Identity Politics, Political Ideology and Well Being

Article by George Yancey

INTRODUCTION

Research indicates that political progressives have lower levels of mental well-being than political conservatives (Bixter 2015; Butz et al. 2017; Jetten et al. 2013; Napier and Jost 2008; Onraet et al. 2013; Schlenker et al. 2012; Stavrova and Luhmann 2016). Why this is the case has been debated. One possibility is that individuals with lower levels of well-being are more likely to be drawn toward politically progressive perspectives (Vargas Salfate et al. 2022). Perhaps due to their lower level of well-being, they desire a progressive form of government that will support them. It has been argued that progressives are more prone to ailments such as depression and anxiety because they have more problems accepting inequities within our society (Napier and Jost 2008). It is also possible that political conservatives are happier since they live in societies more supportive of their political outlook (Stavrova and Luhmann 2016). There may be elements in political conservatism that act as a protective force against lower well-being (Bixter 2015; Schlenker et al. 2012). The comparative ease conservatives have in finding social groups can also factor into their higher well-being (Jetten et al. 2013).

However, there may be some aspects of political progressiveness that lead to lower levels of mental well-being. An important clue to this mystery is connected to a sudden worsening of the well-being of political progressives in 2012 (Gimbrone et al. 2022). Since this time, the gap between the well-being of political progressives and political conservatives notably widened. According to Gimbrone et al. (2022), the change in average depressive effect for female 12th-grade liberals increased from 1.92 in 2010 to 2.65 in 2018. This change of 0.73 is more than three-quarters of a standard deviation. Male 12-grade liberals saw their average depressive effect increase from 1.98 to 2.49, an increase of 0.51. On the other hand, female 12th-grade conservatives saw an increase in their average depressive effect from 1.75 to 2.2, an increase of 0.45, while male 12th-grade conservatives experienced an increase in average depressive effect from 1.75 to 2.17 or an increase of 0.42. The 12-grade liberals start at a higher degree of depression which accelerates at a faster rate than for 12-grade conservatives. Similar results are found in measurements of self-esteem, self-derogation, and loneliness.

While political conservatives still fare better than political progressives, in recent years there has been a worsening in well-being of political conservatives as well as political progressives. Whatever mechanisms explaining the differences between the two political factions is likely connected to the event surrounding that point in time and must explain why political conservatives have recently suffered a lesser, but real, downturn in well-being. One potential event has been called “The Great Awokening” (Fischer 2018; Yglesias 2019) which is an increase in progressive activism, particularly around issues of identity politics. While identity politics has been a feature in progressive political activism for some time (Hobsbawm 1996; Muir 2007; Walters 2018), with the election of President Trump, there has also been a higher acceptance of identity politics among political conservatives in the past few years (Jardina 2019; Sides et al. 2017). Theories of “white grievance” (Benson 2022; Hooker 2017; Smith 2020) suggest one way in which conservatives may use identity politics to promote their political interest. Thus, acceptance of identity politics may account for both the increasing gap in well-being between political progressives and conservatives around 2012 as well as the recent decrease in well-being among conservatives.

Identity politics can take the form of concerns about gender, sexuality, and racial minorities. While it has been argued that identity politics may create a lower level of well-being for political progressives (Lukianoff and Haidt 2019), there is no empirical evidence investigating this possibility. This article endeavors to test the possibility that concerns on issues shaped by identity politics may be related to the lower well-being of political progressives.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND WELL-BEING

As previously noted, there is a solid foundation of literature indicating a degree of well-being advantage for political conservatives relative to political progressives. The measured advantage may be slight (Butz et al. 2017; Onraet et al. 2013), but the consistency of the findings makes it difficult to dismiss the reality of this political difference. While there is agreement about the higher level of well-being of political conservatives, the source of its existence is unclear. One possibility is that conservatives more easily justify inequalities between social groups which may reduce interpersonal stress (Napier and Jost 2008). It has also been theorized that conservatives are more likely to belong to supportive groups that buttress their well-being (Jetten et al. 2013). Higher religiosity among conservatives may also play a role in their greater well-being (Bixter 2015; Schlenker et al. 2012). The higher well-being of conservatives may be due to living in cultures supportive of their political ideology (Stavrova and Luhmann 2016). It is plausible that characteristics common among conservatives such as a greater sense of personal agency and a positive outlook contribute to their happiness (Schlenker et al. 2012). However, it is also possible that conservatism itself does not impact well-being but those who are happy have a tendency to become conservatives (Vargas Salfate et al. 2022).

Evidence indicates that over the past decade, even more discrepancy between the mental health of conservatives and progressives has developed among adolescents (Gimbrone et al. 2022). Explanations of the political effects on well-being accounting for why the gap between the two groups has recently increased can provide insight into the relationship between political ideology and well-being. Since the pattern of increasing differences between conservatives and progressives began in 2012, this gap cannot be attributed to the election of President Trump and it is difficult to identify a specific social or political event tied to the actions of conservatives. The key to explaining the political effect on well-being may be tied to attributes connected to political progressiveness rather than political conservatives. However, while attention has been paid to why conservatives have higher levels of well-being relatively little attention has been used to examine why progressives may have comparatively low levels of well-being. Social events impacting political progressives may explain the emergence of the recent gap in well-being between young conservatives and progressives. While previous scholarship has focused on the concern progressives have for societal well-being (Cooper 2023; Eisler 2017; Seaford 2018), there is little work, outside of Napier and Jost (2008), exploring the possibility that a politically progressive ideology may act to lower an individual's well-being.

