudes and preferences
are virtually unshakable. Economic
incentives in such a situation not only
have to be very substantial but also
increasing at a faster rate with each
election. We have seen this happening
over the last two decades.
Not that there haven’t been
exceptions as when BSP voters in UP
aligned with Brahmins. But that’s very
rare. 99 per cent of the time voters stick
to their sociologies.
So the key issue for Indian political
parties is to ascertain how much is
enough if voter behaviour is nearly
unshakable.
Competition at the margin will leave
everyone worse o as recent Assembly
elections have shown.
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