One of the attempts to address the potential problems of well-being among political progressives can be seen in a recent book by Lukianoff and Haidt (2019). They argue that young students have adopted certain ideals from their progressive beliefs that make them more psychologically fragile. The problematic beliefs may promote a lack of internal agency, emotionalism, and dichotomous thinking among those who engage in progressive activism. Previous research indicates poorer health outcomes for individuals with low levels of internal locus of control (April et al. 2012; Klonowicz 2001; Li et al. 2015; Pu et al. 2017) tend to engage in emotional reasoning (Ellis and Dryden 2007; Gangemi et al. 2021; Paredes-Mealla et al. 2022; Rector et al. 2011) and overuse dichotomous thinking (Egan et al. 2007; Kawabata et al. 2021; Lester et al. 2011; Nakama and Oshio 2013). The answer to the political impact on well-being is partially answered if progressive political beliefs promote a loss of a sense of internal control, emotionalism, and dichotomous thinking. Lukianoff and Haidt argue that what they call “common enemy identity politics”2 is an important source of the lack of agency, emotionalism, and dichotomous thinking among progressive activists. If identity politics is tied to elements within a progressive belief system that lowers well-being, then individuals who adopt the ideas behind identity politics should suffer from lower levels of well-being. It is vital to define and explore the place of identity politics among political progressives.

NATURE OF IDENTITY POLITICS

There has been, since the second half of the twentieth century, a renewed emphasis on identity politics within progressive politics. Kauffman (2001) defines identity politics as “the belief that identity itself—its elaboration, expression, or affirmation—is and should be a fundamental focus of political work;” Modern identity politics is often conceptualized as a moral imperative to fight oppression against a given social outgroup (Hawley 2022). A focus on social identities as the focus of political work can aid in mobilization of racial and sexuality minority groups (Bernstein 2005; Brettschneider et al. 2017; Miller 2021; Walters 2018). Those facing oppression due to a given identity often reinforce their loyalty to that social group as they seek to obtain respect for the very identity that encourages rejection from the dominant group (Kruks 2001). Movement toward adherence to a politically progressive group can be fueled by loyalty to one's social group if identification with that social group is linked to a larger politically progressive effort to shape society. Majority group members without a social identity rooted in their dominant status may still reinforce the norms and values found within an identity politics framework and experience the psychological consequences tied to the promotion of an identity politics mindset.

Linkage of identity politics to a progressive ideology is not guaranteed. Early progressive ideology in the United States was often empowered by a Marxian or Neo-Marxian philosophy that focused on issues of division between the classes. This type of progressive perspective sought to endorse a universalizing principle inclusive of individuals from all groups (Hobsbawm 1996). However, over time within the left, universalizing expectations made room for expressions of different oppressed social groups (Hobsbawm 1996). Promotion of shared identities helps to bring easy to generalize components of a group and allows individuals to have attachments to their group, which can be used to link loyalties of the identity group to loyalties of the larger left (Muir 2007). Moreover, the focus on the oppressed within identity politics allows members of the group to define themselves in opposition to the dominant group (Heyes 2020).

There is a unifying common belief in the value of the experiences of marginalized racial and ethnic groups to unite the distinct identity groups within the left (Heyes 2020). Such an emphasis on experiences as a form of social knowledge may be troublesome on the left since it could challenge intersectionality as a method by homogenizing the experiences of the oppressed (Heyes 2020). However, lived experiences have been valuable in promoting the interest of marginalized groups using counternarratives (Blaisdell 2021; Hunn et al. 2006; Ledwith 2017). Utilizing experiences as a mechanism to promote progressive political goals is a valuable tool identity politics provides for a progressive agenda (Walters 2018). Through techniques such as counternarratives, the centering of minority group identities can be used to legitimate political efforts that support general progressive goals. Even with the tension of an overarching progressive set of values and desire for distinct social identities, identity politics is a powerful supportive tool for buttressing a progressive political agenda.

Promotion of identity politics may lead to the potentially problematic psychological tendencies noted in the previous section. A focus on external institutional forces that one cannot immediately alleviate may lead to a lower external locus of control. Techniques such as counternarratives, as well as a critique of rationality among some critical theorists (Baszile 2015; Blessett et al. 2016), can theoretically provide a pathway to emotional reasoning. Finally, the focus on centering political legitimation on identity can lead to rejecting outgroups that threaten the identity of minority groups (Heyes 2020; Huddy 2001), and to dichotomous thinking about social groups. If these, or other types of cognitive deficiencies, are exacerbated by participation in identity politics, then identity politics may be an important mechanism by which progressive political ideology can lead to lower levels of well-being. In contrast, a class-based progressive cognitive focus may focus less on the group identity, generating less of a need to rely on emotional narratives and dichotomous thinking, and may be less likely to be detrimental to the well-being of a political progressive. Since there is reason to believe that recently political progressives have shifted from a more class-based progressive framework to a framework rooted more in identity politics, it is plausible that identity politics may explain the recent increase well-being gap between conservatives and progressives.

IS THERE A GREAT AWOKENING EFFECT?

Recent social forces may have increased adherence to identity politics. For reasons that are not clear around 2010, cultural institutions dramatically increased the attention paid to issues connected to oppression of marginalized groups. In the media, there has been since 2010 a striking increase in the use of words connected to prejudice (i.e., racism, white supremacy, sexism, homophobia) (Rozado et al. 2023). After 2011 there was a powerful increase in terms denoting prejudice in academic abstracts (Rozado 2022). This academic and media attention may have had a powerful impact on the social attitudes of Americans. According to Pew Research Center (2017), as late as 2014, a majority of Americans did not believe that the country needed to make changes for racial equality. However, by 2017 nearly three out of five Americans believed that changes were necessary. Regardless of whether this heightened public attention to racism, sexism, and homophobia is tied to the increased focus in cultural institutions such as the media or academia, tolerance of Americans for social prejudice against oppressed groups has recently significantly declined. This decrease in tolerance of prejudice against marginalized groups coupled with increased sympathy for the experiences of those in marginalized groups creates a social atmosphere where there is increased support for the concerns connected to identity politics.

Some (Fischer 2018; Reed 2020; Yglesias 2019) have called this recent attention to issues of oppression a “Great Awokening.” This is a reference to the historical events of the great awakenings in the 1730s–1770s, 1790s–1840s, and 1890s–1930s. Those great awakenings resulted in a change in many fundamental attitudes and values within American society. Likewise, the so-called “Great Awokening” has impacted the social values of the larger American society, although of a different nature than those expected from religious revivals. These values are likely to be reinforced by various types of informal and formal methods of sanctions. Individuals not directly impacted by attention given by academics and the media to the prejudice faced by marginalized groups may still feel pressure to adopt attitudes that reflect the priorities provided by identity politics due to pressure from their social peers. In such a social atmosphere, proponents of identity politics are likely to increase.

While a desire to confront prejudice against marginalized groups has increased in all social groups, it has increased more dramatically among political progressives. The Pew Research Center poll (2017) indicated that between 2009 and 2017 the percentage of Republicans and those who lean toward Republicans who stated that the country needs to make changes for racial equality increased from 30% to 36%. However, among Democrats and those who lean toward Democrats, the percentage increased over the same period from 57% to 81%. There is not only a more dramatic increase within the Democratic population but the percentage who desire social change for racial justice is so high that concern for racial change is almost synonymous with being a Democrat. Similarly, concern for the rights of LGBTQ individuals has been firmly implanted within the social values of political progressives. According to the 2020 American National Election Studies, 69.4% of individuals who identify as slightly liberal, liberal, or extremely liberal indicate that gays face a lot of discrimination in comparison to 25.4% of individuals who identify as slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely conservative. Given that identity politics in the United States was rooted in progressive activism, it is not surprising that social attitudes buttressing the political interest of the proponents of identity politics would impact political progressives more than political conservatives.

CAN IDENTITY POLITICS IMPACT WELL-BEING?

While there are many measures of well-being, the data I have access to allows me to measure self-assessed levels of depression, anxiety, and sense of control. While there are different manifestations of identity politics, social groups arguably most relevant are those based on racial identity and sexuality. If identity politics explains the propensity of political progressives to have lower levels of well-being, then it is not sufficient for measures of identity politics to be related to lower levels of well-being. Such measures should also at least partially, and perhaps completely, mediate the relationship of political ideology to well-being. This leads to the key hypothesis of the article. This hypothesis is that for each measure of well-being—depression, anxiety, and control—concern tied to fighting for the rights of racial and sexual minorities will at least partially mediate the impact of political ideology on well-being after application of relevant demographic and social controls. If these identity political variables completely mediate general political ideology/well-being measure, then I will have strong confidence in the power of those political ideology variables to explain the political differences in well-being. A corollary to that hypothesis is that identity politics measures are negatively related to the three indicators of well-being.

In contrast to identity politics, it is plausible that individuals adopt a politically progressive ideology due to broader class-based concerns. Concerns about the government creating a more equitable society with more generous allocations to the public may escape tendencies toward emotional reasoning and dichotomous thinking that may be present in an identity politics mindset. If identity politics is the major driver of lower levels of well-being for political progressives, then attitudes connected to a concern that the government supplies more resources to the lower or working classes should not explain the relationship of political ideology to well-being. This leads to a second hypothesis that for each measure of well-being—depression, anxiety, and control—concerns tied to fighting for increased public sector resources will not mediate the relationship between political orientation and well-being after application of relevant demographic and social controls. A corollary to that hypothesis is that class-based political measures are not negatively related to the three indicators of well-being